Published in final edited form as:

Law Soc Rev. 2018 March ; 52(1): 206–233. doi:10.1111/lasr.12314.

The Global Adoption of National Policies Protecting Children from Violent Discipline in Schools and Homes, 1950–2011

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Abstract

With a focus on the relationship between women's and children's rights and theories of globalization, we conduct an event history analysis of more than 150 countries between 1950 and 2011 to assess the factors associated with policies banning corporal punishment in schools and homes. Our research reveals that formal condemnation of corporal punishment in schools is becoming a global norm; policies banning corporal punishment in the home, in contrast, are being adopted more slowly. We find that the percentage of women in parliament is associated with the adoption of anti-corporal punishment policies in both schools and homes, suggesting a nexus between women's and children's issues. Countries with more ethnic diversity are slower to adopt home policies, however. We propose that groups in these countries may be resistant to laws because of the risk of selective or prejudicial enforcement. In terms of globalization, more aid is associated with both school and home policies, and countries that have ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child are more likely to adopt home policies. Surprisingly, international nongovernmental organizations are not significantly associated with either type of policy adoption.

In 2015, an enraged teacher at the Florence Christian Academy Primary School near Hluti, Swaziland, used a stick “big enough to kill a snake” to apply hundreds of lashes to a 12-year-old girl (Mkhonta 2015). The teacher viewed this beating as punishment for “spreading malicious gossip” about him. The *Swazi Observer* reported the child “screamed and asked for forgiveness, but this seemed to infuriate the teacher more.” The extent of the girl's injuries shocked medical personnel.

This brief story provides a powerful reminder that corporal punishment is still used to abuse children in the contemporary world. At the same time, this story also reveals a marked shift in perceptions of corporal punishment. It suggests the practice is now condemned by Swazi elites, which is clear from the tone adopted by the local journalist who wrote the story, the response of the medical personnel who treated the girl, and the presence of local organizations like the Swaziland Action Group Against Abuse. This condemnation is also

¹The authors wish to thank Evan Schofer, Liam Swiss, and Ann Swidler for their feedback on this paper. Research reported in this publication was supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF) under Grant No. 0921767 and the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Development (NICHD) under Grant No. R01 HD069471-07. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the NSF or NICHD.

reflected at the global level, with the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child and organizations such as Save the Children using this and other cases to pressure Swaziland into changing its laws regarding corporal punishment.

Countries like Swaziland that do not legally prohibit beatings in schools are increasingly changing their policies. While corporal punishment was not a priority half a century ago, many countries have since banned physical reprimands in schools, and some have also banned such discipline in the home. Yet, no studies (to our knowledge) have examined the factors associated with policies restricting violent discipline. Accordingly, in this study, we draw upon event history analyses of more than 150 countries between 1950 and 2011 to assess the dynamics of adopting corporal punishment bans in homes and schools, respectively.

We find that women and children's interests appear to be linked, as the percentage of women in parliament is positively associated with bans on corporal punishment in schools and in the home. We also find that public (that is, school) policies tend to precede home policies, just as women's rights policies addressed the public sphere (e.g., voting, employment rights) before the private sphere (e.g., domestic violence). Yet, countries with more ethnic fractionalization have lower odds of adopting policies that regulate children's rights in the home. One possible explanation for this is that ethnic-linguistic minorities may block such policies because states tend to under-protect and over-police minority communities (compare Crenshaw 2012).

Our analysis of the adoption of policies banning violent discipline in the home and in schools provides insights on global processes of policy diffusion as well. We find that the ratification of the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is associated with the adoption of policies banning corporal punishment in the home but not in schools. We also find that receipt of international aid is associated with the adoption of violent discipline bans in both schools and homes. Links to international nongovernmental organization (INGO) are not associated with either form of policy adoption, however, which is surprising given earlier studies of diffusion in the world polity literature.

Feminism, Women, and Children

Before 1970, most international human rights organizations focused on state-instigated human rights abuses, such as torture. Abuses that occurred in the home were generally viewed as outside the law and certainly outside the jurisdiction of the international system. For example, when a coalition of African women asked the World Health Organization (WHO) to take action against female genital cutting in 1962, the WHO refused, responding that female genital cutting was a cultural matter (Boyle 2002). The private sphere was a sacred space that preserved local culture (Merry 2006), and male heads of households were typically perceived as responsible for their household's well-being (e.g., Rousseau 1974). Family law consequently was not a core concern of governments (e.g., McBride & Parry 2011), let alone a concern of international law.²

In fact, global legal regulation of the private sphere has historically been seen as intrusive;³ and understanding the shift toward viewing such regulation as necessary requires an understanding of women's global activism. At the turn of the 19th century, feminist activists mobilized globally to gain the right to vote (Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997). They justified women's formal entry into the political system by arguing that a unique feminine temperament would facilitate peace among countries and that women's roles as mothers and wives would lead to greater attention to children (Berkovitch 1999). For many feminists at the time, women and children's interests were inextricably connected. As Minow (1986:3) notes: "... the historic roles played by women as advocates for children's needs and interests closely link women's own political struggles with political reforms on behalf of children."

The feminism that emerged in the post World-War II era in Western Europe and the United States had different foci. Many of these activists de-emphasized women as mothers and generally wanted states to treat women as individual rights holders equal to men (Berkovitch 1999).⁴ After making inroads against gender discrimination in public organizations, many of these activists turned toward violence against women, characterizing it as a universal phenomenon that women disproportionately experienced everywhere, including in the home (Keck & Sikkink 1998). Prominent activists and policymakers successfully argued that states and other actors in the global system needed to become more involved in combatting abuses that occurred in the private sphere (e.g., Coomaraswamy 2000), arguing that "the private is political." Ending violence against women was both prominently featured in the 1979 United Nations Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and in subsequent mobilizations throughout the 1980s.

This activism transformed a divide between the public and private spheres by asking states to intervene in cases of domestic violence. Once global actors turned their attention to violence against women in the home, it was conceivably only a matter of time before violence against children also became an important global issue.⁵ Soon, activists called for the recognition of child rights and the elimination of violence against children, and Sweden became the first country to ban all forms of corporal punishment in 1979 (Paintal 2007). A decade later, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) was open for ratification. The CRC extended many of the rights enshrined in other human rights treaties to children and is the most ratified treaty in the world, as all United Nations member⁶ countries except the United States have ratified it.

Despite its success in prompting international and national legal reforms, much of the Western feminist rhetoric of this period was exclusive and hierarchical (Kapur & Cossman 1996), and many Western activists adopted a discourse of saviors and victims that treated women from low- and middle-income states as a homogeneous group (Mohanty 1984).

²Even in recent years, violence against women has had less salience in international law when the perpetrators were civilians rather than state actors (Stansell 2010; Sullivan 1995).

³This perception is socially constructed, as certain private activities, such as homosexual sex, have rarely been accorded private status under law (Cossman 2002).

⁴Some earlier feminists outside of the United States and Western Europe emphasized women as rights holders (see, for instance, Marino [2014] on Latin American feminists).

⁵Anti-corporal punishment activists and organizations existed well before this time (Glenn 1984). However, corporal punishment was not seen as a global issue until relatively recently.

⁶Other countries whose recognition is disputed, such as Kosovo, have not ratified the CRC.

Subsequently, a new generation of academics and activists—led by women from low- and middle-income countries and minority women in wealthy countries—began to focus on intersections of inequality (see, e.g., Budgeon 2011; Mack-Canty 2004; Mahmood 2011). They argued that recognizing rather than eliding differences among women would lead to deeper understandings of inequalities and more effective approaches for combatting them (Buss 1997; Collins 2000).

For example, Crenshaw (1991) suggested activists should not aim to eliminate all gender or racial differences but rather should recognize these differences as potential sources of social empowerment. In terms of the public/private spheres, this required recognition that, for some women, “the home is not simply a man’s castle in the patriarchal sense, but may also function as a safe haven from the indignities of life in a racist society” (Crenshaw 1991:1257). These scholars raised new sensitivities about using the law to address the ills of the private sphere, and the identity politics they fostered may have influenced policies concerning violent discipline.

Taken together, women’s global activism informs several hypotheses regarding countries’ adoption of anti-corporal punishment policies. First, an initial emphasis on women’s unique concerns as mothers suggests a lasting policy connection between women and children. Scholars argue that men and women legislators make decisions according to gendered interests (Kittilson 2008; Swers 1998; Thomas 1991) and have found greater representation of women in political bodies affects public spending and the adoption of policies beneficial to women (Celis 2006; Htun & Piscopo 2010; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler 2005; but see Burnet 2008; Devlin & Elgie 2008).⁷ Despite this, comparatively few studies have considered whether the presence of women in politics is associated with explicitly child-oriented policies or outcomes (but see Swiss, Fallon, & Burgos 2012). We suggest that women’s political representation may positively influence the adoption of policies benefitting children. Put formally:

Hypothesis 1. The greater the percentage of women in a country’s national parliament or legislature, the higher the odds the country adopts anti-corporal punishment policies in schools and homes.

Nevertheless, there is some reason to believe that Hypothesis 1 will not be supported, as it would be a mistake to assume that all women support violent discipline bans. For instance, a study reviewing attitudes toward violent discipline in nine countries found that some women who believe corporal punishment is unnecessary nonetheless engage in the practice (Lansford et al. 2010), and evidence suggests that many parents, including women, use physical discipline at some point (United Nations General Assembly 2006). It is thus important to test empirically whether there is a connection between women in parliament and child-oriented anti-violent discipline policies. Second, in line with activists’ emphases outlined above, countries began to protect women’s rights in terms of women’s public statuses as voters or workers before their private rights, such as the rights to contraception and divorce. Protections from violence followed a similar pattern. For instance, legal

⁷Others suggest that a threshold (such as 30%) must be crossed for women to have an impact (Chaney 2006; Childs & Krook 2009; Swiss, Fallon, & Burgos 2012; but see Grey 2006).

protections for rape victims preceded the recognition of domestic violence as a crime. We expect to see a similar pattern for the violent discipline of children, that it will be prohibited first in the public sphere followed by the private sphere. Therefore, we hypothesize:

Hypothesis 2. Policies banning corporal punishment in schools will generally precede policies banning corporal punishment in homes.

In line with this, we anticipate the recognition of children's public rights will operate as a precursor to private rights. This is consistent with policies concerning women's rights. Further, policymakers in countries that passed anti-corporal-punishment laws for schools will have likely laid the foundation for laws related to the home. NGOs and activists may also target policymakers in these countries, viewing them as promising reformers because of their earlier actions. We consequently hypothesize:

Hypothesis 3. Countries that passed anti-corporal punishment policies for schools will have higher odds of passing anti-corporal punishment policies in homes.

Finally, we consider whether greater numbers of minorities influence resistance to using law to combat violence in the home.⁸ Anti-corporal punishment policies may be less likely in more diverse countries because members of minority groups may promote alternative approaches that rely less on state or police authority. As noted, critical scholars in recent decades have increased awareness of the prejudicial enforcement of such laws and have increased leeringness of policies that invite the state into the home. We therefore hypothesize:

Hypothesis 4. The greater the ethnic fractionalization within a country, the lower the odds the country adopts an anti-corporal punishment policy in homes.

Global Influences on Policymaking

Beyond the role of gender and feminism in the passage of anti-corporal punishment policies, theories of globalization suggest additional factors that affect the worldwide diffusion of laws. Globalization scholars tend to focus more on the process of legal diffusion than on the substance of policies themselves. In general, these scholars fit into two groups: those who emphasize resources and those who emphasize global cultural influences. With respect to the former, a growing body of research considers the relationship between foreign aid and human rights, often reaching conflicting conclusions. Some studies find that aid is associated with human rights and democracy (Hearn 1999; Poe 1990; Tavares 2003), while other studies find no association (Crawford 1997; Knack 2004; Moyo 2009; Yoo & Boyle 2015).⁹ In the case of anti-corporal punishment policies, it is difficult to determine the extent to which donors actually link their aid to actions against corporal punishment. On the one hand, donors may consider other rights more important and therefore focus their energies elsewhere, and scholarship has shown that other factors—like political alliances and colonial ties—drive the allocation of aid (Alesina & Dollar 2000). On the other hand, donors may prefer recipients who enact global norms, and anti-corporal punishment policies may be

⁸For example, feminists have challenged the discriminatory nature of laws regulating Islamic homes in India (Merry 2006), veils in France (Ajrouch 2007), and Maasai practices in Tanzania (Winterbottom, Koomen, & Burford 2009).

⁹Most of this research examines whether aid had the intended effect on human rights outcomes. We assume that policy adoption is often an intermediate step and thus rely upon this work.

considered part of the package of global norms (Barrett & Tsui 1999). We nonetheless frame our hypothesis in the positive:

Hypothesis 5. The greater the level of international aid received by a country, the higher the odds it adopts anti-corporal punishment policies in schools and homes.

Turning to global culture, countries often look to other states or international organizations for ideas about policy reforms (Dobbin, Simmons, & Garrett 2007). World polity theorists stress that states are part of a global society that shapes the construction of interests and provides clues regarding what “good” states should do (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Meyer et al. 1997). In fact, scholars have specifically noted the importance of global civil society for promoting child rights (Boyle & Kim 2009; Gran & Aliberti 2003; Kim et al. 2013; Kim & Boyle 2011).

Global norms may be spread to countries in several ways. First, they may be disseminated through international treaties that delineate global norms countries are expected to incorporate into their national laws. As noted above, the Convention on the Rights of the Child is the core human rights treaty pertaining to children. Although the CRC does not explicitly prohibit corporal punishment, it does prohibit torture and any other violence against children. The CRC Committee also began explicitly discussing corporal punishment in its recommendations to countries in the mid-1990s. For instance, a 1995 Concluding Observation issued by the CRC Committee¹⁰ concerning Sri Lanka lamented that there was still corporal punishment in schools and in the home and suggested Sri Lanka take measures to combat the abuse. Several documents created by the Committee solidified this perspective into formal doctrine. A UN study on violence against children was published in 2006 (UN General Assembly 2006). This was quickly followed by a General Comment highlighting states’ obligations to prohibit and eliminate corporal punishment of children: “Addressing the widespread acceptance or tolerance of corporal punishment¹¹ of children and eliminating it, in the family, schools and other settings, is not only an obligation of States... It is...a key strategy for reducing and preventing all forms of violence in societies.” Thus, as the CRC Committee specifically addresses corporal punishment, we anticipate that the CRC will be especially relevant to policy adoption:

Hypothesis 6. The earlier a country ratifies the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the higher the odds it adopts anti-corporal punishment policies in schools and homes.

International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) may also influence policy adoption. Indeed, many world polity theorists have demonstrated the link between INGOs and policy adoption, noting their role as carriers of global society (Boli & Thomas 1999; Frank, Hironaka, & Schofer 2000; Hironaka 2002). INGOs often invoke normative arguments to pressure governments to improve their human rights practices through policy reform (Tsutsui & Wotipka 2004; Wotipka & Tsutsui 2008). The case of corporal punishment is no

¹⁰The CRC is monitored through a reporting system. Countries file reports on their progress in promoting child rights every five years. Representatives from these countries then meet with Committee members to discuss the reports and subsequent recommendations.

¹¹This document defines corporal punishment as any punishment in which physical force is used and intended to cause some degree of pain or discomfort, however light this punishment is.

different, and several international organizations and networks—such as the Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children (GI)—have worked closely with the UN to emphasize outlawing corporal punishment. We therefore hypothesize:

Hypothesis 7. The greater the number of INGOs within a country, the higher the odds it adopts anti-corporal punishment policies in schools and homes.

Note that GI, which was founded in 2001, has been especially important in accelerating the rate of corporal punishment prohibitions (Bower 2015). Because the GI was founded so recently and its founding coincides with several initiatives by UN entities, however, we cannot assess its independent effect in our models; we must rather examine INGOs more broadly.¹²

In sum, we hypothesize foreign aid, the ratification of the CRC, and the presence of INGOs will influence the adoption of corporal punishment policies. Recent research suggests that numerous global influences impact national policy adoption and related human rights practices (Kim & Boyle 2011) and has linked membership in INGOs and aid (Swiss & Longhofer 2016). We therefore do not treat these hypotheses as mutually exclusive. It is also important to note that we anticipate that the same factors that influence the adoption of the first policy will influence the adoption of the second policy. In other words, controlling for the adoption of a school policy, these factors will continue to be influential on the odds of adopting a home policy.

Methods and Measures

We conduct the analysis between 1950¹³ and 2011. This includes as many years as possible, as international data are scarce before 1950.¹⁴ We begin our analysis in 1950 because this coincides with the emergence of global human rights norms and international laws. Specifically, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948, and UN commissions completed drafts of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 1954. This time span allows us to examine the factors associated with the lack of policy adoption in early years, which is important for understanding the factors that are associated with policy adoption.

We sought to include all countries as we are interested in general international trends and as all countries could feasibly pass such policies. Ultimately, however, several small nations¹⁵

¹²The GI does not have offices in every country, making it difficult to create a quantitative measure that captures the GI's effects on individual countries. This is not to suggest that there is no effect but rather to highlight our inability to capture an effect using quantitative analysis.

¹³As we note below, seven countries had passed a policy banning corporal punishment in schools by 1950. They are thus censored. Note also that if we restrict our analyses to 1989 to 2011, the direction and significance of all effects remain the same (available upon request).

¹⁴For instance, we use the most comprehensive dataset of GDP to date (James et al. 2012), and the dataset begins in 1950. Data on aid (AidData.org) are similarly first available in 1947.

¹⁵These include Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Brunei Darussalam, Dominica, Honduras, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, Papa New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. Note also that we restrict countries in this study to United Nations member countries due to the lack of available data on disputed territories.

are excluded because there were not data available for most independent variables. Specifically, there are 150 countries and 5,363 country-years in analyses of school policies, and there are 159 countries and 6,254 country-years in analyses of home policies. The unit of analysis is the country-year,¹⁶ and the values vary annually. As with any quantitative study covering many years and numerous countries, this analysis consequently sacrifices locally specific nuance in favor of analyzing general relationships.

Dependent Variables

We used several sources to create a dataset of corporal punishment laws. First, we coded whether there was any law regarding corporal punishment, as well as the year of adoption, based on Concluding Observations by the Committee on the Rights of the Child.¹⁷ This Committee reviews country compliance with the CRC. Specifically, it examines corporal punishment in schools, the home, and in the juvenile justice system; and it expects member states enact legislation outlawing corporal punishment in these spheres.¹⁸ In this paper, we analyze corporal punishment policies related to the home and to educational institutions as two distinct dependent variables. We do not assess laws pertaining to corporal punishment in the juvenile justice system due to the wide range of laws regarding this form of corporal punishment.¹⁹

We model the presence of national laws regarding corporal punishment in the home and in schools separately, as we consider these two forms of policies as related indicators of the same phenomenon. In other words, we examine home policies and school policies in separate models. We assign countries a “1” for the year in which they enact a home policy and/or a school policy and a “0” otherwise. As no country enacted a policy against one form of corporal punishment and then later allowed corporal punishment, countries are censored after passing each policy. For a ban to count as a home policy or as a school policy and be coded as a “1,” it must apply to the entire country. We do not count policies with exceptions or that only applied to certain regions within a country. For instance, if a province within a federalist system had outlawed corporal punishment in schools but such a law had not been passed at the national level, this country receives a “0” for the school policy dependent variable in relevant country-years. The policy must clearly outlaw corporal punishment in the home and/or the school *countrywide* to be included as a national policy in our dataset.

To check the validity of the years that laws were adopted and obtain information that was not included in Concluding Observations, we supplemented our data with information from the Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children.²⁰ This organization was

¹⁶Countries enter the risk set when they become independent. Many countries were independent in 1950, but others enter the risk set throughout the subsequent two decades. Note that countries that dissolved are included until dissolution, at which point new countries are included appropriately. For instance, the Former Yugoslavia is included until 1991, and its former republics that declared independence and were recognized are included afterward.

¹⁷http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID=5&TreatyID=10&TreatyID=11&DocTypeID=5

¹⁸Note that, although the CRC entered into force in 1990, the Concluding Observations include the passage of laws well before that time.

¹⁹For example, corporal punishment might be outlawed as a sentence or it might be banned within particular penal institutions. Data on the years of corporal punishment policies pertaining to juvenile justice were also missing or unclear in numerous cases, in large part due to the complexities of banning corporal punishment as it relates to juvenile justice. Thus, we focus on laws pertaining to corporal punishment in the home and in educational institutions.

²⁰<http://www.endcorporalpunishment.org>

created in 2001 to campaign for worldwide prohibition of corporal punishment in any setting. As part of this initiative, the organization monitors the laws against corporal punishment in each country worldwide. Their website provides data on when policies were adopted, and we checked all data from the Concluding Observations against the Global Initiative's website. When there were discrepancies, we located and read countries' laws ourselves. We are thus confident in the validity and reliability of these data, although as laws can be ambiguous and difficult to track over time, minimal errors may remain.

Independent Variables

We obtain independent variables, further explained in Table 1 and summarized by policy adoption in Table 2, from a variety of sources.

Women in parliament—To assess the effect of women in parliament, we include the percentage of legislative seats held by women in the national parliament in each country-year. We focus on *national* parliaments due to our emphasis on countrywide bans, as opposed to regional bans, on corporal punishment. These data were obtained from Paxton, Hughes, and Green (2006) as well as from the International Parliamentary Union (2014).²¹ As we explain in more detail below, we also test a threshold effect of 30% or more seats belonging to women.

Ethnic fractionalization—Plurality within the population is operationalized with an indicator of *ethnolinguistic fractionalization*, which measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from a country are from different linguistic groups (Fearon & Laitin 2003). Constructing any comparative measure of ethnic groups across countries raises validity concerns. Fearon's ethnolinguistic fractionalization measure gives special attention to linguistic diversity, which is not perfectly correlated with ethnic diversity but is better than alternate measures.²² Fearon (2003:210) does take into account factors other than a shared language, however, such as indicators of a common culture or race. He constructed this metric using data from the *Atlas Narodov Mira 1964*, which provides the best-known and most widely used measure of ethnic fractionalization. He then supplemented the *Atlas* with data from the *CIA World Factbook*, the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, the *Library of Congress Country Studies*, and other sources in order to take other indicators of culture into account. As this measure remains quite constant over time, we interpolated it for missing years.²³

International aid—Given our focus on child rights, we include a measure of civil society aid from AidData (2015; see also Tierney et al. 2011). Civil society aid includes aid given for human rights, women's groups, grassroots organizations, and other efforts that promote civil society. AidData provides the raw amount of aid given in USD 2011 across all country-

²¹We began with data from Paxton, Hughes, and Green (2006) and supplemented these data after 2003 (the last year they are available) with data from the International Parliamentary Union (2014), which was the primary source of data in the Paxton, Hughes, and Green dataset. Countries that are missing data are included in footnote 14.

²²See Fearon (2003) for a review of other measures and for additional information.

²³In cases where data are missing, we supplement with the ethnolinguistic fractionalization from Krain (1997) at <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/15494>. In total, 1,487 country-years were interpolated or gleaned from Krain in the home policy models, while 1,143 country-years were interpolated or gleaned from Krain in the school policy models. Note also that we explored all measures of ethnic power from the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (Wimmer et al. 2009), and none were significantly associated with policy adoption.

years; we thus added all aid allocated to each country for each country-year and logged this value to best fit the data.

CRC Ratification—As the CRC Committee monitors corporal punishment and as human rights treaties reflect international norms, we include a measure of ratification of the CRC.²⁴ We operationalize ratification as the number of years since ratifying the CRC, which was open for ratification in 1989.

INGOs—International nongovernmental organizations are operationalized as the number of INGOs to which any citizen of a country belongs. The data are obtained from the Yearbook of International Organizations (various years) and are logged. As is consistent practice, data for earlier periods are interpolated (see Kim & Boyle 2011).

Controls—We include several control variables. First, to measure *democracy*, we include the Polity IV scale (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers 2016). In this scale, democracies range from 10 (full democracy) to −10 (full autocracy).²⁵ To measure *development*, we include the Gross Domestic Product per capita. We obtain this measure from James et al. (2012), who sought to develop a comprehensive measure of GDP across countries and combined data from key sources to produce data on GDP (such as the World Bank). Data are in U.S. dollars and logged. Finally, we measure time by including a count of the years since a country entered into the risk set (either 1950 or independence).

We also explored a number of other control variables. Specifically, we examined the percentage of youth living in a country, regional effects, dominant religion, regime durability, trade openness, and the ratification of CRC Protocols and other human rights treaties, including CEDAW.²⁶ We also examined numerous data that are only available for a subset of years, such as women teachers, women employers, years since suffrage, the birth rate, and the share of women in wage employment. None significantly improved the fit of the models or influenced the adoption of policies.²⁷

Analysis

To assess the factors that influence whether and when countries adopt corporal punishment policies in the home and in schools, we utilize discrete-time hazard models and, again, model the adoption of policies in the home and in the school separately. The hazard is the instantaneous propensity that an event will occur. Unlike many models, hazard models analyze the influence of time and allow for time-varying predictors and censoring of data. In other words, countries are no longer considered “at risk” of adopting a certain policy once policy adoption has occurred, as there are no cases of legislation being overturned.²⁸

²⁴We obtained these data directly from Wade Cole and supplemented more recent years with data from the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, obtained at <http://indicators.ohchr.org>.

²⁵We explored the possibility of using the FreedomHouse score, but this variable is not available before the 1970s. See <https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world>.

²⁶Specifically, we examined years since ratification of the ICCPR, the ICESR, and CEDAW. The measures were highly correlated, and we found that each treaty had a similar effect. If more than one treaty was included in a model, the oldest treaty typically wiped out other treaty effects.

²⁷These supplemental analyses are available upon request.

²⁸We do not lag the dependent variable, as passing a policy is a lengthy process. Mobilization and political pressure typically precede actual policy adoption, and we want to capture the effect of our independent variables on the entire process.

Specifically, we employ discrete-time logistic regression models (Allison 1984):

$$\log[P_{it}/(1 - P_{it})] = \alpha_t + \beta_1 X_{it1} + \dots + \beta_k X_{itk}.$$

In this model, P_{it} represents the probability that country i enacts a policy at time t . β signifies the effect of the independent variables; $X_1, X_2 \dots X_k$ denote k time-varying explanatory variables; and α represents a set of constants corresponding to each discrete-time unit of one country-year. We also cluster by country identifier to adjust for correlated errors within countries over time.²⁹

The discrete-time hazard model invokes several assumptions. First, it invokes linear additivity, which means that a predictor's effect does not depend on the values of other predictors in the model or the position of the unit difference along its scale. Second, it invokes the proportionality assumption: that each predictor has an identical effect in every time period under study. In other words, it does not depend on the duration. Finally, the discrete-time hazard model invokes an assumption that there is no unobserved heterogeneity. Essentially, the population hazard depends only on predictor values (Singer & Willett 2003).

Analyses were conducted in Stata13 (2014), and results for the two models are presented in odds ratios with exponentiated confidence intervals. Coefficients larger than one are associated with increased odds of a policy, while coefficients smaller than one are associated with decreased odds of having a policy. Again, we cluster standard errors by country identifier, though Appendix A includes random effects models as a robustness test. Results remain qualitatively similarly, providing additional support for the results of our event history analysis.

Results: Banning Corporal Punishment

Figure 1 shows the number of countries that adopted corporal punishment policies in the home and in schools between 1950 and 2011.³⁰ As the figure clearly illustrates, few countries banned either form of corporal punishment during the first few decades of our analysis. Instead, a handful of countries sporadically adopted policies until 1990, when school policy adoption increased dramatically. Home policy adoption also greatly increased during the 1990s, though most policy adoption occurred later in the decade. Overall, the 1990s and 2000s saw the largest rise in the adoption of each form of policy, with the highest number of policy adoptions occurring between 2005 and 2009.

This figure illustrates important general trends and supports our hypothesis that public (school) policies will be adopted prior to private (home) policies (Hypothesis 2). In 1950, seven³¹ countries had previously adopted a policy banning corporal punishment in schools, and no countries had policies outlawing corporal punishment in the home. By 2011, over 70 countries had banned corporal punishment in schools, and over 30 countries had outlawed

²⁹Specifically, we include "cluster(countryidentifier)" in our Stata syntax for each model.

³⁰Only new policy adoptions are shown; thus, the figure does not show cumulative policy adoption.

³¹As international data on several of our indicators do not exist prior to 1950, we begin our analysis in 1950. These seven countries are thus censored and are not included in the analysis.

corporal punishment in the home. This trend—increasing numbers of policies being adopted over time—suggests a norm cascade (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).

While we focus on the two forms of policies as indicators of a similar phenomenon, these trends illuminate differences between the two types of policies. On a global scale, countries adopted policies pertaining to schools well before they adopted policies pertaining to the home. Policies regarding schools are also more than two times as prevalent as policies regarding the home. In fact, only one country (Turkmenistan) has adopted a policy banning corporal punishment in the home but has not banned corporal punishment in schools, and only one other country (Iceland) adopted a policy pertaining to the home before adopting a policy pertaining to schools. These trends suggest that child-friendly policies related to the public sphere—in this case, educational institutions—are more prevalent than policies pertaining to the private sphere of the home. To understand these processes in more depth, we now turn to a multivariate analysis.

Multivariate Analysis

Table 3 presents discrete time hazard models of the adoption of the two forms of policy. Models 1, 2, and 3 pertain to school policies, while Models 4, 5, and 6 pertain to home policies. Model 7 considers home policies when the earlier adoption of a school policy is controlled, and each of the seven models also includes controls for the type of government, development, and time, as explained above.

Hypothesis 1 suggested that the percentage of women in a country's national parliament is positively associated with the adoption of each form of policy. As seen in Model 1, the percentage of women in parliament is associated with the adoption of policies against violent discipline in schools. Each increase in the percentage of women in parliament is associated with a 4% marginal increase in the odds of adopting a school policy ($p < .01$). The percentage of women in parliament is also significantly associated with the odds of banning corporal punishment in homes ($p < .001$) as seen in Model 4, and this effect is particularly robust across models.³²

The significance of the percentage of women in parliament falls in line with existing research that finds that having women in parliament is associated with a host of outcomes related to women and child well being. The relative strength of this effect on banning corporal punishment in the home also suggests that women may be more effective at mobilizing change related to the home—a realm traditionally associated with women—than in educational institutions, which may be considered the domain of men in certain countries.

We also hypothesized that more diverse countries may avoid law as a solution to the issue of violent discipline. This hypothesis is based on the idea that members of minority groups may be especially vocal opponents of policies that invite the state into their homes (Hypothesis 4). This hypothesis is supported, as greater ethnolinguistic fractionalization is significantly associated ($p < .01$) with a lower likelihood of adopting an anti-corporal punishment policy in

³²We also explored the threshold of 30% of women holding seats in the national legislature. This binary indicator was significantly associated with policies banning corporal punishment in the home but not in educational institutions.

homes (Model 5). The significant interaction effect in Model 6 shows that ethnolinguistic fractionalization is especially influential when there are more women in parliament. Indeed, there are early adopters of home policies—such as Finland, Norway, and Denmark—where ethnolinguistic fractionalization was low and the representation of women in parliament was continually increasing. At the same time, there are ample examples of countries that have high representation of women in parliament, high ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and have yet to adopt policies banning corporal punishment in the home (such as Bolivia, Tanzania, Senegal, and Canada). However, given the large conditional effects when this interaction is introduced (which likely is the result of a relatively small number of home policies), we urge caution in interpreting it and urge future researchers to consider whether the finding is replicable.

Turning to global factors, we also find that aid allocated to civil society pursuits—which includes aid provided for human rights, women’s groups, grassroots organizations, and other efforts that promote civil society—is associated with significantly greater odds ($p < .01$) of adopting both policies pertaining to schools (Model 2) and policies pertaining to the home (Model 5). This lends strong support to Hypothesis 5. While this aid may have a direct effect on mobilization efforts, we contend it more likely represents the spread of a global norm against corporal punishment. For example, Theresa Kilbane, Senior Advisor of Child Protection at UNICEF (2016), revealed in an interview that even within UNICEF’s very decentralized structure, in which each country’s office has substantial latitude over the focus of its efforts, there has been an uptick in the number of countries choosing to focus on violent discipline (Kilbane interview 2016). Numerous scholars have found that aid is associated with human rights outcomes, and aid is often allocated under certain conditions (Abrams & Lewis 1993). Organizations that provide aid also monitor their aid recipients, suggesting close ties to other countries and norms they propagate.³³

Turning to other global factors, early ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child is associated with higher odds of home policy adoption. Every year since a country has ratified the CRC increases the odds of adopting a policy by a factor of 1.1 ($p < .001$). This partially confirms Hypothesis 6 and illustrates the importance of the CRC. Yet, while CRC ratification is significantly associated with the odds of adopting a policy banning corporal punishment in the home, it is not significantly associated with the odds of adopting a policy banning corporal punishment in educational institutions.³⁴ This difference may be explained by most countries’ hesitancy to regulate behavior in the private sphere. Formal insisting from the CRC committee thus may have influenced the regulation of behavior in the home, though the relatively small number of countries that have adopted such policies suggests that such insisting is also not sufficient for policy adoption.

³³As previous studies have suggested a relationship between aid and quotas for women in national legislatures (Bush 2011), we also explored an interaction. This interaction is significantly associated with the adoption of policies banning corporal punishment in the home but not in educational institutions. This suggests that increases in aid are associated with diminished effects of women in parliament. Women in parliament may, for instance, choose to direct their efforts to other concerns if those providing aid emphasize banning corporal punishment.

³⁴As some countries adopted such policies prior to the adoption of the CRC, we also analyzed the adoption of school policies in country-years following 1990. The effect of years since CRC ratification was not significant. Note also that the effect of CRC ratification is likewise not significant in models of school policy adoption when the number of years at risk, which is moderately correlated with years since CRC ratification, is excluded.

Contrary to Hypothesis 7, membership in INGOs³⁵ is not significantly associated with the adoption of either form of policy. While this measure is correlated with time, it is also insignificant when time is excluded from the models. Likewise, excluding aid from the models did not bolster the INGO effect. To further probe this finding, we examined the effects of women's INGOs, children's INGOs, and health NGOs, and none was significantly related to either policy adoption. This is surprising because INGOs are consistently associated with the diffusion of policies in other studies of global processes (Frank, Hironaka, & Schofer 2000; Frank, Camp, & Boutcher 2010; Swiss, Fallon, & Burgos 2012). One plausible explanation is that the ideas of global civil society are being carried through many different networks, attenuating the unique importance of INGO networks (compare Hironaka 2014). Another possibility is that pressure for reform from INGOs has become less powerful over time, and we encourage future researchers to explore these possibilities further.

As noted above, descriptive statistics indicated that almost all countries that had adopted a home policy had previously adopted a school policy. To test this in our multivariate analysis, Model 7 includes a dichotomous variable indicating whether a country had adopted a school policy at least one year prior to the country-year.³⁶ As seen in the table, previously adopting a school policy is the strongest predictor of enacting a home policy, which provides support for Hypothesis 3. While weaker, the effects of the other key independent variables on home policies remain when school policies are controlled—women in parliament, aid, and ratifying the CRC are significant, while INGO connections are not. This indicates that similar factors are associated with policy adoption regardless of whether it is a first or a second policy concerning violent discipline.

Lastly, control variables yield several findings. GDP per capita is significantly associated with home policy adoption, indicating that wealthy countries are more likely to extend human rights regulations into the home. Yet, GDP per capita is not associated with the adoption of policies that ban corporal punishment in educational institutions, which have been adopted in a wider range of countries. This may indicate that developed and developing countries have somewhat different views on whether corporal punishment in the home is harmful. Conversely, democracies have higher odds of adopting policies pertaining to schools but not to the home. Democracies may hesitate to regulate certain elements of the domestic sphere because such regulation may be viewed as infringing on the rights of their citizens. This also suggests that autocratic regimes may treat education as an institution that encourages compliance and obedience.

Conclusion

Previous research has demonstrated negative consequences of corporal punishment, such as lower math scores and less engagement with school (Ogando, Portela, & Pells 2015). Our

³⁵We also tested the effect of International Governmental Organizations (IGOs), measured as the number of IGOs that a country belongs to and obtained from the Yearbook of International Organizations (various years) and logged. This measure was likewise not significantly associated with the adoption of policies banning corporal punishment in the home or in schools, and we exclude it from the models presented due to its very high correlation with the INGO indicator.

³⁶This does not include policies that were adopted in the same year, as these were typically adopted in the same piece of legislation. Note that countries that are censored in the school policy models (those that adopted a school policy prior to 1950) are included here.

research reveals a positive development—that formal condemnation of corporal punishment is becoming a global norm. While few countries had banned corporal punishment in either schools or homes during the first few decades of our analysis, Figure 1 illustrates that the 1990s saw a large increase in policy adoption. Policies banning corporal punishment in schools have proliferated widely, while policies banning corporal punishment in the home are being adopted more slowly. School policies are a strong predictor of home policies, and adopting a home policy prior to a school policy is very rare. These trends mirror the public/private pattern of women's rights reforms, suggesting that state institutions are relatively more permeable than the institution of the family.

In line with this, our event history analysis of more than 150 countries between 1950 and 2011 suggests a nexus between women's and children's issues. Women in parliament are associated with the adoption of anti-corporal punishment policies in both schools and homes. Our findings are also consistent with the idea that protecting children from violence is part of the general anti-violence framework that feminist activists have promoted. Most other forms of private violence have been addressed in legislation, and activists and policymakers have now turned their attention to creating norms against violent discipline (Kilbane interview 2016). Nevertheless, this finding is not completely obvious. At least one study, based on surveys in nine countries, found that women on average were no more opposed to corporal punishment than men (Lansford et al. 2010).

We also find that home legislation is less likely in countries with high levels of ethnic diversity. In countries with diverse populations, members of minorities may support alternative ways of dealing with violent discipline because they are concerned about the consequences of greater policing of the private sphere. To be clear, this does not indicate that members of these communities support violent discipline or that support for violent discipline varies by ethnicity. Rather, it highlights the potential reluctance of minority communities to support policies that bring the state into their homes. We find that this effect is especially pronounced in countries that have more women in parliament, which could mean that elite women are particularly sensitive to the concerns raised by critical theorists. Unfortunately, there are no public data on the ethnic make-up of legislatures, so it is not possible to test this directly.

Our findings also have implications for understanding the global diffusion of policies. Most notably, the receipt of international aid is tied to the adoption of both school and home policies. It seems unlikely that there is a direct *quid pro quo* relationship between corporal punishment policies and the receipt of foreign aid; there are likely many other human rights-related policies that garner more attention. Rather, this finding suggests that countries that signal respect for global reforms and international law generally are favored by donor states (see Barrett & Tsui 1999). Anti-corporal punishment policies are relatively easy to adopt, in part because their enforcement is difficult to measure.

With respect to indicators of global norms, CRC ratification does not predict school policies. Many of these policies precede or closely coincide with CRC ratification. Our finding may indicate that a global norm opposing corporal punishment prompted both the ratification of the CRC and the adoption of the policy within countries, as there was already a high degree

of consensus around this issue by the time the CRC was opened for ratification. This is consistent with Hironaka's (2015) "swarm" metaphor for the spread of global norms. At the same time, there is a strong connection between the ratification of the CRC and the adoption of policies banning corporal punishment in the home. This implies that the CRC put states under pressure to expand child rights into the more controversial private sphere.

More INGO memberships signal dense ties to a global polity that shapes norms and fuels reforms. Yet, INGOs surprisingly have no significant association with the adoption of anti-corporal punishment policies in our models. This may be a consequence of the profound and rapid embrace of child rights in the immediate post-Cold War era. The CRC was ratified more quickly and by more countries than any other global treaty. Further, as noted above, many school policies preceded the CRC. Together, this implies more consensus—at least at the policy level—than is typical for global reforms. Our finding suggests that even states that are less connected to the world polity did not need much prodding to adopt policies against violent discipline. The lack of an association of policies with INGOs, in combination with the strong association of policies with women in parliament, could also mean that states rather than civil society have been the primary movers of corporal punishment policy adoption.³⁷

At any rate, INGOs may play a vital role in holding countries accountable for the policies they have adopted (Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui 2005). The enforcement of policies differs from their adoption. In the specific case of corporal punishment, evidence suggests that many of the countries that adopt laws do not enforce them (World Health Organization 2014). At the same time, the recently-launched Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children (2016), which brings together state and non-state organizations in the fight to end violence against children, cites policy enactment as one of its cores strategies. We hope that future studies will take up the question of how the actual practice of violent discipline is changing over time. Indeed, ongoing data collection by UNICEF (2015) through the multi-indicator cluster surveys is paving the way for future analyses of how policies are affecting behavior in this sphere.

As this was the first study to assess the factors associated with policies banning corporal punishment in the home and in schools, this quantitative approach has provided a broad foundation of knowledge regarding the general factors that are associated with policy adoption. Going forward, scholars should seek to refine the relationships tested here and to assess the precise mechanisms behind them. Further, change in spheres other than law, such as education or media, must also be considered. Violence against children in schools and in homes remains a pressing social problem, and sound sociological and legal research is vital in better understanding corporal punishment and global efforts to address it.

³⁷Measures of INGOs likewise are not able to account for the complex interplay between INGOs and intergovernmental organizations. INGOs that work closely with certain intergovernmental organizations involved in international law (like the United Nations) may have influenced policy adoption, though it is not possible to assess this with available quantitative data.

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Appendix

Appendix A

Random Effects Models of Adoption of Corporal Punishment Policies, 1950 to 2011, Odds Ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Predictors	School Policy	School Policy	School Policy	Home Policy	Home Policy	Home Policy	Home Policy
Women in Parliament	1.049 [*] (1.011 – 1.088)	1.029 (0.984 – 1.077)	1.044 (0.977 – 1.115)	1.079 ^{***} (1.043 – 1.116)	1.062 ^{**} (1.024 – 1.101)	1.236 [*] (1.020 – 1.498)	1.110 ^{***} (1.054 – 1.168)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization	0.526	0.268	0.456	0.269 ⁺	0.175 [*]	241.659	19,309 ⁺

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Predictors	School Policy	School Policy	School Policy	Home Policy	Home Policy	Home Policy	Home Policy
	(0.132 – 2.094)	(0.041 – 1.765)	(0.035 – 5.935)	(0.057 – 1.274)	(0.034 – 0.905)	(0.182 – 320,006.050)	(0.695 – 536.665)
Women in Parliament *Ethfrac			0.961			0.653 *	0.803 **
			(0.837 – 1.104)			(0.429 – 0.995)	(0.681 – 0.946)
Civil Society Aid (log)		1.099 **	1.101 **		1.098 *	1.158 *	1.099 *
		(1.034 – 1.168)	(1.036 – 1.170)		(1.017 – 1.186)	(1.022 – 1.311)	(1.011 – 1.194)
CRC Ratification (years)		1.080	1.079		1.109 **	1.298 *	1.150 ***
		(0.984 – 1.186)	(0.983 – 1.183)		(1.036 – 1.188)	(1.008 – 1.672)	(1.067 – 1.240)
INGOs (log)		1.364	1.331		1.494	2.556	1.451
		(0.664 – 2.801)	(0.653 – 2.714)		(0.720 – 3.100)	(0.552 – 11.837)	(0.692 – 3.043)
<i>Controls</i>							
Democracy Scale	1.131 **	1.126 *	1.126 *	1.073 +	1.048	1.079	1.073
	(1.046 – 1.222)	(1.029 – 1.233)	(1.028 – 1.234)	(0.987 – 1.167)	(0.963 – 1.140)	(0.930 – 1.252)	(0.979 – 1.176)
GDP per capita (log)	0.902	1.073	1.086	1.232	1.753 *	3.512 +	1.905 *
	(0.685 – 1.187)	(0.685 – 1.680)	(0.697 – 1.692)	(0.909 – 1.672)	(1.018 – 3.019)	(0.916 – 13.466)	(1.088 – 3.334)
Years at Risk	1.043 *	1.014	1.013	1.030 *	0.980	0.948	0.978
	(1.009 – 1.079)	(0.979 – 1.050)	(0.979 – 1.049)	(1.001 – 1.059)	(0.952 – 1.009)	(0.884 – 1.017)	(0.947 – 1.010)
<i>School Policy</i>							
School Policy							3.082 **
							(1.355 – 7.010)
Constant	0.002 ***	0.000 ***	0.000 ***	0.000 ***	0.000 ***	0.000 *	0.000 ***
	(0.000 – 0.053)	(0.000 – 0.012)	(0.000 – 0.012)	(0.000 – 0.002)	(0.000 – 0.000)	(0.000 – 0.003)	(0.000 – 0.000)
Country-Years	5,363	5,363	5,363	6,254	6,254	6,254	6,165
Number of Countries	150	150	150	159	159	159	157

Random effects are excluded due to space constraints. Exponentiated confidence intervals are in parentheses.

Abbreviations: Ethfrac = ethnolinguistic fractionalization.

p<0.001,

**
p<0.01,

*
p<0.05,

+
p<0.1

Figure 1. Number of Corporal Punishment Policies Adopted Globally, 1950 to 2011

Note: Only new policy adoptions are shown; thus, the figure does not show cumulative policy adoption.

Table 1

Dependent and Independent Variables

Variable	Description	Source
<i>Dependent Variables</i>		
Home Policy	Adoption of a policy that outlaws corporal punishment in the home	CRC Concluding Observations and End Corporal Punishment
School Policy	Adoption of a policy that outlaws corporal punishment in educational institutions	CRC Concluding Observations and End Corporal Punishment
<i>Independent Variables</i>		
Women in Parliament	Percentage of women in national parliament	Paxton, Hughes, & Green (2006) and International Parliamentary Union (2014)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization	Probability that two randomly drawn individuals from a country are from different linguistic groups	Fearon & Laitin (1993) and Krain (1997)
Aid	Sum of all loans, grants, or equity investments from governments, government aid agencies, IGOs, and private foundations received toward civil society pursuits; in USD 2011 currency	AidData.org
CRC Ratification	Years since ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child	Convention on the Rights of the Child
INGOs	International nongovernmental organizations that at least one citizen in a country is a member of	International Yearbook of Associations
<i>Controls</i>		
Democracy	–10 (full autocracy) to 10 (full democracy)	Polity IV
GDP per capita	Gross Domestic Product divided by midyear population in then-current USD currency (IHME measure)	James et al. (2012)
Time	Years	

Table 2

Mean Values by Policy Adoption in 159 Countries

Indicator	Home Policy	No Home Policy	School Policy	No School Policy
Women in Parliament	20.61	9.04	12.86	8.30
Ethnolinguistic Fract.	0.26	0.40	0.37	0.42
Aid	2,946,828.00	2,023,491.00	6,157,499.00	1,715,141.00
CRC Ratification	12.52	4.07	9.10	3.57
INGOs	1,520.75	489.19	743.65	432.06
<i>Controls</i>				
Democracy	6.94	0.22	4.21	-0.61
GDP per capita	20,772.95	7,302.78	8,424.58	6,363.66

* Aid data, INGO data, and GDP per capita are logged in the analysis.

Table 3
Discrete Time Hazard Model of Adoption of Corporal Punishment Policies, 1950 to 2011, Odds Ratios

Predictors	Model 1 School Policy	Model 2 School Policy	Model 3 School Policy	Model 4 Home Policy	Model 5 Home Policy	Model 6 Home Policy	Model 7 Home Policy
Women in Parliament	1.040** (1.012 – 1.069)	1.027+ (0.996 – 1.059)	1.043* (1.001 – 1.086)	1.079*** (1.044 – 1.115)	1.062** (1.022 – 1.103)	1.116*** (1.071 – 1.163)	1.110*** (1.059 – 1.162)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization	0.560 (0.203 – 1.543)	0.477 (0.166 – 1.368)	0.889 (0.178 – 4.450)	0.269+ (0.063 – 1.152)	0.175* (0.037 – 0.818)	11.048+ (0.957 – 127.549)	19.319* (1.297 – 287.658)
Women in Parliament * Ethfrac			0.952 (0.860 – 1.054)			0.798** (0.692 – 0.921)	0.803** (0.698 – 0.923)
Civil Society Aid (log)		1.093** (1.032 – 1.158)	1.094** (1.033 – 1.159)	1.098** (1.025 – 1.177)	1.105** (1.030 – 1.186)		1.099* (1.023 – 1.180)
CRC Ratification		1.031 (0.971 – 1.095)	1.034 (0.973 – 1.099)	1.109*** (1.044 – 1.179)	1.131*** (1.060 – 1.207)		1.150*** (1.075 – 1.230)
INGOs (log)		1.016 (0.699 – 1.477)	1.010 (0.698 – 1.460)	1.494 (0.740 – 3.016)	1.480 (0.769 – 2.850)		1.451 (0.786 – 2.682)
<i>Controls</i>							
Democracy Scale	1.094*** (1.042 – 1.149)	1.070** (1.017 – 1.127)	1.072** (1.019 – 1.127)	1.073 (0.981 – 1.174)	1.048 (0.958 – 1.146)	1.069 (0.970 – 1.179)	1.073 (0.962 – 1.197)
GDP per capita (log)	0.881 (0.714 – 1.087)	1.137 (0.827 – 1.562)	1.154 (0.844 – 1.577)	1.232 (0.939 – 1.617)	1.753* (1.054 – 2.914)	1.927** (1.213 – 3.062)	1.905** (1.241 – 2.923)
Years at Risk	1.030** (1.009 – 1.051)	1.005 (0.979 – 1.032)	1.004 (0.978 – 1.032)	1.030 (0.994 – 1.067)	0.980 (0.949 – 1.013)	0.979 (0.946 – 1.013)	0.978 (0.946 – 1.011)
<i>School Policy</i>							
School Policy							3.082** (1.505 – 6.313)
Constant	0.007*** (0.001 – 0.039)	0.001*** (0.000 – 0.011)	0.001*** (0.000 – 0.009)	0.000*** (0.000 – 0.001)	0.000*** (0.000 – 0.000)	0.000*** (0.000 – 0.000)	0.000*** (0.000 – 0.000)
Observations	5,363	5,363	5,363	6,254	6,254	6,254	6,165

Standard errors are clustered by country identifier, and exponentiated confidence intervals are included in parentheses.

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Abbreviations: Ethfrac = ethnolinguistic fractionalization.

p<0.001,
**
p<0.01,
*
p<0.05,
+
p<0.1

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