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Emerging U.S. Immigrant Geographies: Racial Wages and Migration Selectivity*

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Abstract

Objective—The maturing of the post-1965 children of immigrants and the recent emergence of immigrant settlement outside of traditional locations have implications for understanding immigrant economic incorporation. This analysis examines how changing immigrant geographies will affect the economic prospects of immigrants and a maturing second generation, and addresses sociological and economic perspectives on internal migration and immigrant progress.

Methods—Using the 2000 5 percent Public Use Microdata Files (PUMS), I employ endogenous switching regression models in analyzing the selectivity of internal migration and state residence patterns to the wages of immigrant, 1.5 generation, and U.S.-born workers.

Results—Nonwhite immigrant and 1.5-generation workers evade racial wage penalties through migration, but not through residing in emerging immigrant states.

Conclusions—Understanding the selectivity of internal migration to wages across racialized labor markets is important in assessing new immigrant geographies and prospects for the second generation.

Two prominent issues have refocused research on immigrant integration since 2000. First, the dominance of top immigrant destinations such as Los Angeles was reduced as immigrants increasingly settled in newer destinations, often rural and without a history of immigrant concentrations. Second, the children of post-1965 immigrants began to reach working age in the 1990s and enter the labor force. These trends focus debates over immigrant integration on geography and inequality, as prospects for the second generation will depend upon their presence in the racially structured labor markets they inherit from their parents and internal migration. (The same, of course, can be said of young workers of U.S.-born parents.) Will immigrants and their children have better relative wage prospects—relative to the U.S.-born of U.S. parents—as a result of internal migration? How does the selectivity of internal migration come into play in the 1990s? What will changing settlement patterns mean for “catching up” to the wages of native-born workers?

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In a series of wage selectivity models, I find that immigrants and the adult second generation manage to escape some racial wage penalties via internal migration. That said, they do not do so by locating in newly emerging immigrant destination states, which demonstrate considerable negative selectivity with regard to wages (even after controlling for local variations in housing value and employment growth). Regardless of nativity and generation, all nonwhites (with the exception of U.S.-born Asians) garner lower wages in these locations relative to whites, and much lower returns to a university degree overall. There are interesting intergenerational and gendered patterns in these wage selectivity models to be discussed as well. I suggest further that we need to reconsider discussions of migration and spatial assimilation to account for the fact that some migrants may be moving in order to evade disadvantages in unequal local labor markets. Further, given the negative selectivity to newer immigrant locations for even the U.S. born, these models suggest that the geography of 1990s labor market growth in the United States might have been evidence of increasing regional inequalities as well as individual mobility.

Theoretical and Empirical Background

By the late-1990s, immigration scholars across disciplines had turned their attention to the ways in which immigrant geographies were likely to matter for their prospects of both social and economic incorporation. The 1990 census still showed immigrants concentrated overwhelmingly in a few key immigrant metropolises, and Roger Waldinger's 2001 edited volume *Strangers at the Gates* framed discussions of immigrant progress across multiple dimensions in just five immigrant cities (New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, and Miami). This set the stage for a continuing focus on the importance of the differing geographies of immigrants and natives—specifically with regard to the largely deleterious effects of high levels of inequality and segregation alongside highly concentrated immigrant settlement. Geographers were quick to point out that much of the immigrant-native wage gap was an artifact of disproportionate immigrant presence in the most extremely polarized labor markets (Clark, 2001; Ellis, 2001), and sociologists sought to allay concerns surrounding concentrations of “unassimilable immigrants with the suggestion that immigrant education and mature job networks in immigrant cities provided substantial assets for integration and mobility into the middle class” mainstream (Zhou, 2001; Waldinger and Feliciano, 2004). The focus on a handful of immigrant cities and states and concern with immigrant concentrations therein intensified as the second-generation children of post-1965 immigrants began to enter the labor market in the 1990s. Questions of intergenerational immigrant geographies were posed early—perhaps too early in retrospect—and certainly before many of this population were visible as adults in the data. The spatial assimilation perspectives that link assimilation with dispersion from immigrant concentrations have long provided theoretical undergirding for questions of immigrant settlement and mobility, so it was no surprise that they resurfaced with regard to the newly adult second generation. How would immigrants' children fare entering the labor force in the same immigrant cities and states that had often imperiled their parents? Would their parents' presence in places such as Los Angeles hinder their chances of entering the economic and social “mainstream”? Would ethnic concentration persist intergenerationally and result in super-segregation and a segmented foreign-stock underclass?

As it turns out, signs mount that we need not have worried quite so fervently. As geographers hastened to argue that spatial assimilation had been inappropriately scaled-up from the ghetto to the metropolis to the state (Ellis and Goodwin-White, 2006), and sociologists that immigrant metropolises could bear (and had borne) stories of intergenerational social mobility as well as segmented downward assimilation (Zhou and Logan, 1989; Logan, Alba, and McNulty, 1994; Waldinger, 1996; Logan et al., 1999; Foner, 2000; Logan, Alba, and Dill, 2000; Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, and Waters, 2004), the maps of immigrant America experienced a seismic shift for the first time in decades. By 2000, nearly one-third of all immigrants lived outside of traditional immigrant states, and new immigrant states were experiencing extraordinarily rapid growth in their immigrant populations (Suro and Singer, 2002; Singer, 2004). The 2000 census provided initial evidence that the dominance of a mere handful of immigrant cities and states would not continue for long (Frey, 2002). While scholars waited for census microdata, immigrant settlement patterns changed decisively, and largely through internal migration dispersion (Singer, 2004; Leach and Bean, 2008; Liaw and Frey, 2007).

Changing immigrant geographies provided a wake-up call to a field that had focused on the issues of concentrated immigrant settlement. The first and most critical task was a descriptive one: Where were the new immigrant destinations, who was going there, and what were they doing? Why had they come, and what were the responses of local communities unaccustomed to receiving immigrant newcomers? Suro and Singer (2002) and Singer (2004) led the way in categorizing new immigrant destinations, and in providing analytical typologies of urban areas that are former immigrant concentrations such as Pittsburgh and Detroit; continuous sites of immigrant settlement such as New York, San Francisco, and Chicago; post-World War II immigrant destinations such as Los Angeles and Miami; reemerging locations such as Seattle and Phoenix; newly emerging locations such as Atlanta and Las Vegas; and preemerging immigrant settlements in Salt Lake City, Raleigh-Durham, and smaller cities of the American South and West. (Part of the advantage of these typologies is precisely that they bring to the fore that patterns of immigrant settlement have changed previously, for some of the same reasons that patterns of U.S.-born settlement have.)

Subsequently, researchers have turned to analysis of the implications of shifting immigrant geographies for the lives of immigrants and changing populations in areas previously less affected by immigration. Generally, the argument is that these changed immigrant geographies yield new challenges to the theorizing of immigrant assimilation (Waters and Jimenez, 2005; Zúñiga and Hernández-León, 2005). The evidence is mixed on whether new destinations might be positive for immigrant outcomes. Authors have noted both strong immigrant/family networks resulting from long-term post-IRCA (Immigration Reform and Control Act) naturalization effects (Massey, 2002; Zúñiga and Hernández-León, 2005), and the importance of increased low-wage labor recruitment (Johnson-Webb, 2003) as reasons for the dispersal of immigrant settlement. Extensive ethnographic and policy-based analyses made early assessments of the difficulties immigrants face in newer locations (Millard and Chapa, 2004; Kandel and Parrado, 2005). Singer (2004) found that immigrants in emerging immigrant locations have generally lower levels of human capital (education, language skills, and citizenship) than those in more traditional immigrant cities.

Some of this research also tries to make sense of this recent shift for the children of immigrants in emerging cities, although it is still probably premature to predict gains the second generation will make into adulthood using census data (Farley and Alba, 2002). A notable example is Stamps and Bohon's 2006 paper that finds high levels of educational completion among the adult second generation in emerging cities (while noting that this effect is probably something brought with them from other places in the United States). Here, I make a foray into this field by focusing on the selectivity of (1) internal migration and (2) emerging immigrant state residence with regard to racial wage differences for immigrants, natives, and an adult second-generation population. One reason for this approach is that it allows for comparative counterfactuals of immigrant location and mobility behavior to be assessed through (1) investigating whether those immigrants who undertake internal migration are those who benefit from doing so, and (2) suggesting hypothetical outcomes to residence in new immigrant locations rather than traditional ones, or vice versa. The economic downturn of the past several years, not yet easily visible in data sensitive and extensive enough to capture detailed individual characteristics, will surely produce even greater shifts in internal migration and labor market dynamics. But before we begin to think about the ways in which those may differentially affect immigrants and the U.S. born, it is useful to examine the racialized wage dynamics of the much-noted changed immigrant geographies that marked the 1990s.

Migration Selectivity and Spatial Assimilation

While a considerable emphasis in the immigration literature is on the geographic concentration of immigrants in major U.S. cities, a related area of interest centers on the internal mobility patterns of immigrants and their descendants. This is in no small part because of association of dispersal from immigrant cities with immigrant progress (Bartel, 1989; Kritz and Nogle, 1994), or from the related concern with immigrant cities as highly unequal places where immigrants are economically marginalized (Clark, 2001; Zhou, 2001). This focus parallels that of amore classically human capital formulation that migration is selective of those who would stand to gain most from it. Interestingly, Vigdor (2002) finds significant selectivity effects of parental moves on locational outcomes for (native-born) adult children when using 1940 and 1970 Integrated Public Use Microdata sample data. My interest here is with a more contemporaneous immigrant second generation and I do not directly test 30-year pseudocohort parents and children. However, Vigdor's study sets a precedent in considering that locational choices made by one generation might be (1) selective of educational level and (2) exert selective effects of location on a second generation.

Previous contributions to the internal migration selectivity literature have argued that migrants sort themselves across labor market regions according to various forms of inequalities, especially in that migrants choose areas where their own particular characteristics garner the highest reward or the lowest penalty (Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo, 1992; Chiswick, 2000). For the most part, literature on immigrants has focused on theorizing the selectivity of the initial immigration path, and on the relative positions of immigrants at origin and destination country that are endogenous to the decision to immigrate (see, e.g., Chiswick, 2000; Feliciano, 2005). It seems critical, given the ongoing interest in patterns of

immigrant economic integration and spatial settlement patterns, to assess the relationship of internal mobility within the United States to immigrant wage outcomes. Put simply, is there a selectivity component to immigrant internal mobility in the United States, such that those most likely to experience positive wage outcomes are those who undertake internal migration? If so, does it differ for immigrants and natives, and how? Would the foreign-born fare better if they moved? My interest in these questions stems in part from a realization of theoretical similarities in the assumptions of the economists' migration selectivity and the immigration sociologists' spatial assimilation models. Given regional inequalities across local labor markets, I suggest migration selectivity needs to be investigated with regard to the places between which it does (or does not) occur. In other words, the presumption that migrants are positively selected may not be geographically uniform since the characteristics that constitute selection within a wage distribution are context specific. The emergence of immigrants in new states begs the question of whether there is selectivity to being in an emerging immigrant state versus a more traditional location. How does this choice happen and how does it matter? Are those who are in emerging states positively or negatively selected? And, importantly with regard to the racialized context of U.S. immigration and integration, are there significant differences in the racial wage returns or penalties of those who are in new destinations?

Data and Methodology

In what follows, I report the results of a series of endogenous switching regression models assessing the effects of migration selectivity on logged hourly wages for native-born, foreign-born, and 1.5-generation¹ men and women, using data from the 2000 5 percent U.S. Public Use Microdata Files (PUMS). In order to control for major differences between generation group in terms of age and employment profiles, I extract data on prime-age workers (25- to 54-year olds with active labor force status). The sample is further restricted to those who are currently employed, and who worked a minimum of 30 hours per week and 40 weeks last year. In order to exclude the most recent immigrants, individuals are restricted to those who have been in the United States for at least five years' time.² Although it is possible that immigrants' wages increase with time spent in the United States (it is difficult to separate this effect from labor force experience, in any event), this is not a central concern in this research, which focuses on geographic and mobility differences in wages between aggregate groups of immigrants, natives, and the 1.5 generation. Age controls and the requirement that immigrants had been in the United States for at least five years will reduce some of the variance in duration in any case.

These models are attempts to answer two key questions: (1) whether immigrants' internal migration is positively selected for wages, and (2) whether emerging state residents'

¹In this analysis, the 1.5 generation is a proxy for the second generation, since we cannot identify parental birthplace from the U.S. Census. The 1.5 generation is defined as those individuals who entered the United States prior to their 10th birthday, and who ostensibly share many of the characteristics of the native born of native-born parents in terms of a U.S. education and experience by the time they are 25 years of age.

²This excludes many of the most recent immigrants to new immigrant destinations in the United States, but is a necessary exclusion as these individuals have had no time to adapt to the United States and often have very low wages. This selection is also at the heart of the different findings (Singer, 2004 vs. Stamps and Bohon, 2006) comparing the education of immigrants in new destinations to those in more traditional immigrant locations.

migrations are positively selected with regard to wages. Each of the two sets of models also includes racial categories (discussed below) allowing for comparison of relative racial wage gaps. For comparison of intergenerational effects, I also include U.S.-born individuals and the 1.5-generation adult children of immigrants. I expect that selectivity should increase across generations. Following both spatial assimilation and integration theories, the 1.5 generation should be theoretically less tied to an initial location than immigrants. Following human capital theories, their ability to gain wage rewards through locational choice should begin to approach that of the U.S. born. Extending these ideas to include locationally specific racial wage gaps, the 1.5 generation should also be more able than the immigrant generation to use migration to escape places where the ethnic wage penalty may be particularly disadvantageous. This would be evidenced in narrowed racial wage gaps between the stayer/mover models.

Covariates include those commonly used in wage regressions: age (25–34, 35–44, and 45–54), education, and race. Since the majority of the significant variance in wages was captured by a dummy variable indicating whether an individual had a bachelor's degree or not, and since these models require somewhat parsimonious variable selection, “BA” is the only education variable. Race is grouped into broad categories of white, black, Asian, and Hispanic,³ with white as the reference category. Since race is a categorical variable, it is possible to evaluate selectivity's effect on racial wage differentials. In addition, the probit selection component of the models for the migration and emerging state dummies include the following covariates: new employment growth at destination (this is the increase in the labor force over a five-year period), family size, and median housing value. These two destination variables are measured at the level of the metropolitan area but clustered within states. Both destination characteristics are believed to attract migrants, while family size is considered a deterrent to migration. The migration selection variable measures whether an immigrant made a move between 1995 and 2000, at least at the scale of moving to a new metropolitan area (local within-neighborhood mobility is not included). The selection equation of this family of models (in this case the migration/location probits) must include covariates not present in the substantive equation of interest (in this case, the wage regressions) in order to avoid multicollinearity. Although many papers employing these models have found it difficult to justify this constraint theoretically, the analysis in this article presents a compelling case for modeling place characteristics that should correlate with migration or location decisions somewhat separately from wage outcomes.

The inclusion of a dichotomous mover/nonmover covariate in a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) wage regression is insufficient if it is believed that there exist (1) selectivity effects of observed wages for migrants (rather than potential migrants) and/or (2) endogeneity effects that associate a choice variable (such as migration) with unmeasured variance in error terms associated with wages (Heckman and Sedlacek, 1990). In this case, if there were endogeneity in a series of unobserved variance related to migration choice (such that, for example), movers were more likely than a random individual to expect higher

³Individuals indicating more than one race, with one race being white, were coded in the nonwhite racial category. All other multiracial individuals (i.e., Asian-blacks) were coded in an “other” category. These were dropped from the final models due to very low cell counts.

wages as a result of higher education, then their wages would be biased were no correction made for this choice (Vigdor, 2002).

Endogenous switching regression models address both endogeneity and selection concerns and are appropriate when both the wage intercept and covariate coefficients are thought to vary with selection (Heckman, Lyons, and Todd, 2000; Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004). Although selectivity models are thus normally used to account for measurement or sampling errors that can impede interpretation of treatment effects (such as migration) on outcome effects (such as wages), the variance in covariate estimates between models can also usefully be applied to interpret differences in how different groups experience the relationship between treatment and outcome. Thus, we can reasonably consider how the relationship between migration and localized structures of wage inequality might vary by race and nativity.

Results and Discussion

Descriptive statistics by nativity group and mobility status are presented in Table 1. Endogenous switching regression models of internal migration (Table 2) and of emerging state residence (Table 3) are reported for foreign-stock and U.S.-born men and women. Separate parameters are estimated for 1.5-generation Asians and Hispanics but 1.5-generation whites and blacks are not separated from their immigrant co-ethnics as their numbers are relatively small.

Internal Migration Selectivity Models

For each group, the wage regression models are reported as estimated for movers and nonmovers. The selection model follows, with the covariates in the migration probit reported. Comparing the coefficients on a single covariate between the simultaneously estimated mover and stayer equations shows the different relationship of that covariate to the log wage outcome. (Since wages are logged, these can be interpreted in percentage changes.) Again, since race is a categorical variable, the wage estimates can be interpreted as the relative ethnic wage gap (here, with regard to white workers as the excluded reference group), and compared for movers and nonmovers. Among the summary statistics at the bottom, r_1 (ρ) reports on the significance of the first equation (movers) being different from a random sample of the overall population, and r_2 reports the same thing for the second equation (nonmovers).

There is large and significant migration selectivity effect, as indicated by the positive coefficients on ρ . The magnitude of ρ is nearly doubled for the native-born population when compared with the foreign-stock population, indicating the correlation between the residuals on characteristics of migration propensity relating to wages are considerably higher for the native born. This is as expected, since immigrants' migration streams are considerably more economically focused than those of the native born, and native-born migration streams are more efficient. The 1.5 generation falls somewhat in between, indicating that their migration selectivity begins to approach that of the U.S. born. In each case, men's migration is more positively selected with regard to wages than women. This is consistent with gendered rewards in recruitment and hiring, and the intertwined processes of gender wage inequality, gendered labor force periodicity, and male employment determined

household migration (Cooke and Bailey, 1996; Withers and Clark, 2007; Cooke et al., 2009). Coefficients on other covariates are as expected, with a college degree exerting a strongly positive effect on wages, new employment growth at destination exhibiting a positive pull, and increasing family size exhibiting a deterrent effect as it limits mobility. Whites tend to fare better than other racial groups regardless of nativity, although 1.5-generation and native-born Asians (especially women) fare slightly better than their white counterparts. Still, there are interesting comparisons to be made across nativity groups and between the mover/stayer equations.

The large and significant effect of having a BA is much stronger for immigrants than for either native-born group, demonstrating either the very high returns to a college degree for immigrants, or the positive selectivity of immigrants coming to the United States with these qualifications—since immigrants in aggregate have more polarized educational distributions than the native born. Since this coefficient would be biased downward were it not for the selectivity parameter, this suggests that the wage benefits of higher education are exercised through internal migration by immigrants and the 1.5 generation as well as natives (and arguably to an even stronger extent). A college degree means *far less* for women in terms of wage rewards, as has been found previously in literature on tied movers (see, e.g., Cooke and Bailey, 1996). Younger workers generally have much lower wages, and young immigrant workers (especially women) fare much worse relatively if they are not mobile. Interestingly, the youngest second/1.5 generation in their 20s and early 30s fare worse if they have undertaken a recent move. Given their relative youth, this may have to do with moving away from locations where their parents had lived previously (see, for example, Ellis and Goodwin-White, 2006).

The critical finding with regard to these models is that ethnic wage penalties are significantly abated through mobility. The difference is small if significant for Hispanic and black immigrant men, where selectivity basically boils down to an intercept and a college degree (the mover/stayer ethnic penalties are $-0.36/-0.37$ and $-0.23/-0.24$, respectively), meaning that for immigrant black or immigrant Hispanic men, racial wage penalties are only slightly higher for those who do not move. In essence, this probably represents an equilibrium whereby some are better off staying and others better off moving and this is largely related to education. For other immigrant men, there are strong and significant selectivity effects. Asian immigrant men, for example, reduce their racial wage penalty considerably through migration (-0.10 movers/ -0.16 nonmovers). Accounting for migration selectivity reduces racial wage gaps for all Hispanics regardless of nativity or gender (slightly for immigrant men but by a good deal for all other Hispanics)—pointing out that the Hispanic wage penalty can be abated by the process whereby some who can do better elsewhere choose to move. 1.5-generation Hispanic men and women fare especially worse relative to whites if they do not move (by about $1/3$). This is also true for other nonwhite groups, with the exception of highly employed black immigrant and Asian U.S.-born women who tend to fare better by staying put (mover/stayer differentials of $-0.06/-0.02$ and $0.07/0.13$, respectively). All other Asians, who generally make wages that are at least as high as whites, fare relatively better still by moving.

Overall, the important point about migration selectivity is that it is strong and positive for all groups, and that it tends to be a process through which Hispanics, Asian immigrants, and some blacks evade racial wage penalties vis-à-vis whites (and some Asians increase their wage advantage through migration selectivity as well). As evidenced by the categorical coefficients, racial differences matter quite a bit more for immigrants than the 1.5 generation, and for the 1.5 generation than for the U.S. born (with the exception of U.S.-born blacks)—and less for women than for men. The 1.5 generation of all races and both genders evinces a certain hypermobility to the best options for evading the worst wage penalties in U.S. labor markets.

Emerging State Selectivity Models

While migration may be a way in which nonwhites (especially immigrants) evade ethnic wage penalties, they are not doing it in (or by moving to) emerging immigrant states. Table 3 displays a second set of endogenous switching regression models—this time for a selection variable that attempts to determine if there is a selectivity effect to being in an emerging state. I have adapted Singer's "emerging, preemerging, and reemerging" categories for metro areas here and applied them to states (choosing states with only emerging metros and excluding states that might have both old and new immigrant metros), as much of the discussion on new migrant destinations mentions the nonurban focus of this new settlement. Thus, the emerging states for the purpose of constructing the selection variable are Georgia, North Carolina, Nevada, Arizona, Washington, Oregon, Colorado, and Utah. Even though these states were experiencing rapid growth in their immigrant populations, by 2000 two-thirds of immigrants still lived in California, New York, New Jersey, Florida, Texas, and Illinois (Singer, 2004). With these models, I attempt to determine if there is selectivity to *residence* in these emerging immigrant states.⁴ To clarify, as Table 2 reported on the selectivity of internal migration, Table 3 reports on the selectivity of residence in an emerging state (models of internal migration to emerging states had even *stronger* effects but are not reported here as that is only a subset of those in emerging immigration states).

Table 3 can thus be interpreted similarly to Table 2, with relative racial wage gaps or the payoff to a college degree being different for those in emerging immigrant states, and location selectivity displaying positive and negative effects net of the wage regressions. Some general trends are worth noting. First, with regard to the youngest 25- to 34-year-old immigrants and 1.5-generation workers, they generally fare slightly better in emerging states than elsewhere. This is particularly important, as some of these may have been children brought with their immigrant parents to these new states. The negative significance of the housing value variable in the selection equation indicates that location choices are positively selected for cheaper housing options. The much lower returns to a college education in emerging states are also evidenced here, and are at odds with Stamps and Bohon's (2006) suggestion of positively selected educational patterns in emerging metro areas (which do not explicitly model selection).⁵ The much lower returns to a BA are especially strong for

⁴In a second set of models—not reported here but with similar and stronger effects—I limit the sample to movers only in order to test the selectivity of those *choosing* emerging immigrant states over other states through secondary migration.

immigrant and 1.5-generation men and women (0.41 emerging state vs. 0.54 nonemerging state for immigrant women, for example). The difference is somewhat less important for young second-generation men, who tend to fare much more poorly overall in relative terms, as evidenced by the strongly negative coefficients for 25- to 34-year-old 1.5-generation men. This echoes recent findings on the gendered emergence of second-generation women in professional jobs, especially in traditional immigrant cities, while second-generation men remain in immigrant men's niches, especially in newer immigrant metros (Goodwin-White, 2009).

Among immigrant men, there are significant racial wage penalties to being nonwhite for all groups—worst for Hispanics (−0.41 in emerging states), less so for blacks, and less so again for Asians. All of these are significantly stronger in emerging immigrant states. While there are also significant racial wage penalties for nonwhite immigrant women, the locational differences are less important than they are for men (with the exception of Asian women for whom residence in an emerging state nearly doubles the wage penalty from 5 to 10 percent). The penalties overall are less severe for women immigrants than for men, but this finding suggests that some of the detrimental gender/wage effects of traditional immigrant geographies (Zhou and Logan, 1989; Gilbertson, 1996) are configured differently in newer locations. The rho coefficients are negative for residence in an emerging state, but very strongly and significantly positive for residence in a *nonemerging* state. There is very positive wage selectivity associated with *avoiding* emerging state residence for all groups. (This effect is moderated in that older as well as continuous immigrant states are included in these analyses. It would be stronger still were *only* continuous immigrant states such as New York, California, and Illinois used as the reference.)

The 1.5 generation evidences critical gender differences: Hispanic 1.5-generation men fare poorly regardless of location, but 1.5-generation women fare better in traditional immigrant locations, even after controlling for educational attainment. Although the racial wage penalties themselves attenuate somewhat by the 1.5 generation, much of the pattern still holds (and for 1.5-generation men, the negative selectivity coefficient rho1 on emerging state residence is strongly significant). This means that, despite cheaper housing costs, racial wage penalties are as likely to persist into the second generation in newly emerging states as elsewhere (and more so for women). For the 1.5 generation, the positive selectivity for residence elsewhere (rho2) is also much stronger—especially among women.

The persistence of racial locational effects is not tremendously surprising, given that racial penalties for even U.S.-born blacks are stronger in emerging states, and similarly for Asians (even as they earn higher wages than whites they are higher yet in *non* emerging states). A different pattern, however, is seen for U.S.-born Hispanic men and women, who actually fare *relatively better* in emerging states, if everything else remains consistent. It may be because there are some positive employment opportunities for U.S.-born Hispanics in newer immigrant states relative to older ones, especially as an influx of new immigrants creates demands for a bilingual, multicultural workforce. It is also possible that this advantage

⁵Although there are other differences in model set-up (plus scale) that could explain the differences as well. As they are, mine follow Singer's descriptive analysis.

results simply from the fact that U.S.-born white wages are on average much lower in these states. The important point is that regional selectivity patterns are generally and similarly negative throughout for emerging states and strongly positive for residing elsewhere, and especially for immigrants.

Conclusions

Although internal migration selectivity in the United States is positive, workers who move are generally those who will fare better by doing so. That said, faring better as an individual migrant occurs with regard to other workers, and in unequal circumstances with regard to geography, education, gender, and race. A lack of mobility has detrimental consequences for the youngest workers and also for nonwhite groups—especially 1.5-generation nonwhites and immigrant women. Nonwhite immigrant and 1.5-generation individuals who migrate evade some considerable racial penalties vis-à-vis whites by virtue of migration selectivity, net of other characteristics of individuals and places. That said, they do not do so by being in or moving to emerging immigrant states, which evidence strongly negative selectivity with regard to wages. Racial penalties to nonwhites are substantial in these states, and the selectivity effect of this is stronger yet for the 1.5 generation. These models suggest the need for further investigation of the unequally configured geographies of these newer immigrant locations, and of how internal migration interacts with wage inequality more generally. The emergence of new immigrant geographies alongside the maturation of the second generation provides an opportunity to move such discussions beyond the theoretical and empirical constraints of migration selectivity and spatial assimilation models (constructed to conceptualize immigrant inequality with regard to spatial concentration).

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TABLE 1

Descriptive Statistics and Weighted Sample Sizes by Nativity

Total	Men			Women		
	U.S. Born	1.5 Generation	Immigrant	U.S. Born	1.5 Generation	Immigrant
<i>N</i>	22,087,627	575,053	2,985,124	9,863,700	238,458	868,674
25–34	26%	42%	26%	31%	45%	24%
45–54	34%	23%	32%	32%	20%	35%
Black	6%	4%	7%	22%	11%	17%
Hispanic	10%	41%	43%	1%	36%	28%
Asian	1%	18%	27%	35%	19%	33%
BA	37%	35%	32%	35%	39%	30%
Family size	2.7	3.1	3.8	1.9	2.3	2.8
Movers						
<i>N</i>	2,462,111 (11%)	67,239 (12%)	327,976 (11%)	1,101,067 (11%)	31,921 (13%)	83,579 (11%)
25–34	47%	61%	40%	55%	67%	41%
45–54	19%	11%	18%	17%	9%	20%
Black	5%	5%	7%	16%	10%	14%
Hispanic	8%	30%	34%	6%	24%	28%
Asian	2%	35%	37%	2%	38%	33%
BA	54%	54%	50%	53%	57%	45%
Family size	2.3	2.4	3.1	1.3	1.6	2.2
Nonmovers						
<i>N</i>	19,625,516	507,814	2,657,148	8,762,633	206,537	785,095
25–34	24%	39%	25%	29%	22%	37%
45–54	36%	24%	33%	33%	42%	22%
Black	9%	4%	7%	23%	11%	17%
Hispanic	6%	42%	45%	7%	38%	39%
Asian	1%	16%	26%	1%	16%	22%
BA	34%	32%	29%	35%	36%	28%
Family size	2.8	3.2	3.8	1.9	2.4	2.9

TABLE 2

Endogenous Switching Wage Regression Models (Switch = Internal Migration)

	FB		1.5		NB	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Logwage (movers)						
Age 25–34	-.0710 ***	-.0010	-.2596 ***	-.2000 ***	-.1443 ***	-.0787 ***
Age 45–54	-.0439 **	-.0444 *	.0534	-.1060 *	-.0180	-.0158 *
BA	.6880 ***	.5768 ***	.5028 ***	.5024 ***	.5418 ***	.4590 ***
Hispanic	-.3696 ***	-.2980 ***	-.1463 ***	-.1225 ***	-.1810 ***	-.1112 ***
Black	-.2379 ***	-.0637 **	-.1408 **	.0241	-.2065 ***	-.0908 ***
Asian	-.1033 ***	-.0127	.0314	.1061 ***	.0488 ***	.0741 ***
Constant	2.270 ***	2.033 ***	2.4391 ***	2.334 ***	2.049 ***	2.152 ***
Logwage (nonmovers)						
Age 25–34	-.1189 ***	-.0569 ***	-.2117 ***	-.1212 ***	-.1774 ***	-.0915 ***
Age 45–54	.0215 ***	-.0089 *	.0770 ***	.0422 ***	.0484 ***	.0305 ***
BA	.5239 ***	.5448 ***	.4633 ***	.4659 ***	.4466 ***	.4570 ***
Hispanic	-.3744 ***	-.3214 ***	-.2128 ***	-.1466 ***	-.2184 ***	-.1364 ***
Black	-.2422 ***	-.0204 ***	-.1549 *	-.0040	-.2256 *	-.0925 ***
Asian	-.1649 ***	-.0571 ***	-.0303 ***	.0693 ***	.0255 ***	.1334 ***
Constant	2.776 ***	2.445 ***	2.8740 ***	2.594 ***	2.852 ***	2.540 ***
MSA move (1 = y)						
Age 25–34	.2628 ***	.3086 ***	.2693 ***	.3350 ***	-.3466 ***	.4579 ***
Age 45–54	-.3445 ***	-.3207 ***	-.3040 ***	-.2601 ***	.3682 ***	-.2666 ***
BA	.3370 ***	.2321 ***	.2644 ***	.2267 ***	-.0383 ***	.2895 ***
Hispanic	-.0309 *	-.1004 ***	-.0949 ***	-.1397 ***	-.0108 ***	-.0830 ***
Black	-.0082	-.0328	.0727	.1283	.3077 ***	-.0958 ***
Asian	.2210 ***	.1606 ***	.2890 ***	.3695 ***	.3641 ***	.3943 ***
Persons in family	-.0632 ***	-.0491 ***	-.0899 ***	-.0789 ***	-.0957 ***	-.0803 ***

	FB	FB	1.5	1.5	NB	NB
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
New employment	.0084 ***	.0080 ***	.0066 ***	.0075 ***	.0055 ***	.0061 ***
Housing value	-.1041 ***	-.1143 ***	-.1132 ***	-.1102 ***	-.0716 ***	-.0751 ***
Constant	.3446 ***	.4171 ***	.5118 ***	.3342 ***	-.1518 ***	-.2692 ***
rho1	.3375 ***	.3016 ***	.2958 ***	.2013 *	.6388 ***	.3110 ***
rho2	.4205 ***	.4581 ***	.6483 ***	.6399 ***	.7112 ***	.7302 ***

* $p < .05$;

** $p < .01$;

*** $p < .001$.

TABLE 3

Endogenous Switching Wage Regression Models (Switch = Emerging States)

	FB		1.5		NB	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Logwage (emergst)						
Age 25–34	–.1052 ***	–.0645 ***	–.2110 ***	–.0927 ***	–.2299 ***	–.1373 ***
Age 45–54	.0330 **	–.0028	.0888 **	.0488	.0654 ***	.0424 ***
BA	.4311 ***	.4066 ***	.3853 ***	.3644 ***	.3748 ***	.3845 ***
Hispanic	–.4086 ***	–.3285 ***	–.1722 ***	–.1735 ***	–.1469 ***	–.0790 ***
Black	–.2969 ***	–.0465	–.1411 **	–.0373	–.2390 ***	–.1145 ***
Asian	–.1913 ***	–.0957 ***	–.0253	.0028	–.0579 ***	.0367 **
Constant	2.770 ***	2.439 ***	2.821 ***	2.475 ***	2.796 ***	2.529 ***
Logwage (noemergst)						
Age 25–34	–.1315 ***	–.0704 ***	–.2543 ***	–.1638 ***	–.2349 ***	–.1414 ***
Age 45–54	.0326 ***	.0041	.0982 ***	.0496 ***	.0782 ***	.0474 ***
BA	.5220 ***	.5368 ***	.4302 ***	.4454 ***	.4041 ***	.4277 ***
Hispanic	–.3685 ***	–.3232 ***	–.2143 ***	–.1521 ***	–.2431 ***	–.1601 ***
Black	–.2422 ***	–.0331 ***	–.1709 ***	–.0245	–.2129 ***	–.0683 ***
Asian	–.1668 ***	–.0540 ***	–.0528 ***	.0461 ***	–.0011	.0886 ***
Constant	2.762 ***	2.448 ***	2.890 ***	2.625 ***	2.874 ***	2.577 ***
Emerging state (1 = y)						
Age 25–34	.1552 ***	.1139 ***	.0045	.0652 *	–.0198 ***	.0624 ***
Age 45–54	–.1073 ***	–.0650 ***	–.0263	.0035	–.0454 ***	–.0064
BA	–.0414 ***	–.0970 ***	–.1081 ***	–.1044 ***	–.3323 ***	–.0402 ***
Hispanic	–.0777 ***	–.2505 ***	–.3291 ***	–.4263 ***	.0668 ***	–.3547 ***
Black	–.2105 ***	–.3835 ***	–.1592 **	–.2607 ***	.0229 ***	.0541 ***
Asian	.0580 ***	.0881 ***	.0706 *	.0474	.0530	.0345 *
Persons	–.0098 ***	–.0018	–.0233 ***	–.0157 *	–.0234 ***	–.0007

	FB	FB	1.5	1.5	NB	NB
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Newemp	.0210***	.0186***	.0174***	.0161***	.0204***	.0194***
Mhsval	-.1002***	-.1142***	-.1016***	-.1125***	-.0173***	-.0394***
Constant	.0912***	.3756***	.3039***	.4412***	-.9141***	-.6617***
rho1	-.0316	-.0299	-.0885*	.0289	-.0306***	-.0687***
rho2	.3397***	.3899***	.4971***	.5840***	.4907***	.6002***

*
p < .05;
**
p < .01;

p < .001.