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NEURAL RESPONSES TO APPEARANCE-BEHAVIOR CONGRUITY

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Abstract

Research evidences stronger reactions toward those whose behaviors seem consistent with appearance. To better understand the processes underlying appearance-behavior congruity effects, we assessed regions responding as a function of the congruity between visual (appearance) and abstract (behavior) cues. Using fMRI, trustworthy- and untrustworthy-looking faces were paired with positive, negative, or neutral behaviors. Approach judgments were stronger for congruent over incongruent targets, replicating prior work. Incongruent targets (e.g., untrustworthy face/positive behavior) elicited medial prefrontal (mPFC) and dorsolateral prefrontal (dlPFC) cortex activity more than congruent (e.g., untrustworthy face/negative behavior), suggesting processing incongruent targets requires additional mentalizing and controlled processing. Individual differences in enjoying interpersonal interactions negatively correlated with mPFC activity toward incongruent over congruent targets, suggesting more effortful processing of incongruent targets for individuals with lower levels of social motivation. These findings indicate mPFC contributions to processing incongruent appearance-behavior cues, but suggest that individual differences may temper the extent of this effect.

Much behavioral (Uleman, Saribay, & Gonzalez, 2008; Zebrowitz & Montepare, 2008) and neuroimaging (Ma, Vandekerckhove, VanOverwalle, Seurinck, & Fias, 2011; Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008) work has explored the mechanics of impression formation. People associate actors with traits inferred from behaviors (Todorov & Uleman, 2002, 2003, 2004), and activation related to mentalizing (i.e., the process by which we make sense of others' mental states) underscores these associations (Ma et al., 2011). Behavioral research often controls for facial contributions to impressions (e.g., trustworthiness; Willis & Todorov, 2006), preventing an examination of how appearances impact behavior-based impressions. Overlooking facial information may simplify how we view the processes underlying impression formation given that people behave differently based on the congruity, or consistency, of social cues (for a review, see Stangor & McMillan, 1992). Identifying brain regions sensitive to appearance-behavior congruity can inform our understanding of the processes underlying impression formation and how appearance-behavior congruity leads to behavioral differences in thinking about others.

Defined by outcome dependency hypothesis (Erber & Fiske, 1984), people react more strongly to incongruent information when perceiver outcomes depend on the actions of an individual, but react more strongly to congruent cues when outcomes are not actor-dependent. Manipulating facial trustworthiness (which conveys valence; see Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008) and behavioral valence can vary appearance-behavior congruity. Research demonstrates advantages of congruent (e.g., trustworthy face/positive behavior) over incongruent (e.g., trustworthy face/negative behavior) cues when outcomes are not actor-dependent. For instance, source memory for undesirable headlines is best when provided by an untrustworthy- versus trustworthy-looking source (Nash, Bryer, & Schlaghecken, 2010). People remember more impressions of others (Cassidy, Zebrowitz, & Gutchess, 2012) and are more likely to approach people (Cassidy & Gutchess, 2014) with appearance-congruent versus incongruent behaviors.

Mentalizing could be differentially engaged based on appearance-behavior congruity. Forming impressions from incongruent appearance-behavior cues could require more mentalizing than when cues are congruent because resolving inconsistency requires resources (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Wheeler, 1996; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Schloerscheidt, & Milne, 1999). The conflict present with incongruent cues may therefore *weaken* judgments toward others. People constantly associate behavior-inferred traits with actors, in activities ranging from perusing dating websites to reading the newspaper. Addressing neural responses to appearance-behavior congruity can complement behavioral work by clarifying the processes underlying decisions that vary by the consistency of social cues.

The present study advances the literature by assessing the neural response to appearance-behavior congruity established by abstract (behavior) *and* visual (appearance) cues. Medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), a region widely involved in mentalizing (Ma et al., 2011), potentially underlies differences in processing congruent and incongruent appearance-behavior cues. For instance, mPFC engages when forming impressions of politicians paired with statements incongruent versus congruent with partisan beliefs (Cloutier, Gabrieli, O'Young, & Ambady, 2011). mPFC activity correlates with learning behaviors after first learning faces, suggesting a role in updating impressions over time (Baron, Gobbini, Engell, & Todorov, 2011). Impression updating work also revealed mPFC engagement, in addition to a general conflict network (Ma et al., 2012), when new behaviors contradict versus match behavioral expectations (Ma et al., 2012; Mende-Siedlecki, Cai, & Todorov, 2013). Multiple visual cues also evoke differential neural engagement, with stronger amygdala responses to incongruity based on expression and eye gaze (Adams, Gordon, Baird, Ambady, & Kleck, 2003), and mPFC engagement given expectancy violation from race and emotion cues (Hehman, Ingbreten, & Freeman, 2014). We expected more mPFC activity for incongruent over congruent appearance-behavior cues, potentially reflecting more mentalizing to integrate and bind traits to actors.

Because social information influences visual processing (Adams, 2011; Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & Davies, 2004; Verosky, Todorov, & Turk-Browne, 2013), we predicted that unanticipated social cues could influence processing more than anticipated ones. Indeed, connectivity exists between pre-frontal and ventral-visual regions when perceiving

stereotype-incongruent versus congruent targets (Hehman et al., 2014; Quadflieg et al., 2011). We predicted activity within visual processing regions would functionally correlate with mPFC engagement for incongruent over congruent trials. However, given mPFC connectivity to dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) under trait inconsistency (Ma et al., 2012), we alternatively predicted connectivity between mPFC and dlPFC, a region critical in regulation and impression updating (Mende-Siedlecki, Cai, & Todorov, 2013).

Although studies have identified regions underlying differential processing of incongruent over congruent social cues, no work has considered *who* may most likely differ in their processing of incongruent and congruent information. Our secondary and more exploratory goal was to identify individual differences associated with processing incongruent over congruent social cues. Neuroimaging provides an ideal method, as individual differences in neural processing could result in similar behavior. For instance, young and older adults similarly evaluate social stigma, but activate brain regions differently to arrive at these evaluations, reflecting strategies compensating for age-related cognitive decline (Krendl, Heatherton, & Kensinger, 2009).

One characteristic potentially associated with processing social cues varying in congruity is extraversion, the extent to which people seek out and are comfortable interacting with new people. This social dimension of personality (Eysenck, 1967) has been linked to social competence (Schneider, Ackerman, & Kanfer, 1996) and decoding of nonverbal behaviors in contexts requiring cognitive control (Lieberman & Rosenthal, 2001). Examining differences on this characteristic may be promising in the cognitively demanding neuroimaging environment (Gutchess & Park, 2006). Individuals who engage in social interaction less might find processing incongruent over congruent targets more effortful, exhibiting increased mentalizing-related activity towards these targets. However, people who engage in interpersonal interaction more might also more likely spontaneously mentalize about others to learn about strangers.

METHOD

PARTICIPANTS

Eighteen right-handed adults with no history of neurological problems (18–34 years, 10 female; $M = 26.24$, $SD = 5.36$) from the Boston area participated and provided informed consent. Power analyses using an estimated medium effect size ($d = .5$) and 168 observations per participant indicated 16 participants to obtain power = .80 (Westfall, Kenny, & Judd, 2014). The Brandeis IRB approved this study.

STIMULI

Faces—Eighty-four trustworthy- and 84 untrustworthy-looking faces were selected from 740 publically available (<http://tlab.princeton.edu/databases/>) male faces generated by FaceGen version 3.1 (<http://facegen.com>). Faces were selected based on trustworthiness ratings (1 = very untrustworthy to 9 = very trustworthy) from 10 young (M age = 18.90 years, $SD = 1.20$) and 10 older (M age = 80.80 years, $SD = 5.16$) adults. Ratings were standardized by each age group's mean rating of all faces. Standardized ratings were entered

into a 2 (Age Group: young, old) $\times$ 2 (Facial Trustworthiness: trustworthy, untrustworthy) ANOVA. Trustworthy faces ($M = .79$, $SD = .48$) were more trustworthy than untrustworthy ($M = -1.06$, $SD = .65$), $F(1, 332) = 876.62$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .73$. Other effects were non-significant, $ps > .70$.

Behaviors—Fifty-six positive, 56 neutral, and 56 negative behaviors were selected from a dataset of 185 behaviors (Somerville, Wig, Whalen, & Kelley, 2006). Behaviors were selected based on arousal and valence ratings of eight older adults and eight of 23 younger raters (see Somerville et al., 2006). We averaged the young and older adults' ratings, and standardized ratings based on the mean rating of the dataset. Ratings were entered into ANOVAs comparing Category (positive, neutral, negative) on arousal, valence, and valence extremity (i.e., how strongly a behavior feels positive or negative). Tukey comparisons characterized differences.

The behaviors differed on arousal, $F(2, 165) = 312.92$, $p < .001$. Positive ($M = .67$, $SD = .50$) and negative ($M = .65$, $SD = .48$) were more arousing than neutral ($M = -1.25$, $SD = .41$), $ps < .001$. Positive and negative did not differ, $p = .97$. All of the categories differed from each other on valence, $F(2, 165) = 1597.53$, $p < .001$: positive ($M = 1.18$, $SD = .25$), neutral ($M = .08$, $SD = .13$), and negative ($M = -1.21$, $SD = .27$), $ps < .001$. The categories differed on valence extremity, $F(2, 165) = 453.79$, $p < .001$. Positive ($M = .65$, $SD = .45$) and negative ($M = .70$, $SD = .59$) had stronger ratings than neutral ($M = -1.29$, $SD = .18$), $ps < .001$. Positive and negative did not differ, $p = .81$.

Face-Behavior Pairs—Positive, negative, and neutral behaviors were equally distributed among trustworthy and untrustworthy faces. Trustworthy face/positive behavior and untrustworthy face/negative behavior pairs were categorized as “congruent.” Trustworthy face/negative behavior and untrustworthy face/positive behavior pairs were categorized as “incongruent.” Faces paired with neutral behaviors were categorized as “neutral-behavior pairs” (Figure 1). As the neutral-behavioral pairs were not directly relevant to our hypotheses, data involving these pairs will not be discussed further. Three versions, in which each face was paired with a positive, negative, or neutral behavior, counterbalanced the 168 pairs.

PROCEDURE

Stimuli were presented using E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). Trials lasted 6000msec. Faces appeared alone for 2000msec and together with behaviors for 4000msec, during which participants were instructed to indicate their likelihood of approaching each person based on the given information (8-point scale; 1 = definitely would not; 8 = definitely would).

Data were collected over four seven-minute (210 TR) runs. Runs consisted of 42 pairs. Equal numbers of congruent, incongruent, and neutral-behavior pairs were viewed in each run. Trustworthy- and untrustworthy-looking faces were equally represented within all conditions in each run. Periods of baseline (indicated by a fixation cross) introduced jitter (Dale & Buckner, 1997) into the event-related design. Fixation intervals obtained using Optseq (<http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/opt-seq>) ranged from 0-22000msec.

Participants completed a post-task questionnaire including items related to task difficulty (e.g., “Did you find it more difficult to make decisions about people whose facial characteristics did not seem to match their behaviors?”) and enjoyment of interpersonal interactions (“Do you feel comfortable approaching new people?”; “Do you like meeting new people?”; “How many close friends do you have?”; “How introverted or extroverted do you consider yourself to be?”; and “Do you like learning new things about strangers?”). All items used a 7-point scale (e.g., 1 = not at all to 7 = very much so).

IMAGE ACQUISITION AND ANALYSIS

Data were collected at the Center for Brain Science at Harvard University with a Siemens Trio 3.0T whole-body scanner using a 12-channel headcoil and an echo-planar imaging sequence (TR = 2000msec, TE = 25msec, FOV = 216mm, flip angle = 90) to acquire 34 slices 3.0mm thick with no skip and 3.0mm isotropic voxels. Anatomical images were acquired with a multi-echo MPRAGE sequence (176 slices, 1.0mm thick, TR = 2530msec, TE₁ = 1.64msec, TE₂ = 3.5msec, TE₃ = 5.36msec, TE₄ = 7.22msec) (Wonderlick et al., 2009).

Analyses were conducted in SPM8 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuro-imaging, London, UK). Images were slice-time corrected, realigned to correct for motion, normalized to the MNI (Montreal Neurological Institute) template, and smoothed using an 8mm FWHM isotropic Gaussian kernel. We modeled events for the four-second epoch when faces and behaviors were displayed together. This epoch is an appropriate choice given that we wanted to model activity when appearance-based impressions were either confirmed or violated by behavior information. The two-second epoch when faces were viewed alone was modeled separately so these timepoints were not included in the implicit baseline. Because viewing faces alone preceded face-behavior pairings, it is inappropriate to consider neural responses to viewing faces alone. Thus, events (congruent, incongruent, or neutral-behavior pairs, and faces alone) were convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function and used to create contrasts of interest.

General Linear Model—We assessed regions responsive to incongruent versus congruent pairs by contrasting [incongruent > congruent] over the four seconds in which faces and behaviors appeared together. First-level images were submitted to second-level one-sample t-tests, as in Cloutier and colleagues, 2011. Peak coordinates were identified by an extent threshold of 19 contiguous voxels exceeding a voxel-wise threshold of $p < .001$. One thousand Monte Carlo simulations indicated this provided a corrected experiment-wise threshold of $p < .05$. This method (described in Slotnick, Moo, Segal, & Hart, 2003) has been used in numerous fMRI studies of social cognition (Quadflieg et al., 2009). Brodmann areas were obtained with MRICron (Rorden & Brett, 2000).

Psychophysiological Interaction—A psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis (Friston et al., 1997), performed using gPPI (<http://www.nitrc.org/projects/gppi>), examined functional connectivity to an mPFC seed identified at the group level GLM [incongruent > congruent] contrast (peak MNI coordinate: 6 50 1). gPPI accommodates more than two task conditions and simulations suggest greater sensitivity and specificity than SPM

implementation (McLaren, Ries, Xu, & Johnson, 2012). The deconvolved time series from a 6mm radius sphere around this coordinate was extracted from each participant. First-level images from the PPI analysis were entered into a one-sample t-test to identify regions eliciting correlated activity with mPFC during incongruent versus congruent trials.

RESULTS

BEHAVIOR

Because our aim was to investigate neural responses based on appearance-behavior congruity, we verified a behavioral congruity effect also existed. We were interested in the relative judgment strength of congruent and incongruent pairs, as prior work identified stronger judgments toward congruent versus incongruent face-behavior pairs (Cassidy & Gutchess, 2014). Approach judgment strength, or the degree of approach motivation relative to average approach motivation, may be of interest in exploring congruity. Although people may approach trustworthy- and untrustworthy-looking people performing positive behaviors, congruity impacts judgment *strength*.

For each participant, the approach judgment for each pair was subtracted from his or her mean judgment. To compare across congruent (i.e., trustworthy-positive and untrustworthy-negative) and incongruent (i.e., trustworthy-negative and untrustworthy-positive) pairs, we took the absolute values of these subtractions. This accounts for individual differences in scale use and has been used in work considering social judgment and trait attribution strength (Cassidy & Gutchess, 2014; Follett & Hess, 2002). We collapsed across valence because behavioral work has converged on the idea that faces are better distinguished when paired with congruent versus incongruent behaviors (Cassidy & Gutchess, 2014; Rule, Slepian, & Ambady, 2012) and because we did not have a priori predictions regarding valence.¹ We used multi-level modeling (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) to examine data where trials were nested within participants. Congruent and neutral-behavior pairs were dummy coded, such that incongruent pairs were an implicit baseline. The equations were as follows:

$$\text{Level 1: } JUDGMENT_{ij} = \beta_0j + \beta_1j * (CONGRUENT_{ij}) + \beta_2j * (NEUTRAL_BEHAVIOR_{ij}) + r_{ij}$$

$$\text{Level 2: } \beta_0j = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j}; \beta_1j = \gamma_{10}; \beta_2j = \gamma_{20}$$

$$\text{Mixed model: } JUDGMENT_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10} * CONGRUENT_{ij} + \gamma_{20} * NEUTRAL_BEHAVIOR_{ij} + u_{0j} + r_{ij}$$

An effect of congruent face-behaviors emerged ($\beta_1 = .54$, $t(2942) = 12.66$, $p < .001$). Congruent pairs ($M = 2.50$, $SD = .45$) received stronger judgments relative to the mean approach tendency than incongruent ($M = 1.96$, $SD = .49$). An effect of neutral-behavior pairs also emerged ($\beta_2 = -.77$, $SE = .04$, $t(2942) = -18.29$, $p < .001$), indicating weaker judgments of neutral-behavior pairs ($M = 1.19$, $SD = 0.38$) relative to the mean approach tendency than incongruent. These comparisons implicitly suggest stronger judgments for congruent over neutral-behavior pairs.

¹Exploratory analyses showing congruity effects regardless of valence verified collapsing across valence was appropriate. For negative behaviors, stronger judgments toward untrustworthy- versus trustworthy-looking faces emerged. For positive, stronger judgments toward trustworthy- versus untrustworthy-looking faces emerged. Collapsing across valence allows us to most parsimoniously address our hypotheses.

MANIPULATION CHECK

We hypothesized that forming impressions from incongruent cues requires more mentalizing than from congruent given the resource demands of inconsistency resolution (e.g., Macrae et al., 1999), with conflict weakening judgments. If this is true, difficulty in making decisions about incongruent versus congruent targets should lead to more disparity between congruent and incongruent targets judgment strength. We calculated disparity for each participant by subtracting the mean judgment strength of incongruent targets from the mean of congruent. We then correlated disparity with self-reported difficulty of making decisions about incongruent over congruent targets. A correlation between disparity and difficulty emerged, $r = .70$, $p < .001$. Participants with more disparity between congruent and incongruent target judgment strength reported more difficulty in making decisions about incongruent targets.

IMAGING

GLM—We identified regions from the [incongruent > congruent] contrast to assess whether increased mentalizing supported the incongruity's effect on judgment strength. As hypothesized, greater recruitment of right mPFC existed (Table 1A, Figure 2A), consistent with related work (Cloutier et al., 2011; Hehman et al., 2014; Ma et al., 2012; Mende-Siedlecki, Cai, & Todorov, 2013) and supporting the idea that people mentalize more in response to incongruent social cues. Additionally consistent with prior work (Hehman et al., 2014; Ma et al., 2012), a region of left dlPFC emerged (Table 1A, Figure 2B). dlPFC engages in tasks requiring cognitive control (Miller & Cohen, 2001). Contrasting [congruent > incongruent] yielded widespread activity in visual processing regions (Table 1B), suggesting perhaps more attention to faces for anticipated behaviors.

Psychophysiological Interaction (PPI)—PPI identified regions functionally connected with the mPFC seed for incongruent over congruent targets. No activations emerged at $p < .001$. Activity was coupled with dlPFC (BA 9; $k = 9$, $t = 4.26$, $p < .001$, peak MNI coordinates: 18 44 25) using a more liberal threshold. ($p < .005$; commonly utilized in related work, see Mende-Siedlecki, Baron, & Todorov, 2013). This suggests mPFC and dlPFC communicate more for incongruent versus congruent targets. mPFC-dlPFC connectivity has been identified during social incongruity during spontaneous, but not intentional, impression formation (Ma et al., 2012). Our effect may be less robust than previous findings because our task involved approach ratings directly related to the intentional formation of impressions.

ROI and Individual Differences—We verified that mPFC response characterized activity related to the inconsistency of appearance-behavior cues using independent region of interest (ROI) analyses. We selected two mPFC regions (MNI coordinates: dorsal mPFC: 4 46 28, ventral mPFC: 6 56 10) identified in related work (Ma et al., 2012) as sensitive to violations in behavior-based trait expectations by opposite valence behaviors. Spherical ROIs of 6mm were defined based on MNI coordinates. At $p < .001$, activity in the [incongruent > congruent] contrast was identified in the ventral, but not dorsal, mPFC ROI (Figure 3A). Thus, our findings complement work on processing inconsistent trait-related information, extending this work to include processing appearance-behavior inconsistencies.

Our secondary goal considered individual differences contributing to processing incongruent over congruent appearance-behavior cues. Specifically, we were interested in how differences in introversion and interpersonal ease relate to processing inconsistent person information. Because five post-task questionnaire items (see Methods) related to seeking out interpersonal interactions and had high internal consistency (Cronbach's $\alpha = .83$), we created a composite interpersonal enjoyment score by averaging these responses for each participant. We correlated [incongruent > congruent] parameter estimates from the ventral mPFC ROI with interpersonal enjoyment scores. A negative relationship emerged, $r = -.55$, $p = .02$ (Figure 3B). Those with lower interpersonal enjoyment had greater mPFC responses to incongruent over congruent targets. Those with lower interpersonal enjoyment did not, however, exhibit more disparity in judgment strength between congruent and incongruent targets, $r = .23$, $p = .35$.

DISCUSSION

Appearances elicit social expectancies (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1993; Olivola & Todorov, 2010). A core tenant of impression formation theory is that perceivers expect consistency in an individual's traits and behavior (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). Expecting consistency suggests that processing information incongruent with appearances is cognitively effortful, an idea supported by behavioral work (Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1994; Macrae et al., 1999), but crucial to maintain an organized impression. Forming impressions of people whose behaviors conflict (versus cohere) with appearance-based expectations may require increased mentalizing, with conflicting appearance-behavior cues ultimately tempering judgment strength. The present study used fMRI to inform behavioral work by clarifying the processes underlying stronger judgments toward congruent versus incongruent face-behavior pairs. Greater mPFC and dIPFC responses existed for incongruent over congruent targets, suggesting increased mentalizing and control when encountering incongruent appearance-behavior information.

MPFC activation is widely implicated in mentalizing (Ma et al., 2011; Van Overwalle, 2009). Thus, increased activity toward incongruent over congruent pairs could reflect more mentalizing to *integrate* social cues coming from separable domains, here visual (appearances) and abstract (behaviors). Sensitivity of mPFC to the congruency of appearance-behavior cues extends prior work finding differential neural activation based on inconsistent visual cues (Adams et al., 2003; Hehman et al., 2014), inconsistent abstract information (Cloutier et al., 2011), and for updating impressions based on inconsistent behaviors (Ma et al., 2012; Mende-Siedlecki, Cai, & Todorov, 2013). Our findings suggest a role for mPFC in integrating cues from multiple domains to form impressions, dovetailing nicely with recent work showing a causal role for dmPFC in impression integration (Ferrari et al., 2014). Moreover, mPFC activity complements behavioral models of person perception, in that when information about others violates our expectations of them, additional inferences and processing help resolve the violation (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990).

Interestingly, applying stereotypes also elicits mPFC activity (Mitchell, Ames, Jenkins, & Banaji, 2009; Quadflieg et al., 2011; Quadflieg et al., 2009). A distinction between this work

and ours is that our participants *integrated* behaviors with appearances, whereas stereotype work often involves deciding how much someone would act in a stereotyped way. Future work could investigate potentially differential mPFC contributions to integrating social information and stereotyping, and if activation reflects similar or different processes. For instance, multivariate pattern analysis could distinguish whether different mPFC subregions support these processes, which would indicate that these psychological processes are distinct from each other.

Encountering incongruent over congruent targets also elicited dlPFC activity. dlPFC supports cognitive control operations (Braver, Paxton, Locke, & Barch, 2009; for a review, see Miller & Cohen, 2001) potentially necessary to integrate incongruent appearance-behavior cues into organized impressions. Supporting this idea, related work has reported lateral prefrontal recruitment for expectation violating social stimuli (Cloutier et al., 2011; Ma et al., 2012; Weissman, Perkins, & Woldorff, 2008; Zaki, Hennigan, Weber, & Ochsner, 2010). More dlPFC activity when encountering incongruent over congruent targets mirrors classic social congruity work showing unexpected behaviors as more difficult to comprehend and requiring more effort to link together, increasing their prominence in observers' minds (Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Srull, 1981; Srull & Wyer, 1989).

It is therefore interesting that incongruity *tempered* judgment strength, when violations have exacerbated extremity in other work. Notably, work finding exacerbated extremity has involved categorical stereotypes (e.g., gender) and expectation-violating behaviors (Bettencourt, Dill, Greathouse, Charlton, & Mulholland, 1997). Facial trustworthiness is an individuating, versus categorical, distinction (Todorov, 2008). Reduced judgment strength given incongruent appearance-behavior cues could thereby better relate to work illustrating that congruent facial features strongly influence decision overconfidence (Hassin & Trope, 2000) as compared to work involving the violation of categorical stereotypes.

Our more exploratory goal regarded whether individual differences in interpersonal engagement influence the processing of incongruent versus congruent social cues. We provide initial evidence that less interpersonal engagement is linked to greater mPFC activity toward incongruent over congruent targets. Our findings support work demonstrating that introverted individuals exhibit non-verbal decoding deficits under cognitive load (Lieberman & Rosenthal, 2001). Such work is relevant to the present task, as successful decoding of non-verbal behavior predicts many social outcomes (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992). Speculatively, less engagement in and enjoyment of interpersonal interactions could make processing incongruent over congruent targets more effortful, eliciting greater mentalizing. Indeed, relative introversion corresponds to myriad neuroanatomical structural (Wright et al., 2006) and functional (Canli, 2004; Gray et al., 2005) variations. Our measure of judgment strength disparity did *not* correlate with interpersonal enjoyment, consistent with work showing that differential neural processing can lead to similar behavior (Krendl et al., 2009) and highlighting a unique role for fMRI in elucidating individual differences in behavior. Albeit intriguing, this finding is only a first step in linking personality differences to mentalizing-related activity. Future research should utilize well-validated standard personality measures to clarify a personality mechanism underlying differential neural response to social congruity.

These findings inform past behavioral work (Cassidy & Gutchess, 2014; Cassidy et al., 2012; Kleider, Cavrak, & Knuycky, 2012; Nash et al., 2010; Rule et al., 2012; Rule, Tskhay, Freeman, & Ambady, 2014; Suzuki & Suga, 2010) by localizing brain regions whose engagement underlies the processing of incongruent versus congruent appearance-behavior information. MPFC and dlPFC activity co-occur with congruity effects in judgment strength, connecting brain function linked to mentalizing and control to a key social behavior dependent on appearance-behavior congruity: approach likelihood. Moreover, individuals with *less* interpersonal ease activate mPFC *more* when encountering incongruent over congruent targets, suggesting differences in how people feel about social interaction impact brain activity supporting the processing of different social cues. Although future work can clarify specific individual differences and mechanisms supporting the processing of social cue congruity, these findings extend previous work (Cloutier et al., 2011; Ma et al., 2012; Mende-Siedlecki, Cai, & Todorov, 2013; Zaki et al., 2010) by demonstrating sensitivity to appearance-behavior congruity.

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FIGURE 1.
Examples of congruent, incongruent, and neutral-behavior targets.

FIGURE 2.
mPFC (A) and dlPFC (B) activated more for incongruent > congruent targets.

FIGURE 3.

Increased activation to incongruent > congruent targets was evident in an independent ventral mPFC ROI (A). Composite interpersonal enjoyment scores correlated with ventral mPFC engagement to incongruent > congruent targets (B).

TABLE 1

Brain Regions Responsive to Appearance-Behavior Congruity

A. Incongruent > Congruent						
BA	Incongruent > Congruent	k	t	p-value	x	y z
9/46	L dorsolateral prefrontal cortex	30	5.54	< .001	-30	26 37
10	R medial prefrontal cortex	34	5.21	< .001	6	50 1
B. Congruent > Incongruent						
BA	Congruent > Incongruent	k	t	p-value	x	y z
17	R primary visual cortex	244	7.70	< .001	15	-88 -2
18	L visual association area	187	6.01	< .001	-15	-97 1
18	L visual association area		5.47	< .001	-33	-85 -11
19	L extrastriate cortex		4.61	< .001	-45	-79 -5
19	R extrastriate cortex	49	4.62	< .001	42	-76 -11

Note. Regions listed without cluster sizes are subsumed by the cluster listed above. Regions are listed from highest to lowest t-value.

L = left; R = right; k = cluster size; BA = approximate Brodmann's area;

x, y, and z represent MNI coordinates of the peak voxel within each cluster. Cluster sizes are reported using a voxel-wise threshold of $p < .001$ and a 19-voxel extent threshold for an experiment-wise threshold of $p < .05$.