The Impact of State and Trait Anger on Processing of Evidential Inconsistencies

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The courtroom can be an emotional place, and these emotions may impact on a juror's ability to process and evaluate evidence. This study investigated the effects of mock-jurors' state and trait anger on the detection of evidential inconsistencies. Community members eligible for jury duty ($N = 123$) were randomly assigned to hear one of four audio trials differing in evidence consistency and emotion-inducing content. State anger increased endorsement of guilty verdicts, and angry mock-jurors were more careful processors of evidence, detecting more inconsistencies and recalling significantly more trial details. The results lend support to motivational theories of emotional influence on information processing.

Key words: inconsistencies; juror decision making; state anger; trait anger.

Anger is an emotion intimately entwined in legal judgment (Feigenson, 2010), and despite the view that law involves reason rather than emotion, it has been shown to play a significant role in the way that people reason about the causes of others' behaviour (Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996). The impact of anger on jurors' ability to reason about the evidence they are presented with is a fundamental concern to the fairness and efficiency of the legal system. Despite this, there have been few experimental studies of the impact of anger on juror processing of trial information; rather, the majority of research has focused on the relationship between anger and judgments of culpability and blame without measuring the impact of anger on information processing (see, for example, Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006). While the link between anger and blame is well established in the psychological literature (Averill, 1982), less is known

about the effects of anger on jurors' ability and motivation to process the evidence presented by witnesses. Anger can and does influence how carefully and completely information is processed (see Kerr, 2010, for a review). For example, Schwarz's (2002) 'cognitive tuning' model suggests that when experiencing certain negative affective states (e.g., fear, surprise, anxiety, or anger), people are more likely to infer that the situation is not benign, may be more vigilant for useful information, and process it carefully and thoroughly. In contrast, work by Bodenhausen, Sheppard, and Kramer (1994) suggests that anger can induce more heuristic processing of information, in particular reliance on stereotypes to draw inferences about guilt rather than objective assessment of the evidence. These seemingly contradictory views can be reconciled when considering the cognitive appraisals associated with the particular

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emotional state. Tiedens and Linton (2001) have suggested that the key factor moderating the relationship between the emotional state and the resulting behaviour is the degree of attitude certainty that the emotional state triggers in the person. Anger is thought to trigger a greater degree of certainty than other emotional states such as sadness, leading to less careful processing of information; however, it may also lead people to shift focus when making inferences about the causes of behaviour. Ask and Granhag (2007) found evidence for this in a study looking at the impact of anger on the conclusions drawn by criminal investigators. Investigators who were incidentally induced to feel anger were more likely to attribute their judgements of reliability of the witnesses' evidence to person- rather than situation-based factors. Similarly, they were insensitive to the inconsistency between the investigative hypothesis and the evidence presented during the investigation, suggesting that they were much more certain of their appraisals.

While anger may affect jurors' attributions for witness and defendant behaviour, an experimental study by Semmler and Brewer (2002) indicates that the operation of anger may also have complex effects on information processing. Semmler and Brewer (2002) induced sadness in mock-jurors by exposing them to details of physical and psychological harm caused to a family involved in a serious car accident. The trial materials also incidentally produced a change in the degree of anger experienced by mock-jurors. In addition to mood, the consistency of the information provided by several witnesses was manipulated. Semmler and Brewer (2002) examined the accuracy and number of inconsistencies detected in the evidence and found that angry jurors were less able to remember this fine-grained information. In sum, this work suggests that anger can play a role in changing the way that trial evidence may be processed, although because anger was not manipulated but only occurred incidentally, causal claims could not be made about this relationship.

Our study aims to manipulate anger, without confounds produced by other emotional states, examining the causal relationship between anger, processing of trial details, and judgments of guilt in mock-jurors.

Our study focuses on whether angry mock-jurors are able to accurately detect inconsistencies in the witnesses' testimony when made angry by the alleged actions and behaviour of the defendant, building on the findings of Semmler and Brewer (2002). A key part of the jurors' task is to evaluate the credibility of the testimony they are presented with. Testimonial inconsistencies are considered a very important indicator of eyewitness accuracy across many legal jurisdictions (Semmler, Brewer, & Douglass, 2011). Judges, lawyers, and jurors place great weight upon the predictive validity of inconsistencies in testimony when evaluating a witness, and a single inconsistency can be enough to impugn the credibility of a witness's account (Fisher, Brewer, & Mitchell, 2009). Although most inconsistencies would be highlighted by attentive counsel opposing, evidential inconsistencies represent a forensically relevant indicator of the processing of information presented during a witness's testimony and may help determine the relative impact of information processing on jurors' verdicts.

We also investigate the role of individual differences in emotionality and of age on information processing and decision making. There is good reason to suggest that individual differences in these attributes may have an impact on the extent to which jurors will be affected by anger-inducing testimony. Studies have documented that individuals high in trait anger exhibit early attentional information processing biases (see Schultz, Grodack, & Izard, 2010). For example, on Stroop tasks, adults high in trait anger show more interference when presented with angry faces, suggesting increased orientation to these faces. They also show a tendency to make appraisals and engage in thinking that is consistent with stereotypical antecedents of anger. On a broader level, trait anger

increases the likelihood that in an anger-inducing situation, a person will also experience higher levels of state anger. Finally, we were also interested in whether age would be related to the experience of anger. Phillips, Henry, Hosie, and Milne (2006) found that older adults tended to show less state anger and reported that they are more likely to use personal strategies to pacify feelings of anger. In sum, we expected to see larger effects of our anger manipulation in younger individuals who scored highly on measures of trait anger.

Our study aims to induce anger in mock-jurors experimentally using a manipulation that is most similar to the way that emotion would be expected to arise in a real trial situation. Rather than use an incidental emotion manipulation (Lerner & Keltner, 2000), which is the dominant approach in this area of research, we developed two versions of the stimulus materials based on the mock-trial used by Semmler and Brewer (2002): one that included details that would be likely to produce anger, but that would not affect the legal relevance of the evidence, and another that was absent of this information. A pilot study ($N = 32$) was conducted assessing the perceived seriousness of the crime, strength of evidence, and credibility of the witnesses for both angry and neutral versions of the trial. A series of t tests¹ indicated no significant difference between the two versions of the trial on any of the measures. These results suggest that the stimulus materials were successfully designed to ensure minimal confounds with crime seriousness, credibility, and evidential strength. For the main study, we combine emotional content with a manipulation of evidential consistency. In particular, the inconsistencies are confined to the evidence given by the prosecution witnesses so that motivation to find the defendant guilty as a result of feeling anger towards him would work against the impact of testimonial inconsistencies. Thus if jurors are processing the evidence carefully, they should show a

tendency to acquit the defendant. However, if anger works to reduce the processing of trial information, inconsistencies will not be detected, and jurors should show a tendency to convict the defendant.

Method

Participants

The study sampled 123 participants (males = 53, females = 70) from two different student populations (a university undergraduate pool and a residential college) and a population of community members from a rural location. Participants from each subpopulation were evenly distributed across the four conditions of the study. There were two exclusion criteria for participation: (a) any significant and uncorrected hearing and/or vision impairments that would impede ability to undertake the study, (b) age exceeding 70 years. These criteria reflect requirements for jury duty in the local jurisdiction, and inclusion of a community group resulted in a sample more representative of actual jurors. Participation in the study was voluntary.

Trial Materials

A mock-trial was developed based on the trial used in Semmler and Brewer's (2002) study. The trial was a case in which a truck driver had been charged with causing death by dangerous driving. Four different versions of the trial were created. Each version of the trial contained (a) the judge's preliminary instructions to the jury, (b) the counsel for the prosecution and defence opening statement, (c) the counsel for the prosecution then defence questioning the prosecuting witnesses, (f) the counsel for the prosecution closing statement, (g) the defence counsel questioning the defendant, (h) the counsel for the prosecution cross-examining the defendant, and (i) the counsel for the defence closing statement. The audio-taped trials were approximately 25 min in duration.

Table 1. Examples of anger-inducing content.

Neutral testimony	Anger-inducing testimony
Information omitted	Prosecution opening statement: 'The father was pinned to his seat by the remains of the bonnet of the car and was in absolute agony. He kept calling for his little girl but wasn't receiving any response. He tried to turn his head to look for her, however the pain was so excruciating he just had to wait, not knowing the fate of his 3 year old . . . '
Information omitted	Police constable testimony: 'No one should ever have to see the injuries sustained by little Kayla and her father. Mr. Arnold, this was one of the most horrific and disturbing accidents I have ever had to attend. The photos don't compare to what it was like there.'
Prosecution question to truck driver: 'So you could have been in the Corolla's ^a path?' Truck driver's response: 'Yeah maybe, but once you lose control of a vehicle like that, there isn't anything you can do but hope for the best. I was praying that the car would move out of the way.'	Prosecution question to truck driver: 'So you could have been in the Corolla's ^a path?' Truck driver's response: 'Yeah maybe, but trucks are heaps bigger, it is so much easier for a small car to move out of the way. They should have seen me coming.'
Defence question to truck driver: 'Mr. Fitzpatrick, are you saying that after braking you took no preventative measures to avoid the car?' Truck driver's response: 'Yes, because unfortunately I had no control, there was nothing I could do.'	Defence question to truck driver: 'Mr. Fitzpatrick, are you saying that after braking you took no preventative measures to avoid the car?' Truck driver's response: 'Yeah, there weren't any.'

^aNote: A Corolla is a small car.

Anger Manipulation

Two versions of the trial were generated to induce either anger or neutral emotion (see Table 1). The angry version contained detailed explanations of the physiological harm caused by the collision between the vehicles, the subsequent psychological trauma, as well as testimony from the defendant conveying a general disregard for the resulting harm. The neutral version of the trial omitted the graphic references to injuries, it did not elaborate on the psychological well-being of both parties, and the testimony of the defendant excluded apathetic remarks. The anger-inducing version of the trial lasted for 25 min in total, and the neutral version lasted for 23 min in total. The trial can be obtained by request to the first author. Disregarding the

emotion manipulation, the two versions were identical.

Consistency manipulation

There were a total of eight testimonial inconsistencies in the inconsistent trial. The first of the inconsistencies were evident in the police constable's testimony ($n = 3$), and the remaining ($n = 5$) were throughout the prosecution witness's (Mrs. White) testimony (see Table 2).

Dependent Measures

Verdict, Probability of Guilt, and Credibility

Participants were asked to indicate their verdict (guilty/not guilty) and the probability of defendant guilt on a 0 (not at all) to 100%

Table 2. Testimonial inconsistencies.

Police constable	Mrs. White
1. <i>The car had impacted the trailed about half way along its right side.</i>	We hit the trailer's left side
2.	<i>Yes, it did break/No, it didn't break at all.</i>
3. <i>The truck swerved to its left.</i>	It quickly swerved to our left.
4.	<i>The children were not distracting/Kayla had spilt her drink.</i>
5.	At least 15 meters before we rounded the bend.
6.	<i>It was $\frac{3}{4}$ the way over on our side/It was Almost half way over our side of the road.</i>
7.	<i>John had time to quickly flash the lights/John didn't have time to do anything.</i>
8.	<i>Ampol truck/paint of the Caltex truck.</i>

Note: Italics indicate the first half of the inconsistency.

(completely) scale. Participants were then required to answer a series of questions, such as ‘How credible did you find the prosecution (defence) witness?’ Participants were then asked to complete 14 multiple-choice questions to assess their memory of the trial – for example, ‘Indicate the estimated speed of the vehicles given by the police witness’. Participants’ ability to recall inconsistencies within the trial evidence was assessed through a series of open-ended questions – for example, ‘Write down any inconsistencies or contradictions you found within the testimonies’.

State and Trait Anger

The State Trait Anger Expression Inventory–2 (STAXI–2; Spielberger, 1999) was used to assess both state and trait anger among participants. The STAXI–2 consists of three scales, with a total of 57 questions and statements to best describe both the experience and expression of anger. State anger is measured with 15 statements indicating the participants’ experience at the time of answering the questionnaire. The statements are rated on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = not at all, 2 = somewhat, 3 = moderately so, 4 = very much so) and include items such as ‘I feel irritated’ and ‘I am mad’. Scores range from 15 to 60, with higher scores indicating elevated state anger.

Trait anger is measured on a 10-item scale to assess respondents’ innate anger. Statements are measured on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = almost never, 2 = sometimes, 3 = often, 4 = almost always) and include accounts such as ‘When I get mad I say nasty things’ and ‘I am quick tempered’. Scores range from 10 to 40, with higher scores indicative of greater trait anger. The Anger Expression Scale was omitted from this study (Spielberger, 1999).

Design and Procedure

The study used a two-factor between-subjects design, with 2 (emotion: neutral or angry) × 2 (testimony: inconsistent or consistent) conditions. Participants were randomly allocated to one of the four conditions.

Initially, participants were given an ethical consent form and were informed about what participation in the experiment required, as well as being notified that they were welcome to cease participation at any stage of the study. They were also asked to fill in the necessary demographic information (age, gender, and service on a jury) on the first page of the questionnaire.

The questionnaire contained the STAXI–2 measures, specific questions about the trial,

and the Need for Cognition scale (short version). These pages also detailed correct ways to interpret and answer the questions; the experimenter was also present to assist. Prior to listening to the mock-trial, participants answered items concerning state anger to establish their baseline anger.

Participants were then exposed to one of the trial audio-recordings. The trial was paused after the counsel for the prosecution closing statement had been heard (after approximately 15 min). The State Anger scale was administered again. However, the statements were shuffled and had different filler items taken from the Profile of Mood States and several additional items. These items were included to reduce the possibility of participants becoming aware of the key manipulations and dependent variables. The participants then listened to the remainder of the trial. Immediately after completion, participants were asked to complete another State Anger scale and indicate their verdict and the probability of guilt. Participants were then required to answer a series of questions about credibility of witnesses, the prosecution, and the defence. Participants were then asked to complete 14 multiple-choice questions to assess their memory for the trial. Participants' ability to recall inconsistencies within the trial evidence was assessed through a series of open-ended questions. These responses were later scored by raters blind to condition for accuracy and completeness. Inter-rater agreement for scoring of the inconsistencies was very high (Cohen's kappa = .87). The last section of the survey was the Trait Anger scale. Total testing time ranged from approximately 40 to 90 min.

Results

Manipulation Checks

Anger Manipulation

A *t* test was conducted on the reported levels of total state anger at the conclusion of the

trial. A Welch's *t* test (equal variances could not be assumed) revealed a medium-sized significant difference in reported state anger between the neutral ($M = 1.10$, $SD = 0.29$) and angry trial conditions ($M = 1.29$, $SD = 0.40$), $t(104.06) = 3.05$, $p < .05$, $d = 0.55$.

Consistency Manipulation

To examine the effectiveness of the consistency manipulation, a *t* test was conducted on mock-jurors' ratings of testimonial consistency (Susan White's testimony). Mock-jurors rated the testimony as significantly more inconsistent when exposed to the inconsistent trial ($M = 2.80$, $SD = 1.21$) than did mock-jurors exposed to the consistent trial ($M = 4.90$, $SD = 0.68$), respectively, $t(121) = 12.6$, $p < .05$, $d = 2.18$.

Impact of Anger on the Detection of Testimonial Inconsistencies and Memory for Trial Details

A comparison of the number of inconsistencies correctly detected in the angry or neutral inconsistent trial conditions showed, contrary to the findings of Semmler and Brewer (2002), that angry mock-jurors detected significantly more inconsistencies ($M = 1.73$, $SD = 1.15$) than the mock-jurors who were in a neutral mood ($M = 1.13$, $SD = 0.93$), $t(56) = 2.17$, $p = .034$, $d = 0.48$. This effect was medium; however, the number of inconsistencies detected were few, given that there were eight inconsistencies in total that could have been detected, and this may have been a reflection of the difficulty of the task.

A similar, but much larger effect of anger was found on the recall of trial details measure, with angry mock-jurors scoring significantly higher on the trial details questionnaire ($M = 10.8$, $SD = 1.3$) than the mock-jurors in the neutral condition ($M = 9.7$, $SD = 1.3$), $t(46) = 2.7$, $p = .01$, $d = 0.80$. Both of these results suggest that anger enhanced mock-jurors' ability to process the trial information.

Table 3. Frequency of guilty verdicts across trial conditions.

	Angry	Neutral	Total
Consistent	25 (40.3)	11 (17.7)	36 (58.1)
Inconsistent	23 (37.1)	3 (4.8)	26 (41.9)
Total	48 (77.4)	14 (22.6)	62 (100)

Note: Percentages in parentheses.

The Impact of Anger and Consistency on Verdict and Probability of Guilt

A chi-square test of independence was conducted to assess the hypothesis that mock-jurors hearing the anger-inducing trial would be more likely to endorse a guilty verdict than mock-jurors hearing the neutral trial. Table 3 shows that there was a significant association between the type of trial that mock-jurors heard and the verdict they endorsed, $\chi^2(1) = 43.45$, $p < .001$, $V = 0.594$. Based on the odds ratio, we can see that mock-jurors listening to the anger-inducing trial were 15.57 times more likely to endorse a guilty verdict than mock-jurors who listened to the neutral trial. A 2 (emotion: angry, neutral) $\times$ 2 (testimony: inconsistent, consistent) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on ratings of probability of defendant guilt produced the same pattern of results, with a large and significant main effect of anger, $F(1, 119) = 27.20$, $p < .05$, $f = 0.49$. The ANOVA also revealed that the consistency manipulation had a small but significant effect, $F(1, 119) = 4.74$, $p < .05$, $f = 0.20$. There was no significant interaction between anger and consistency of testimony. In sum, despite detecting slightly more inconsistencies in the prosecution witness's testimony, angry mock-jurors were more willing to convict and believed that the defendant was more likely to be guilty.

Individual Differences in Trait Anger and Age

Mock-jurors who scored higher on the measure of trait anger may also be more affected

by the anger-inducing content in the trial and thus more likely to experience state anger and its consequent effects on information processing. To assess this possibility we looked at the correlation between state and trait anger; this was small and non-significant, $r(123) = .12$, $p = .17$.

The age of participants in our sample ranged from 18 to 70 years. To examine whether age mediated the arousal of anger when listening to the trial, the participants were separated into two groups: a young group ranging in age from 18–29 years and an older group ranging in age from 50 to 70 years. It was proposed that younger participants may report greater state anger, which in fact they did ($M = 1.2$, $SD = 0.29$) when compared with older adults ($M = 1.1$, $SD = 0.39$), $t(116.1) = 2.3$, $p = .02$, $d = 0.28$. Younger participants were, however, no more likely to endorse a guilty verdict than older participants, $\chi^2(1) = 0.91$, $p = .53$, $V = 0.01$. In addition, there was no difference between younger and older participants in terms of their detection of inconsistencies; however, older participants had significantly better memory for trial details, $t(46) = -3.00$, $p = .003$, $d = 0.90$. This finding slightly contradicts the positive effects of state anger on memory for trial details found in comparing the angry and neutral trial conditions. It is possible that older participants were more motivated to process the trial information carefully than young participants or that they were better able to suppress their outward expression of anger and reappraise the information carefully without the influence of anger. This possibility is discussed in more detail below.

Discussion

The aim of this study was to investigate the impact of anger on mock-jurors' ability to process trial information and make decisions regarding the guilt of a defendant. It also provided an opportunity to test some of the existing theories of the impact of emotion on

information processing. We had expected to find a negative impact of anger on processing of trial details; however, our results supported the opposite finding – even a relatively minor amount of anger induced more careful processing of trial details.

Few studies have manipulated anger to understand its impact on jurors in the courtroom. This is surprising considering that the fundament of anger is the attribution of blame (Averill, 1982; Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, & Pope, 1993), and that a jury's ultimate task is to convict (blame) or acquit the defendant. The present study evoked anger in mock-jurors by presenting a defendant who was apathetic toward the consequences of his alleged actions – he showed no remorse. The results showed that this manipulation was effective in producing moderate differences between state anger of mock-jurors listening to the angry trial, when compared with a neutral trial.

The Influence of Anger on Verdict

The direct effects of anger were evident from significantly more guilty verdicts (77%) in the angry than in the neutral condition (23%), despite angry participants finding inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witness. This is consistent with the theories of anger discussed by Averill (1982) and Lazarus (1991) indicating that blame is a necessary precursor to anger, and that justice is a component of the appraisal of emotion. This desire to achieve justice, or need to punish, may be explained by the moral conscience of mock-jurors being stimulated by anger.

Previous work by Tiedens and Linton (2001) examined the degree of certainty associated with negative emotion. Results from the current study are consistent with the certainty-appraisal associated with anger. This is evident in analyses of reported percentages of probability of guilt. In the angry conditions, mock-jurors reported higher probability of guilt ratings (certainty that the truck driver drove in a dangerous manner) than those in

the neutral condition. In sum, these results confirm the general finding that angry jurors are more likely to convict the defendant with certainty.

Detection of Inconsistencies

To understand the impact of emotion on processing of trial information, we examined the effects of anger on juror processing of testimonial inconsistencies. The existing literature detailing the effect of anger on cognitive processing has yielded equally plausible, yet conflicting, results. However, it was originally thought that anger would have a detrimental effect on jurors' processing capacities (Ask & Granhag, 2007; Bodenhausen et al., 1994; Semmler & Brewer, 2002; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Surprisingly, the results from this study did not support this hypothesis; in fact they tended to support the opposite prediction – that is, that anger would enhance jurors' ability to carefully process the evidence. Angry mock-jurors both found slightly more inconsistencies in the prosecution witness's testimony and recalled more trial details than mock-jurors in a neutral mood, lending support to previous research (Cohen, Eckerhardt, & Schagat, 1998; Moons & Mackie, 2007), showing that anger, in fact, facilitates effortful processing.

In terms of the elaboration likelihood model, these results endorse the view that angry people may show a tendency for *central route* processing, meaning that the negative affect increases motivation for people to be critical and purposeful in the processing of stimuli. Wegner and Petty (1994) offer multiple reasons for the increased motivation. Participants may have wanted to distract themselves from the negative affect by concentrating carefully on the other information, or the increased effort may be attributed to the desire to increase positive outcomes. The positive outcomes were not measured in the current study; however, it may be that 'bringing the defendant to justice' was seen as a positive outcome. This suggestion is also

supported by Lazarus (1991) within his cognitive–motivational–relational view of anger. He implies that vengeance is an important part of anger, and thus people are motivated to repair the attack of personal values such as justice and equality. In the current study, this attempt at restoration may be seen in participants finding the defendant guilty, even though they were relying on inconsistent evidence from the prosecution.

Age and State/Trait Anger

The impact of participants' age on state anger and judgments shows that participants in the younger cohort reported significantly higher levels of state anger than the older cohort. Previous research by Phillips et al. (2006) may offer some explanation for this. Their study concluded that older participants were better able to regulate and suppress the inner experiences of anger. Older adults tend to display outward signs of anger less frequently than younger adults and may be less likely to be motivated to engage in revenge. It is possible that the older adults in our sample recognized the antecedents of anger in the trial, but were able to disconnect this from processing of trial content. This result has implications for the composition of the jury in a courtroom, suggesting that younger jurors may feel the impact of emotion more keenly. While our results imply that this may promote more careful processing, we would hasten to add that we did not find support for this – younger mock-jurors did not process the trial more carefully. Further, it is apparent that careful processing, as indexed by detection and recall of fine-grained testimonial details, does not necessarily translate into verdicts consistent with beliefs about the cues that jurors normally take as indicating reliability of testimony. As our study shows, despite finding more inconsistencies, angry jurors were still less likely to acquit the defendant, somehow dismissing the possibility that inconsistencies may indicate unreliability in the testimony.

Trait Anger

An individual's tendency to become angry was also investigated, and it was found that trait anger did not influence mock-jurors' experience of state anger. This is consistent with results of Parrott, Zeichner, and Evces (2005). These investigators did not detect a significant difference in state anger between those high in trait anger ($M = 11.8$, $SD = 1.9$) and those low in trait anger ($M = 10.7$, $SD = 1.4$), $F(1, 28) = 2.90$, *ns*. These results, along with evidence from the current study, suggest that dispositional (trait) characteristics may not play an active role in the evocation of emotion. Therefore, it may be that emotion-inducing evidence presented during the trial may impact on jury members irrespective of trait anger.

Conclusions

The law assumes that jury members are passive and objective fact-finders. However, the current study, as well as others discussed (Ask & Granhag, 2007; Moons & Mackie, 2007; Semmler & Brewer, 2002; Tiedens & Linton, 2001) qualify the naïveté of this assumption. Results from the current study verify that mock-jurors are significantly affected by emotion-inducing trial content and witness testimony. In addition, the present findings suggest that anger increases individuals' motivation to process with care and a critical mind. This is contrary to what was initially predicted, but is supported by theories that attempt to explain the impact of emotion on motivation (e.g., Moons & Mackie, 2007). The current results suggest that mock-jurors are more willing to endorse a guilty verdict when angry, and are also more likely to carefully process and subsequently show greater recall of trial details. Another aim of this study was to investigate the effects of demographics and dispositional characteristics on evocation of anger significantly and subsequent judgments. Older age was shown to reduce the impact of state

anger, and is qualified by previous studies (Parrott et al., 2005). Trait anger had no effect on participants' experiences of state anger.

The current study has produced evidence supporting the influential role of anger on mock-jurors' ability to process trial information. Future research needs to determine the critical antecedents to anger in a trial, as well as investigate the effects of anger as a function of antecedents. Using a manipulation that caused jurors to be angry at the defendant caused a fairly specific pattern of results that may not be seen in cases where the source of anger is the prosecution witness's behaviour or the behaviour of counsel, for example. Further investigations are imperative to better understand whether anger has a beneficial impact only when aroused in a way that promotes blame. For example, in the present mock-trial, the lack of remorse in the defendant was presumed to induce anger. However, if a lack of sympathy or inappropriate emotion from the prosecution witness made jurors angry, would this influence them to acquit the defendant? The findings of this study should be used as a building block for further investigations into the inevitable occurrence of emotion in the courtroom.

Note

1. For all measures, $t(31) < 1, p > .05$

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