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Beyond Group-Threat: Temporal Dynamics of International Migration and Linkages to Anti-Foreigner Sentiment

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Abstract

Prior research on the association between country-level patterns of international migration and anti-foreigner sentiment shows that larger foreign-born concentrations increase perceptions of threat among native-born individuals in receiving countries, which, in turn, give rise to exclusionary preferences. While recent work has assembled a list of limiting conditions that shape the strength of this association, I argue that these efforts are premature because they are based on a narrow way of conceptualising and measuring international migration. In contrast to concepts and measures privileging the size of the foreign-born population in receiving countries, I draw from other literatures highlighting the temporal dynamics of migration. In considering the role of the temporal dynamics of international migration in explaining variation in anti-foreigner sentiment, the question is whether and how the temporal stability of the foreign-born population in receiving countries matters. My results suggest that it does. The size and temporal stability of the foreign-born population play opposing roles in aggravating and ameliorating anti-foreigner sentiment, respectively, with each operating via different pathways at the individual level. My work thus breaks new ground by challenging existing theoretical constructs and operationalisations in the group-threat literature.

Keywords

Anti-foreigner sentiment; Group size; Group threat; Immigration; Intergroup contact

Introduction

On July 22, 2011, Anders Breivik, author of the self-published manifesto, *2083: A European Declaration of Independence*, carried out a series of highly orchestrated bombings and shootings, which resulted in the deaths of 77 individuals in Oslo, Norway's capital, and at a youth camp on the island of Utøya. The majority of those killed were teenagers. These events, while altogether alarming and incredibly heartbreaking, were also unique in that Breivik is a Norwegian-born citizen.

In Breivik's (2011:Sec. 2.28) case, his manifesto contains a list of grievances about the 'unprecedented amount of immigration' into countries like Norway, and the 'increased [economic and social] costs' associated with large-scale immigration, especially from 'Muslim' countries. Perhaps the most striking feature of his manifesto is the second half, wherein he connects international migration to issues ranging from armed resistance (Sec. 3.4) and acts of terrorism (Sec. 3.22) to the manufacturing and use of chemical and biological weapons (Sec. 3.55) and establishment of terror cells worldwide (Sec. 3.19), complete with a marketing and communications infrastructure (Sec. 3.60-3.61).

Shelving concerns about Breivik's psychological state and well-being (Kalstad 2012), the events of July 22 raise important questions about the connection between international migration and anti-foreigner sentiment. In particular, these events cause us to reconsider what we know about how international migration patterns, and how these patterns are perceived by individuals, contribute to perceptions of threat and subsequent exclusionary preferences, not to mention acts of horrific violence.

In this paper, I adopt a definition of *anti-foreigner sentiment* that includes both perceptions 'that an outside group threatens [one's] prerogatives' (Quillian 1995:586) and accompanying 'preferences for a disadvantageous or discriminatory treatment of the outgroup' (Schlueter and Scheepers 2010:289). The association between country-level patterns of international migration and anti-foreigner sentiment has been studied extensively. Bracketing variation in this association over time and national contexts, research shows that native-born persons living in countries with relatively large foreign-born concentrations tend to exhibit more pronounced anti-foreigner attitudes (Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002). The exact mechanism identified in these studies is that large foreign-born concentrations elicit perceptions of threat among native-born persons, which, in turn, foster more concrete expressions of difference in the form of exclusionary preferences (Scheepers et al. 2002; Pettigrew et al. 2010).

The above findings are perhaps not surprising; after all, as Hollifield (2000:139) once remarked, 'xenophobia could be considered a basic human instinct.' Social-psychologists have long recognized that anti-foreigner sentiment is a response to a set of external stimuli (Allport 1954). Although there exists a large body of research on how the features of one's external environment are perceived and translated into feelings of threat and exclusionary preferences (Citrin and Sides 2006; Hjerm 2007, 2009; Kunovich 2004; Pettigrew and Meertens 1995; Pettigrew et al. 2010; Rustenbach 2010; Savelkoul et al. 2010; Schlueter and Davidov 2011; Schlueter and Wagner 2008), relatively less is known about the nature and nuances of many external stimuli themselves, e.g., their properties, internal dynamics, etc.

With few exceptions (e.g., Schneider 2008), researchers studying the relationship between international migration and anti-foreigner sentiment have uncritically adopted the idea that international migration, 'operationalised as the proportion of foreign-born' persons in receiving countries (Hjerm 2007:1270), serves as a contextual catalyst that intensifies anti-foreigner sentiment. However, as I argue in this paper, the size dimension of international migration patterns is only one manifestation of a highly nebulous system of connections between places.

Other literatures, some of which have not been incorporated into research on anti-foreigner sentiment to date, indicate that there is also an important *temporal* dimension to international migration patterns (DeWaard 2013; Sampson and Groves 1989), which might play a role in explaining in anti-foreigner sentiment. In this paper, I develop an argument for taking seriously the temporal dynamics of international migration in accounts of anti-foreigner sentiment. I then develop a statistical model in which I compare the relatively explanatory power of both the size and temporal stability of the foreign-born population to explaining variation in anti-foreigner sentiment among native-born persons in 21 European countries.

Throughout, the guiding question is not merely *how large* the foreign-born population is in receiving countries, and the implications for anti-foreigner sentiment, but also *how long* the foreign-born population typically resides in these destinations. I show that the temporal stability of migrants in receiving countries functions in exactly the opposite way as the percent foreign-born, and is associated with *reductions* in anti-foreigner sentiment. Moreover, the size and temporal stability of the foreign-born population operate via different pathways at the individual-level.

Background

The Group-Threat Paradigm

Since the late-1950s, an intuitive notion has informed place-based research on the dynamics of intergroup relations and inequality. Codified by Blalock (1967:143), the *group-threat thesis* posits a relationship ‘between discrimination and the relative size of the minority’ group in a locale. According to this thesis, the relative size of a minority group serves to elicit perceptions of threat among members of the majority group, which, in turn, shape exclusionary preferences.

The group-threat thesis has been used to study the relationship between the relative size of the foreign-born population in receiving societies and the prevalence of anti-foreigner sentiment among native-born persons in many national and supranational contexts, including Canada, Europe, Israel, Turkey, and the United States (Citrin and Sides 2006; Dixon and Ergin 2010; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Quillian 1995, 1996; Rustenbach 2010; Schneider 2008; Semyonov et al. 2002, 2006; Pettigrew et al. 2010; Wilkes et al. 2008). These studies have sought to show whether and under what conditions the size of the foreign-born population acts as a contextual catalyst that elicits anti-foreigner attitudes among native-born individuals. One early paper by Quillian (1995), who was arguably the first to develop a hierarchical model of this relationship in the European context, serves as the key point of reference in the current paper.

Before detailing Quillian's (1995) argument, it is useful to distinguish three primary elements of the group-threat thesis—visibility, threat perceptions, and exclusionary preferences. Visibility refers to the presence of a minority group in a locale, and is typically operationalised as the proportionate size of a minority group relative to the majority or total population. Perceptions of threat refer to the ‘perception by the dominant group that an outside group threatens their group's prerogatives’ (Quillian 1995:586), and include feelings

of 'subjectively perceived' competition, vulnerability, unfamiliarity, etc. (Scheepers et al. 2002:18), e.g., in the labor market. Finally, exclusionary preferences refer to more concrete expressions of difference, and speak to the fact that minority group size is often linked to negative material outcomes (Beggs et al. 1997), e.g., stratification, inequality, and other forms of social exclusion.

The starting point for any chronology of studies linking international migration and anti-foreigner sentiment is Quillian's (1995:586) work on perceptions of 'collective threat' among native-born persons in response to 'the numerical size' of the foreign-born population. Quillian's (1995:606) argument was that, while threat 'is perceived by individuals, ... its relationship to prejudice depends on a comparison of the relations between dominant and subordinate social groups.' Quillian found that the percent foreign-born explained cross-national variation in anti-foreigner sentiment among native-born respondents, even after controlling for a broad range of individual characteristics. This relationship is more pronounced when economic conditions in a country are poor.

Scheepers et al. (2002:29) later distinguished perceptions of threat from exclusionary preferences. They found that the 'perception of ethnic threat...[is a] crucial mediating link' between the size of the foreign-born population and exclusionary preferences. More recent work lends further support to this idea, with Schlueter and Scheepers (2010:292) observing that 'outgroup size...[is] positively associated with perceived group threat...[which relates] positively to both anti-immigrant discriminatory intentions and disapproval of immigrants.'

Given that threat perceptions and exclusionary preferences have the potential to mutually inform one another, one important branch of research in this area has been to rule out endogeneity issues of this sort (Powers and Ellison 1995). The main strategy in the empirical literature has been to use multiple-wave panel surveys (Schlueter et al. 2008) and simultaneous equation models (Pettigrew et al. 2010; Scheepers et al. 2002; Schlueter and Scheepers 2010; Wagner et al. 2008) to test for the existence of a reciprocal pathway between threat perceptions and exclusionary preferences. Consistent with Blalock's (1967) original thesis, the general consensus to date is and remains that perceptions of threat shape '[exclusionary] attitudes and not vice versa' (Schlueter and Scheepers 2010:293; Schlueter et al. 2008).

Having distinguished the three primary elements of the group-threat thesis, I offer a working definition of anti-foreigner sentiment going forward. First, borrowing from Lamont and Molnár's (2002:168) work on symbolic boundaries, anti-foreigner sentiment clearly involves 'conceptual distinctions [and] interpretive strategies' in the form of perceptions of threat. Anti-foreigner sentiment is likewise expressed in more concrete social boundaries in the form of exclusionary preferences. In this paper, I therefore define anti-foreigner sentiment to include both threat perceptions and exclusionary preferences. Doing so is consistent with Quillian's (1995:591) idea that anti-foreigner sentiment involves 'feeling[s] by the dominant group that their prerogatives are threatened by the subordinate group,' as well as with more recent work by Schlueter and Scheepers (2010:289), who suggest that anti-foreigner sentiment also encompasses 'preferences for a disadvantageous or discriminatory treatment of the outgroup.'

Heterogeneity in the Group-Threat Linkage

Research after Quillian (1995) has tended to go in the direction of identifying and assessing the role of a broad range of factors that partially or fully explain away the direct association between the percent foreign-born and anti-foreigner sentiment. While I do not have the space to discuss these studies in detail, the general take away is that the group-threat mechanism does depend on number of other factors. These include, for example:

- National and local economic conditions (Rustenbach 2010), as well as one's absolute and relative socioeconomic position (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Hjerm 2007, 2009; Kunovich 2004; Quillian 1995; Scheve and Slaughter 1999; Semyonov et al. 2006; Wilkes et al. 2008)
- The sensationalisation of immigration in national and local politics and the media (Fennema 1997; Hjerm 2009; Mudde 2012; Schlueter and Davidov 2011; Van der Brug et al. 2005).
- Individual perceptions, values, and identities (Billiet et al. 2003; Citrin and Sides 2006; Heath and Tilley 2005; Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011; Lewin-Epstein and Levanon 2005; Maddens et al. 2000; Pehrson and Green 2010; Pettigrew et al. 2010)
- [Constructive] intergroup contact with immigrants (Pettigrew 1998; Pettigrew et al. 2010; Savelkoul et al. 2010; Schneider 2008; Schlueter and Scheepers 2010; Stein et al. 2000; Wagner et al. 2008).

While the above studies represent important contributions to this area of research given their emphasis on *process*, as Hjerm (2007:1270) noted, the fact that the positive association between the size of the foreign-born population and anti-foreigner sentiment is explained away by these factors does 'not, in any way, show that group threat is not a valid theory of anti-immigrant attitudes.' Instead, these findings serve to demonstrate that the group-threat mechanism is contingent on a set of processes that vary over time, place, and individuals. As such, attempts to falsify the group-threat thesis must go beyond merely accumulating 'an open-ended laundry list of...limiting conditions' toward unpacking its tenets, assumptions, and blind spots (Pettigrew 1998:69; Semyonov et al. 2007).

This entails rethinking what we know about how groups are present in places. With respect to international migration, as discussed above, foreign-born populations are present in receiving countries by virtue of their size. However, as I discuss below, there are multiple ways to envision the presence of immigrants (or any group for that matter) at the level of place that go beyond the current preoccupation in the literature with group size.

The Temporal Dynamics of International Migration

According to McGinnis (1968:712, emphasis mine; see also Roseman 1971), because migration, 'in its most skeletal form, is just motion through...space, its analysis clearly must include a *temporal* component.' This is to say that migration is simultaneously a process that connects places in space through time. The implication, then, is that these movements give rise to differential accumulations of time experienced by migrants in and across places. With respect to the work of the current paper, the central question is therefore whether and how

the temporal dynamics of international migration matter for anti-foreigner sentiment. While there is reason to believe that they might, the available evidence is sparse and comes from studies largely outside of the purview of many scholars working on anti-foreigner sentiment.

To illustrate, social disorganization theory treats the ‘stability’ of groups in places as a distinctive feature of place alongside two other factors, local economic conditions and group size; together, these three features are said to shape the very ‘social fabric’ of places (Sampson and Groves 1989:780-781). Importantly, the stability of groups of places is conceptualised as a ‘temporal process’ (Ibid.; see also Bursik 1968; Crutchfield et al. 1982; Shaw and McKay 1942; Sutherland 1934), involving many of the insights espoused by McGinnis (1968). Specifically, the stability of groups in places is a function population turnover, or churning. This churning gives rise to important temporal variation in the stability of groups in places, which subsequently shapes whether and how persons recognize and interact with one another in meaningful ways, e.g. developing and maintaining interpersonal relationships, trust and affective ties, and other forms of constructive intergroup contact (Alexander 2005; Cook 1962; Pettigrew 1998; Sampson 1984; Simcha-Fagan and Schwartz 1986; Zajonc 1968).

Recently, there have been some promising signs pointing to the recognition of the potential import of the temporal dynamics of international migration in research of anti-foreigner sentiment. For example, responding to Ceobanu and Escandell's (2010:323) call to expand ‘the notion of context through the creation of new measures [that] allow better tapping of a country's institutional environment,’ DeWaard (2013:267) developed a measure summarizing, what he called, ‘migrants' expected time of residence’ in each of 31 countries in the European Union (EU) and European Free Trade Association (EFTA). While DeWaard (2013:277) stopped short of testing the efficacy of this measure in models of anti-foreigner sentiment, he did show that this measure is negatively correlated with the percent foreign-born in these countries. This work suggests that the size and temporal stability of the foreign-born population might have different implications for anti-foreigner sentiment. The current paper tests this idea.

However, before providing details on the empirical model that is tested in this paper, it is worth considering two mechanisms at the individual-level that have been shown in previous research to condition the association between the size (and, presumably, temporal stability) of the foreign-born population and anti-foreigner sentiment. These include perceptions of the size of the foreign-born population and intergroup contact with immigrants (Citrin and Sides 2006; Pettigrew et al. 2010; Schneider 2008).

The size of the foreign-born population has been shown to be positively associated with perceptions of the size of the foreign-born population and intergroup contact with immigrants. That is, native-born persons perceive that the foreign-born population is larger (relative to in neighboring countries) when the foreign-born population is, demographically speaking, larger. Likewise, a large foreign-born population affords greater ‘potential for extensive and repeated [intergroup] contacts’ (Pettigrew et al. 1998:76; see also Allport 1954; Cook 1962). While intergroup contact is associated with decreases in anti-foreigner sentiment, perceptions of the size of the foreign-born population are associated with

increases in anti-foreigner sentiment. Thus, taking into account these intermediary pathways, the size of the foreign-born population has both positive and negative effects on anti-foreigner sentiment. Stein et al. (2000:299) refer to the former as a 'corrective' effect.

On the basis of insights gleaned from social disorganization theory, my expectation is that native-born respondents in countries with a more transient foreign-born population, i.e., less temporal stability, will be characterized by heightened anti-foreigner attitudes. This suggests *a priori* opposing effects of the size and temporal stability of the foreign-born population on anti-foreigner sentiment. As the former increases, anti-foreigner sentiment is expected to increase; yet, as the latter increases, anti-foreigner sentiment is expected to decrease. While the literature on social disorganization theory does not offer any predictions with respect to the intermediary role of perceptions of the size of the foreign-born population, this literature does suggest that the temporal stability of the foreign-born population should, like the size of the foreign-born population, afford more opportunities for intergroup contact between native- and foreign-born individuals. I therefore expect there to be a positive association between the temporal stability of the foreign-born population and intergroup contact.

Having distinguished the size and temporal stability of the foreign-born population, as well as discussed two mechanisms at the individual level that potentially condition the effects of these contextual factors on anti-foreigner sentiment, in Figure 1, I present the theoretical model that is advanced and subsequently tested in this paper. The anticipated direction of each effect is also displayed.

Excluding the temporal stability of the foreign-born population, this model is a standard group-threat model that reflects the state of current research on the link between the size of the foreign-born population and anti-foreigner sentiment (Citrin and Sides 2006; Pettigrew et al. 2010; Schneider 2008). My contribution in this paper is therefore to consider the role of the temporal stability of the foreign-born population alongside the size of the foreign-born population.

Data and Methods

Before detailing the data sources and measures used in the analysis, I begin by discussing the empirical model and modeling strategy that is used in the current paper.

A Structural Model of Anti-Foreigner Sentiment

The empirical model that corresponds to the theoretical model of anti-foreigner sentiment above is displayed in Figure 2.

Anti-foreigner sentiment involves both symbolic and social boundaries in the form of perceived threat and exclusionary preferences. Following Schneider (2008) and others, perceived threat is treated as a latent construct. As I discuss in the next subsection, this construct is measured using six items, *y5-y10*, tapping various dimensions of threat perceptions. Exclusionary preferences are likewise treated as a latent construct, and are measured using four items, *y1-y4*, tapping more concrete expressions of difference. I treat perceived threat and exclusionary preferences as latent constructs given the potential for

measurement error associated with measuring these constructs with any single survey item. This is to say that, while perceived threat likely includes feelings of 'subjectively perceived socioeconomic' competition, e.g., in the labor market (Scheepers et al. 2002:18), measuring perceived threat using a single indicator tapping feelings of competition with respect to one's labor market position would miss other types of threat perceptions, e.g., feelings of 'cultural distance' and distrust (Schneider 2008:54).

In addition to the measurement component of the model displayed in Figure 2, relative other regression approaches, another advantage of this modeling strategy is the structural nature of the model, and the ability to distinguish and assess the direct, indirect, and total effects of the size and temporal stability of the foreign-born population on anti-foreigner sentiment (Pettigrew et al. 2010). This means that I am able to distinguish the direct and mediated (indirect) effects of each contextual measure on anti-foreigner sentiment. This models also afford the opportunity to assess moderator effects, i.e., interactions (not shown in Figure 2), between the size and temporal stability of the foreign-born population.

The model shown in Figure 2 is estimated using the Mplus statistical software program (Muthén and Muthén 2006). Given the nested structure of my data, i.e., individuals nested within countries (which I discuss in the following two subsections), it would be preferable to conduct a multilevel analysis (Pettigrew et al. 2010); however, given an insufficient number of 'level-two' units (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Snijders and Bosker 2012), which, in my case, correspond to 21 European countries, I employ a robust maximum likelihood procedure to correct the standard errors for non-independence (Muthén and Satorra 1995). The model is estimated using two sets of weights. The first set accounts for differential probabilities of selection into the sample *within* countries, and the second set accounts for differences in population size *between* countries. One particularly unique advantage of Mplus is that missing data due to non-response are handled via full information maximum likelihood (FIML), which, relative to other approaches, e.g., listwise deletion and mean substitution, yields less biased and more efficient estimates while making use of all available data (Wothke 2000).

Country-Level Data and Measures

The data sources and measures used in this paper are listed and described in Table 1.

I operationalise the size of the foreign-born population using a measure of the percent foreign-born. I likewise operationalise the temporal stability of the foreign-born population using DeWaard's (2013) estimates of migrants' expected years of residence in the host country. These estimates are taken, and in DeWaard's (2013) case, derived from harmonised data on foreign-born population, i.e., migrant, stocks and migration flows, respectively. These data are publicly available from the Migration Modeling for Statistical Analysis (MIMOSA) Project (de Beer et al. 2010; Raymer et al. 2011).

Previous research has shown that data on international migration from such sources as Eurostat, the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations, etc., are not comparable across countries (Kupiszewska and Nowok 2008; Poulain et al. 2006). This is due to the fact that countries use different definitions for

classifying migrations (in the case transitions recorded in a population register) and migrants (in the case of persons recording a change in residence in a census), not to mention different timing criteria, e.g., 6 months, one year, etc., for determining whether a migration has actually occurred (Raymer et al. 2013). The MIMOSA estimates, by contrast, are benchmarked to a one-year timing criterion for long-term migration per the recommendations of the United Nations (1998). Accordingly, these estimates are comparable across countries.

It would be ideal to have measures of the percent foreign-born and migrants' expected time of residence not only for each host country, but also for each foreign-born group by country of origin. While considerable progress has been made in this area with respect to estimates of the percent foreign-born by country of origin (Özden et al. 2011), presently, migration flow data of the sort needed to estimate the quantities developed by DeWaard (2013) do not exist. That said, the MIMOSA estimates are disaggregated by EU/non-EU region of origin. Accordingly, in this paper, the measures of the percent foreign-born and migrants' expected years of residence refer to migrants from outside of the EU.

It is worth also mentioning why I use DeWaard's (2013) estimates, and not duration of stay estimates provided by the OECD (2008). First, as I have already discussed, the OECD (2008) estimates are not harmonised, and are therefore not comparable across countries. Second, these estimates are inexact.¹ Third, and finally, these estimates are conceptually quite different from DeWaard's (2013). To see how, consider a hypothetical country in which the foreign-born population is composed entirely of infants between the ages of zero and one. In this country, the average duration of stay would be less than one year, not because the foreign-born population is turning over rapidly via emigration and immigration, but, rather, on account of the age structure of the foreign-born population. The OECD (2008) estimates do not account for this feature. By contrast, DeWaard's (2013:268) estimates explicitly take into the age structure of migration, and summarize the average number of years that a migrant could be expected to live in each country in the EU/EFTA on the basis of prevailing rates of age-specific country-to-country migration.²

Finally, although I do have the space to discuss these in much detail, in my analysis, I control for two country-level variables that have been shown in previous research to be strong predictors of anti-foreigner sentiment: the percent of the popular vote in parliamentary elections going to right-wing political parties and GDP per capita (Semyonov et al. 2006; Rustenbach 2010).

¹These estimates are provided in coarse duration of stay intervals. Estimates derived from labor force surveys are provided in three intervals: up to 5 years, 5-10 years, and more than 10 years. Estimates derived from censuses are provided in six intervals: up to 1 year, 1-3 years, 3-5 years, 5-10 years, 10-20 years, and more than 20 years. Calculating the average duration of stay would therefore require imposing assumptions about the average duration of stay within each interval, as well as a fixed upper bound on the highest interval.

²DeWaard's (2013) estimates are a type of conditional life expectancy at birth, which summarize the average number of years that a person could be expected to live in a given receiving country, conditional on not only the rates of age-specific mortality, but also on age-specific rates of country-to-country migration.

Individual-Level Data and Measures

At the individual level, several data sources contain information on anti-foreigner sentiment. These include, for example, the set of Eurobarometer surveys (Coenders 2001; Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002; Semyonov et al. 2006; Wagner and van Dick 2001), six rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), as well as a one-time rotating immigration module in 2002/2003 (Citrin and Sides 2006; Preston et al. 2002; Rustenbach 2010; Savelkoul et al. 2011; Schneider 2008, Schlueter and Wagner 2008), and the International Social Survey Programme's (ISSP) module on national identity (Kunovich 2004).

There are benefits and drawbacks to each of these sources. Semyonov et al. (2006), for example, constructed indexes of anti-foreigner sentiment in 1988, 1994, 1997, and 2000 using four items that were consistent across consecutive waves of Eurobarometer surveys. The advantage of this approach was their ability to analyze multiple cross-sections over time. The primary drawback, however, was the dearth of measures required to adequately test the sort of theoretical model shown in Figure 1. The indexes constructed by Semyonov et al. (2006), were comprised of four measures tapping only exclusionary preferences. Accordingly, they did not (and could not) distinguish threat perceptions from exclusionary preferences, which, importantly, is a distinction that is central to Blalock's (1967) original thesis.

A similar approach could be implemented using consecutive rounds of the ESS; however, one runs into the opposite problem as that faced by Semyonov et al. (2006). Consecutive rounds of the ESS contain only three measures tapping threat perceptions; these surveys do not ask respondents about exclusionary preferences in each round. What is more is the fact that only one dimension of threat perceptions is solicited in each round, namely feelings of 'subjectively perceived socioeconomic' competition (Scheepers et al. 2002:18). Missing is any consideration of feelings of 'cultural distance' and distrust or other forms of perceived threat (Schneider 2008:54). For this reason, in the current paper, I follow previous research and use the 2002 ESS and accompanying 2002/2003 immigration module, which contain information on both threat perceptions and exclusionary preferences (Citrin and Sides 2006; Rustenbach 2010; Savelkoul et al. 2011; Schneider 2008, Schlueter and Wagner 2008).

The 2002 ESS and accompanying 2002/2003 immigration module contain detailed survey responses for 42,359 persons in 21 European countries and Israel. These data were collected via standardized personal interviews following a rigorous methodology to ensure the cross-national comparability of responses, with special attention given to issues of selection into the sample within countries, the translation of the questionnaire, and differential population size between countries (Jowell et al. 2003). In the current paper, I focus on native-born respondents in 21 European countries. Native-born respondents are selected into the analysis on the basis of their age (18+), country of birth (they must have been born in the country in which survey was administered), and parents' country of birth (at least one parent must have been born in the country in which the respondent was surveyed). These criteria are the same as or similar to those used in previous studies to identify native-born respondents in the ESS (Citrin and Sides 2006; Schneider 2008). After applying these criteria, the starting sample size is 34,295 persons in 21 European countries.

Toward distinguishing threat perceptions from exclusionary preferences, I also follow previous research and treat these as latent constructs. For each construct, a total of six and four items are available in the ESS, respectively (see Table 1 for descriptions). Available items used to measure perceived threat include three items tapping feelings of economic insecurity (these are the three items that are available across consecutive rounds of the ESS), one item tapping feelings of cultural unfamiliarity and enrichment, and two items which tap perceptions of overall quality of life and crime. With respect to exclusionary preferences, three items tap respondents' preferences around deporting immigrants who are long-term unemployed or have committed a [serious] crime, while one item taps respondents' preferences with respect to extending rights to immigrants.³

Table 1 also shows that the two key intermediary factors discussed earlier—perceptions of the size of the foreign-born population and intergroup contact with immigrants—are likewise treated as latent constructs, and are measured using the same items used by Schneider (2008) and others. I also control for a number of individual-level factors that have been shown to be relevant in models of anti-foreigner sentiment. These are shown at the bottom of Table 1.

While there is clearly some conceptual slippage that comes with translating any concept into a set of empirical measures and constructs, I should emphasize that my aim in this paper is not to challenge existing operationalisations. Indeed, as I have tried to make clear, my work in this section is intended to replicate how others have operationalised these concepts in previous research (see Citrin and Sides 2006; Pettigrew et al. 2010; Schneider 2008) toward further considering the temporal stability of the foreign-born population in models of anti-foreigner sentiment.

Results

Results from the baseline model, Model 1, are shown in Figure 3. To facilitate interpretation of these results, the coefficients in Figure 3 are standardized.⁴

With respect to the direct pathways extending from the percent foreign-born, each is consistent with theory. The percent foreign-born is positively associated with both perceptions of the size of the foreign-born population and intergroup contact with immigrants (Citrin and Sides 2006). Perceptions of the size of the foreign-born population are, in turn, positively associated with perceived threat, while intergroup contact with immigrants is negatively associated with perceived threat. Given the inclusion of these two intermediary constructs, the direct path between the percent foreign-born and perceived threat is not statistically different from zero, a finding that was also reported by Pettigrew et al. (2010).

By way of comparison, migrants' expected years of residence has neither a statistically significant association with perceptions of the size of the foreign-born population, nor with intergroup contact with immigrants; yet, compared to the percent foreign-born, the direct

³Factor loadings are provided in Appendix 1.

⁴As noted earlier, factor loadings, residual variances, and their standard errors are provided in Appendix 1.

path between migrants' expected years of residence and threat perceptions is negative and statistically significant. Thus, while the effect of the size of the foreign-born population is mediated by both perceptions of the size of the foreign-born population and intergroup contact with immigrants, the effect of the temporal stability of the foreign-born population is not.

Of course, threat perceptions are only one component of anti-foreigner sentiment per the definition used in this paper. Given that anti-foreigner sentiment includes both threat perceptions and exclusionary attitudes, it is therefore necessary to calculate the *total effects* of the percent foreign-born and migrants' expected time of residence. Table 2 summarizes these total effects for each migration measure. These effects are subsequently disaggregated for each of the pathways shown in Figure 3.

The total effect of the percent foreign-born on anti-foreigner sentiment is positive (0.018), and is not statistically significant; however, when broken down by pathway, the effect of the percent foreign-born is statistically significant, and is in the direction predicted by theory and supported by previous empirical research (Pettigrew et al. 2010). The percent foreign-born is positively associated with more pronounced anti-foreigner attitudes by increasing perceptions of the size of the foreign-born population, which give rise to greater threat perceptions. At the same time, however, the percent foreign-born also creates more opportunities for intergroup contact with immigrants; these contacts are instrumental in lowering threat perceptions (Schneider 2008; Stein et al. 2000).

In contrast, the total effect of migrants' expected years of residence on anti-foreigner sentiment is both negative (-0.092) and statistically significant. The temporal stability of the foreign-born population is associated with reductions in anti-foreigner sentiment, with the magnitude of this effect nearly five times that of the percent foreign-born. The results summarizing the specific indirect effects of migrants' expected years of residence on anti-foreigner sentiment differ from those for the percent foreign-born. As is evident, the only statistically significant path connecting migrants' expected years of residence to exclusionary attitudes is through perceived threat. The effect of the temporal stability of the foreign-born population on anti-foreigner sentiment is not mediated by perceptions of the size of the foreign-born population; neither is this effect is mediated by intergroup contact with immigrants, as was anticipated on the basis of social disorganization theory. I will return to this point in the concluding discussion.

While the model fit statistics indicate good model fit (Kaplan 2009), I take the additional step in Model 2 and control for the set of country-level and individual-level factors shown earlier in Table 1.⁵ Controlling for these factors does not change the overall story. The effect of the percent foreign-born on anti-foreigner sentiment remains mediated by the perceived size of the foreign-born population and intergroup contact with immigrants, whereas the effect of migrants' expected years of residence maintains a direct negative association with anti-foreigner attitudes. The primary difference between Models 1 and 2 is that the total

⁵Coefficient estimates and standard errors for each control variable are shown in Appendix 2.

effects of the percent foreign-born and migrants' expected years of residence are roughly comparable on order of magnitude, 0.072 and -0.084, respectively.

Recalling my earlier comment that structural models of the sort estimated in this paper can accommodate both mediator and moderator effects, in Model 3, I take the final step and test whether the effect of the percent foreign-born on anti-foreigner sentiment is moderated by the temporal stability of the foreign-born population. This is achieved by adding a multiplicative term, i.e., interaction, to Model 2. The data do not support the idea that the effect of the percent foreign-born on anti-foreigner sentiment is moderated by the temporal stability of the foreign-born population. In other words, the effect of the percent foreign-born on anti-foreigner sentiment is uniform at each level of migrants' expected time of residence. Substantively, this means that the group-threat mechanism functions independently of the temporal stability of the foreign-born population, and vice versa.

The above results, while new and subject to a number of data limitations (discussed in the next section), provide suggestive evidence that the temporal stability of the foreign-born population matters for understanding the relationship between international migration and anti-foreigner sentiment. In addition to the size of the foreign-born population, how long the foreign-born population typically resides in a receiving country appears to be an important consideration that, to date, has not been explicitly considered in theoretical and empirical research on anti-foreigner sentiment.

Discussion

Following Quillian (1995), Schneider (2008), Pettigrew et al. (2010) and others, in this paper, I sought to gauge the relative explanatory power of the size and temporal stability of the foreign-born population with respect to explaining variation in anti-foreigner sentiment among native-born persons in Europe. Relative to other factors that have been shown to shape the strength of this association (Citrin and Sides 2006; Rustenbach 2010), the explanatory contributions of these two measures of international migration are small. Of course, my aim in this paper was to examine two different measures of international migration and compare the relative explanatory power of each. As my results show, both the size and temporal stability of the foreign-born population matter where anti-foreigner sentiment is concerned. Furthermore, they matter in different ways.

Consistent with the group-threat thesis, the size of the foreign-born population, measured as the percent foreign-born, exacerbates anti-foreigner sentiment by eliciting exaggerated perceptions of the size of the foreign-born population, which, in turn, give rise to perceived threat and exclusionary attitudes. And, while there are some built-in corrections in place—e.g., larger foreign-born concentrations render intergroup contact with immigrants more likely, which, in turn, lower threat perceptions—the magnitude of these effects are relatively small.

Earlier, I argued that the temporal stability of the foreign-born population in receiving countries should be associated with reductions in anti-foreigner sentiment. Although the idea that the temporal stability of the foreign-born population contributes to the development and

maintenance of intergroup contact between native- and foreign-born individuals was not supported, the evidence presented does support some of the basic tenets of social disorganization theory. Specifically, the extended temporal presence of immigrants in receiving countries is directly associated with less pronounced anti-foreigner attitudes.

One potential mechanism involved, and one that I could not test given my data, concerns that of 'mere exposure' (Zajonc 1968; see also Petty and Briñol 2010), which, in contrast to [constructive] intergroup contact with immigrants, encompasses the idea that native-born persons are exposed to immigrants in casual and accidental ways in their daily lives, e.g., at the supermarket or the transit station, that constitute a vague and general familiarity and recognition of other groups. In the course of day-to-day activities, persons recognize others whom they judge as different in some respect or another. This sort of exposure may potentially go a long way toward reducing anti-foreigner sentiment.

Of course, the above mechanism is suggestive. Among the primary limitations of the current study is the relative lack of measures in the 2002 ESS and accompanying 2002/2003 immigration module to fully operationalise the relevant theoretical constructs involved and test these associations over time. This applies not only to mere exposure, but also to the concepts considered and tested in this paper. For example, one dimension of perceived threat that I could not examine empirically concerns feelings of threat associated with 'minority entry into explicitly *political* institutions' (Soss and Bruch 2008:6, emphasis mine). Likewise, the available measures tapping exclusionary preferences in the ESS lack information on attitudes towards other types of preferences, e.g., those related to inequality and the social exclusion of immigrants. While translating nuanced theoretical concepts into a set of empirical measures and constructs comes with some degree of conceptual slippage, mitigating and minimizing these incongruences is and remains an important task for future research, one that strongly depends on future data collections efforts (e.g., see Heath et al. 2012). With respect to mitigating and minimizing these issues in the current paper, I utilized what is arguably the best available data source and mined all available items to construct my measures and constructs toward testing my theoretical model.

Similar concerns apply with respect to the aggregate measures of the size and temporal stability of the foreign-born population considered in the current paper. At suitable data become available, future research should consider disaggregating these measures by, for example, country of birth, as well as developing measures which capture immigration as a relatively "new" (versus "old") phenomenon in receiving countries.

Throughout this paper, I emphasized the need to assess the relevance of both the size and temporal stability of the foreign-born population to inform a more comprehensive understanding of the link between international migration patterns and anti-foreigner sentiment. My results cause us to reconsider the processes by which 'stimulus object(s)' in the form of large-scale demographic patterns are conceptualised and operationalised in this literature (Allport 1954:165). One interesting and more general question is why the size dimension of international migration has maintained such a stranglehold in past and current research. After all, since the mid-1960s, efforts to document other dimensions, e.g., the

temporal dynamics, of place-based migration patterns have been both abundant and methodologically innovative (DeWaard 2013; McGinnis 1968).

Perhaps one answer lies in the historical development and transference of theoretical paradigms in this area of research. The group-threat paradigm, having emerged out of structuralist accounts of U.S. race relations in 1960s and 1970s (see Blalock 1967; Blau 1977) was clearly exported to the domain of anti-foreigner sentiment where, perhaps, its application was questionable and, in some cases, unwarranted (for a comparable example, see Bourdieu and Wacquant 1999; French 2000; Hanchard 1994; Telles 2003). The routine and often unquestioned application of paradigms like group-threat can act as a blinder to incorporating and synthesizing insights gleaned from other theoretical traditions, including those outside of work on anti-foreigner sentiment. I have tried to show that there is a potential diversity of ways to conceptualise and measure international migration patterns, and that exactly how this is done matters a great deal for understanding the linkages between international migration and anti-foreigner sentiment. The work in this paper thus challenges researchers to reexamine how generally accepted concepts and measures are and should be a work in progress, ever-evolving by drawing from other theoretical traditions and methodological approaches.

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Appendix 1. Standardized Factor Loadings and Residual Variances

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Exclusionary Preferences			
Item y1	0.664* / (0.049)	0.665* / (0.047)	0.665* / (0.047)
Item y2	0.354* / (0.055)	0.353* / (0.054)	0.353* / (0.054)
Item y3	0.710* / (0.038)	0.705* / (0.040)	0.705* / (0.040)
Item y4	0.779* / (0.035)	0.776* / (0.036)	0.776* / (0.036)
Residual Variance ζ_1	0.586* / (0.091)	0.584* / (0.086)	0.585* / (0.086)
Perceived Threat			
Item y5	0.585* / (0.030)	0.575* / (0.030)	0.574* / (0.030)
Item y6	0.599* / (0.024)	0.585* / (0.023)	0.584* / (0.023)
Item y7	0.711* / (0.022)	0.703* / (0.020)	0.703* / (0.020)
Item y8	0.676* / (0.029)	0.674* / (0.029)	0.674* / (0.029)
Item y9	0.743* / (0.027)	0.739* / (0.026)	0.738* / (0.025)
Item y10	0.521* / (0.021)	0.509* / (0.021)	0.509* / (0.021)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Residual Variance ζ_2	0.553* / (0.085)	0.544* / (0.066)	0.546* / (0.062)
Perceived Size of Foreign-Born Population			
Item <i>y11</i>	0.365* / (0.037)	0.339* / (0.039)	0.327* / (0.049)
Item <i>y12</i>	0.407* / (0.151)	0.421* / (0.148)	0.429* / (0.144)
Item <i>y13</i>	0.588* / (0.046)	0.591* / (0.041)	0.595* / (0.036)
Residual Variance ζ_3	0.758* / (0.164)	0.756* / (0.171)	0.744* / (0.182)
Intergroup Contact with Immigrants			
Item <i>y14</i>	0.699* / (0.036)	0.697* / (0.045)	0.697* / (0.049)
Item <i>y15</i>	0.570* / (0.022)	0.565* / (0.026)	0.568* / (0.027)
Item <i>y16</i>	0.274* / (0.069)	0.274* / (0.071)	0.268* / (0.071)
Residual Variance ζ_4	0.890* / (0.052)	0.892* / (0.053)	0.882* / (0.053)

Appendix 2. Standardized Coefficients: Control Variables

	Model 2	Model 3
Country-Level		
Percent Right-Wing Vote	0.076* / (0.031)	0.075* / (0.034)
GDP per capita	-0.049 / (0.055)	-0.048 / (0.055)
Individual-Level		
Female	-0.008 / (0.012)	-0.008 / (0.011)
Age 18-64	0.007 / (0.012)	0.007 / (0.012)
Married	0.022 / (0.014)	0.021 / (0.014)
Religious	-0.023 / (0.024)	-0.022 / (0.021)
Social support	-0.035* / (0.010)	-0.035* / (0.010)
Live in/near city	-0.029† / (0.017)	-0.029† / (0.017)
Education:		
(Reference: Tertiary education)		
Less than lower secondary education	0.213* / (0.029)	0.214* / (0.030)
Lower secondary education	0.196* / (0.022)	0.197* / (0.022)
Upper secondary education	0.156* / (0.028)	0.157* / (0.028)
Post-secondary, non-tertiary education	0.007 / (0.014)	0.007 / (0.014)
Primary economic activity:		
(Reference: Employed)		
Student	-0.051* / (0.018)	-0.051* / (0.018)
Unemployed, looking for work	0.003 / (0.014)	0.003 / (0.014)
Unemployed, not looking for work	0.010 / (0.011)	0.010 / (0.011)
Permanently sick or disabled	0.010 / (0.012)	0.010 / (0.011)
Retired	-0.004 / (0.016)	-0.005 / (0.016)
Community or military service	-0.008 / (0.007)	-0.008 / (0.007)
Work in home, e.g., looking after children	-0.003 / (0.014)	-0.003 / (0.014)

	Model 2	Model 3
Satisfied with economy	-0.070* / (0.011)	-0.071* / (0.012)
Satisfied with life in general	-0.095* / (0.004)	-0.095* / (0.005)
Politically right-leaning	0.092* / (0.021)	0.091* / (0.020)

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Figure 1. Theoretical Model

Figure 2. Empirical Model

Log Likelihood: -643,186.96; RMSEA: 0.019; SRMR: 0.051

Figure 3. Standardized Coefficients: Model 1

Table 1
Variable Names and Descriptions

Key Country-Level Measures

x_1 : Percent foreign- born^a

x_2 : Migrants' expected years of residence^b

Key Individual-Level Measures^c

Factor η_1 : Exclusionary preferences

Itemy1: "If people who have come to live and work here are unemployed for a long period, they should be made to leave."

Itemy2: "People who have come to live here should be given the same rights as everyone else."

Itemy3: "If people who have come to live here commit a serious crime, they should be made to leave."

Itemy4: "If people who have come to live here commit any crime, they should be made to leave."

Factor η_2 : Perceived threat

Itemy5: "[P]eople who come to live here...take jobs away from workers in [country], or generally help to create new jobs?"

Itemy6: "[P]eople who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out?"

Itemy7: "[I]t is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?"

Itemy8: "[Country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?"

Itemy9: "[Country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?"

Itemy10: "[Country's] crime problems made worse or better by people coming to live here from other countries?"

Factor η_3 : Perceived size of foreign-born population

Itemy11: "Out of every 100 people living in [country], how many do you think were born outside [country]?"

Itemy12: "[D]o you think the number of people *leaving* [country] nowadays compares to the number *coming to live* in [country]?"

Itemy13: "Compared to other European countries...do...more or fewer people come and live here from other countries?"

Factor η_4 : Intergroup contact with immigrants

Itemy14: "Do you have any friends who have come to live in [country] from another country?"

Itemy15: "Do you have any colleagues at work who have come to live in [country] from another country?"

Itemy16: "[H]ow would you describe the area where you currently live?"

Sources:

^a MIMOSA Project

^b DeWaard (2013)

^c European Social Survey

Notes: Additional country-level control variables include percent of popular vote in parliamentary elections to right-wing parties and GDP per capita.

Additional individual-level control variables include gender (female), age (working age, 18-64), marital status (married), religiosity (religious), social support (yes), place of residence (in/near city), education (tertiary, less than lower secondary, lower secondary, upper secondary, and post secondary non-tertiary), primary economic activity (employed, student, unemployed looking for work, unemployed not looking for work, permanently sick or disabled, retired, community or military service, and work in home), satisfaction with economy (yes), satisfaction with life in general (yes), political leaning (right-leaning).

Table 2

Standardized Total Effects by Pathway

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3
	Percent Foreign-Born (x_1)	Migrants' Expected Years of Residence (x_2)	Percent Foreign-Born (x_1)	Migrants' Expected Years of Residence (x_2)	Percent Foreign-Born $\times$ Migrants' Expected Years of Residence (x_1x_2)
Total Effect	0.018 (0.030)	-0.092* (0.033)	0.072 (0.041)	-0.084* (0.033)	-0.031 (0.043)
Total Effect by Pathway					
→ Perceived Threat	-0.082 (0.065)	-0.161* (0.053)	-0.035 (0.058)	-0.147* (0.050)	0.057 (0.050)
→ Exclusionary Preferences					
→ Perceived Size of Foreign-Born Population					
→ Perceived Threat	0.173* (0.084)	0.077 (0.060)	0.166* (0.081)	0.072 (0.060)	-0.062 (0.060)
→ Exclusionary Preferences					
→ Intergroup Contact with Immigrants					
→ Perceived Threat	-0.073* (0.019)	-0.009 (0.015)	-0.058* (0.014)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.027 (0.021)
→ Exclusionary Preferences					
	Log Likelihood: -643,186.96 RMSEA: 0.019; SRMR: 0.051		Log Likelihood: -601,601.71 RMSEA: 0.021; SRMR: 0.041		Log Likelihood: -600,992.30 RMSEA: 0.021; SRMR: 0.040