systematic and thoughtful analysis that persuasively explains significant elements of mass opinion. Moreover, Feldman, Huddy, and Marcus do scholars, students, journalists, policymakers, and ordinary citizens a favor by raising the alarm about what American democracy may be losing with the decline of serious, broadly accessible newspaper reporting. This is a point that is too often lost amid breathless analyses and polemics touting the democratizing effects of digital media. While there is room for reasonable debate about some of the book's findings, there should be no debate that *Going to War in Iraq* is a significant and provocative addition to the growing literature on foreign policy opinion formation.

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Marc J. Hetherington and Thomas J. Rudolph. *Why Washington Won't Work: Polarization, Political Trust, and the Governing Crisis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2015. 256 pp. \$85.00 (cloth). \$27.00 (paper).

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When it comes to most policy debates, Americans are simultaneously polarized and profoundly ignorant. Recent work reconciles this contradiction by arguing that political polarization is primarily affective and not principled. But the affective turn in the work on partisanship largely focuses on measuring, bounding, and defining the nature of inter-party animus. Hetherington and Rudolph step beyond these exploratory questions to document how affective polarization changes and drives political preferences. This book is as important as it is timely.

Why Washington Won't Work begins by noting that traditional models of public opinion and polarization fail to adequately explain the strongly polarized views of political in-groups and political out-groups. Consistent with other work, Hetherington and Rudolph argue that although partisans may not understand the political policies of either party, they seem to think that their party is virtuous and good, and that members of the opposing party are untrustworthy and bad. In this setup, the electorate uses primal assessments to heuristically evaluate policies, representatives, and party identifiers. Hetherington and Rudolph sidestep the troubling implications of affective polarization on representation and democratic accountability to focus on measuring how partisan mistrust changes political outcomes. This is a logical choice. We must know how important and consequential the polarization of affect and trust are in order to address the limits they impose on democratic accountability.

The argument hinges on a simple but convincing model: affective divides among the electorate are focused (primed) by elites to generate/invalidate

political trust. Using this model, Hetherington and Rudolph show that affective political biases create mistrust toward the actions and motivations of the political opposition, and that the resulting mistrust paralyzes national politics. With a robust combination of cross-sectional survey data, panel data, and experimental studies, the authors define some of the causes of political mistrust and show the consistent relationship between polarized trust and political outcomes. The authors are circumspect about using cross-sectional data to assert anything more than a correlation, but the multimodal approaches pool to show a clear relationship between the polarization of political trust and political outcomes.

In the first two chapters of the book, Hetherington and Rudolph define the major terms and theories explored in the book. In the third chapter, the authors identify what creates and changes political trust. Here, the authors argue that political trust has polarized over time, with the separation between in-group and out-group trust accelerating in recent decades. Importantly, Hetherington and Rudolph note that changes to the nature of partisanship and our political system make it unlikely that the nation will return to the high levels of political trust measured in the canonical research of the 1950s and 1960s.

The fourth chapter explores the causes of the polarization in political trust observed in the era post-2000. Hetherington and Rudolph argue that the polarization of political trust during this period was caused by both affective polarization and the application of motivated reasoning to the question of trust. Chapter 5 documents how evaluations of political trust are context dependent. With a survey experiment, the authors show that priming interacts with political trust to change policy positions. Taken together, chapters 4 and 5 offer a causal story of the relationship between polarized trust and public opinion.

Returning to observational data, the authors explore the effects of political trust in a series of specific political contexts in chapters 6 (trust and conservatives), 7 (trust and the economy), and 8 (trust and Obamacare). The case studies are well articulated, and the overlaid analysis does suggest the importance of polarized political trust, but the examples are clearly corner cases. If the polarization of political trust is as large and powerful as the authors argue, it is reasonable to expect effects in even the most basic legislative actions. Because Hetherington and Rudolph do not engage the effects of polarized trust in less salient and divisive issues, there is a gap in the story that future research will need to address.

There is much to applaud in this book: the use of many complementary data sets, the careful consideration of the origins and consequences of the trust divide, and a cogent synthesis of how partisans grew to mistrust the opposition. The final conclusion—that things will probably get better—is normatively appealing but not totally convincing. The authors show that priming government efficacy restores some political trust, but these kind of pro-government

messages are rare in both media content and elite political rhetoric. There is also no clear mechanism to explain how trust-building news might regularly enter the public consciousness. It is possible that a transformative moment similar to the election of 1896 could attenuate some partisan conflict, but the serious prospect of a Trump nomination/presidency likely signals that even darker days are ahead.

This book offers a significant contribution to our understanding of the role of trust in governance and the effects of affective polarization. It is carefully argued, well written, and accessible. It will be important for years to come.

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