Review of R. A. Harris' *Linguistics Wars*

John H. Mabry

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

The Linguistics Wars by Randy Allen Harris, published in 1993, is the result of a number of interviews with participants in the alleged wars which occurred within the confines of MIT's lecture halls, and among the Noam Chomsky inspired and led *transformational-generative grammarians*. The author, Randy Harris, has elsewhere written on aphasia, and apparently published at least one article on the fractious nature of the Chomsky movement. Although the present volume has flaws, it has the flavor of an insider's history due to the many interviews and personal observations that Harris reports. It seems to have been a number of years in preparation and will undoubtedly become a significant resource for historians of a significant era in linguistics which saw ramifications in psychology, philosophy, and even secondary education. For this, the Chomskyan revolution's impact on behavior analysis is likely to have been more for its nuisance value in supposedly preempting the field of verbal behavior.

The first chapter is intended as a overview of the whole. Harris' rather expansive literary style shows itself first here. As with anytime that he is describing Chomsky and his adversaries, his narrative is liberally laced with figurative language: metaphors abound and while some are apt so many are distracting. Harris' narrative here is largely to introduce a chronicle of an increasing divergence within the linguists' ranks, in opposition to some of Noam Chomsky's (frequently changing)

positions. Members of a dissident camp, which came to be known as "generative semantics," were originally Chomsky sponsored and tutored adherents to the general program called *transformational-generative grammar* (TG). While the casual reader will not readily identify some of the contentious issues (and these were sometimes difficult to identify by the participants themselves), the nature of the debate seems to define the parameters of an academic culture which follows an ancient, if not widely admired, tradition of resolving issues by rhetorical means alone: by rallying supporters, polemical ridicule of the other's points, at times guarded and not so guarded, insult.

Harris' prose settles down somewhat in Chapter 2, where he is reciting a very brief history of linguistics. Harris' description of behaviorism will make many wince, but it undoubtedly owes more to the opinions current in the cognitive psychology camp, and those of the linguists who become the subjects of his book than, hopefully, to his scholarship elsewhere. This brings up one minor, but recurrent, irritation with the book. Harris often asserts as narrative opinions that are those of others and not clearly Harris himself but without attribution. We know it is not Harris, since he often inserts the counter-argument, either there or later. To the trusting reader, the immediately uncontested statements, such as the moribund nature or even death of behaviorism, are easily taken as fact.

The very early part played by Franz Boas and especially by Leonard Bloomfield are ultimately probably crucial to understanding the ensuing era of Chomsky et al. Neither was alive when the events por-

Reprints may be obtained from the author at the Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3270.

trayed in this book are occurring, but are represented by the linguists called in the book "the Bloomfieldians." An historical point, and conflict with the Bloomfieldians, which serves to illuminate a chief feature of Chomsky's program and perhaps some of the ensuing arguments is touched on by Harris. This is Chomsky's adoption of intuition as a major guidepost for judging whether a sentence was more or less grammatical (grammaticality) and which was raised to a central position by Chomsky in his method of contrasting sentences. The familiar prescriptive grammars, such as those taught in schoolrooms of Latin and English since very early times had never hesitated to dictate an educational standard and this is the approach to grammar most familiar to students of English. The Bloomfieldians in contrast, essentially comparative linguists in the tradition of Franz Boas, were often engaged in transcribing the languages of disappearing cultures, many of which were on the American continent. Just as anthropologists of the period, they had followed the adage of cultural relativism which said that there were no superior cultures or languages; complexity was similar while the details could differ enormously. As a result these, chiefly American, linguists had adopted a restriction against purely arbitrary judgments of "correctness," and made without a careful study of the entire language's "corpus." This descriptive view was in direct contrast with grammars prescribing, and devised to teach, correct usage. The restriction was held to be indispensable in describing actual practices within a language community and not just adopting standards, and especially those derived from English or other Indo-European languages. Chomsky, claiming that the prescription was frequently violated anyway, proceeded to rely on the judgments of what he called the native speaker, in many cases himself, as to what was grammatical or not in English. Also unlike the comparative linguists, English was to become his only object of study.

A condensed version of the Chomskyan grammar is approached in Chapter 3,

entitled "The Chomskyan Revolution" a term that in some ways coincides with a much heralded cognitive revolution and its presumed victory over behaviorism. Harris inserts two definitions from Chomsky (1957, p. 13) which bear repeating here. "*A language* is a 'set (finite or infinite) of sentences,'" and from the same source, "*a grammar* is 'a device that generates all the grammatical sequences of [that language] and none of the ungrammatical ones.'" A third assumption, not here parroted by Harris, is the insistence by Chomsky that he is dealing with an idealized language, only (Chomsky, 1977).

Harris gives a brief overview of Chomsky's program which can be even more briefly summarized here. The most familiar part of Chomsky's analysis is the partitioning of a typical sentence in English into (an initial marker) noun phrase (abbreviated NP) and verb phrase (VP). For example the notation, $S \rightarrow NP + VP$, pronounces that the sentence is rewritten as a noun phrase plus a verb phrase. Similarly a noun phrase is rewritten as $NP \rightarrow Det + N$ (determinate plus noun). The verb phrase is similarly converted as $V \rightarrow V + NP$ (where a noun phrase is part of the traditional predicate). A given sentence can be arranged into the now familiar "tree" with individual immediate constituents dangled below the respective NPs and VPs. To get them there was to write rules which cause the various constituents to be properly distributed. These rules were to be in the form of, or using, symbolic logic and were typically called transformational rules. Harris (pp. 43-44) gives the example of a simple transformational rule adopted by Chomsky and called Affix-hopping. The rule is written as $AfV \Rightarrow VAf$. The two sentences which Harris says necessitates the rule are:

- 4 a. Andrew skateboards.
- b. Andrew is skateboarding.

To quote Harris "Then Affix-hopping would kick in, leapingfrogging, the *-ing* over the *skateboard*, and the (distributionally correct) 4b was the result. What's the

big deal? Well, the phrase structure rules generate *is* and *-ing* side-by-side, capturing the fact that they serve as a unit to signal progressive aspect, and Affix-hopping redistributes that unit, capturing the fact that they don't in fact occur side-by-side in peoples speech" (p. 44). Harris then goes on to explain why we should care about the Affix-hopping stratagem. Harris often, however, shows enthusiasm about similar formulations which he reports later as having fatal flaws, or in general simply fall out of favor.

The same chapter concludes with a narrative of the rise of Chomsky from relative obscurity, and his dispatching of the Bloomfieldians, starting with Chomsky's and Halle's attack on Bloomfield's phoneme, with his later help coming from younger followers. The tone and method of the exchange between Chomsky and his former students would in time reflect both Chomsky's, and their, earlier attacks on the traditional Bloomfieldian positions. As relayed by Harris these seem to have been: arguing to a point other than that raised; dismissing an argument out of hand as absurd or ridiculous; distorting or misconstruing an argument until it was no longer recognizable; making near personal attacks and damning with faint praise and all seemed to follow from some tradition in academic rhetoric. These were the same techniques used by Paul Postal and George Lakoff, among others, who were enthusiastically involved in effectively silencing the Bloomfieldians. Chomsky's (1959) earlier review of Skinner's *Verbal Behavior* (1957) shows much of the style to follow, and was labeled ungenerous by even the mildest of comments. Harris calls the review a *skinning* (on pages 58 - 59 referring to an earlier St. George and the dragon metaphor by Jerome Bruner recounted on page 55), a *bludgeoning*, a *tanning* (both page 58) and even a *keel-hauling*, for a refreshing switch in metaphors. Although it might have been a portent of things to come, the review of Skinner's *Verbal Behavior* was not all that badly received by the Bloomfieldians who may have considered him a *poacher* (Harris's word) on their turf. Nor were

Chomsky's polemics that far removed from the Bloomfieldians' own. Harris relates the content of one retort to the linguist Householder, but describes the retorted-to-article by Householder as essentially *nasty*.

Harris does not supply many extended examples from these earlier battles, including Chomsky's review of Skinner. A good illustration might be found in one counter attack on a Bloomfieldian by George Lakoff (1969). Probably penned while still on good terms with Chomsky, it was a rejoinder to Hockett's (1968) *The State of the Art* and was somewhat provocatively titled *Empiricism without facts*. Charles Hockett had used a careful syllogism to severely wound one of Chomsky's main premises. Chomsky's claim to be as much mathematician as linguist made it seem appropriate. It had been enough that even Lyons (1977) had pronounced Hockett's critique devastating (but apparently not fatal). Lakoff's (1969) rejoinder to Hockett revealed very little of Hockett's original thesis, instead attempting to discredit it on entirely other grounds without discussing any of its substance; that what Hockett should have done was to muster counter arguments to TG from his impressive knowledge of languages, and that his failure to do that was tantamount to forfeiting the argument. Lakoff's entire challenge to Hockett's thesis is very reminiscent of Chomsky's (1959) attack on *Verbal Behavior*, in which he proceeds to say what Skinner *should* have been concerned with (Chomsky, 1959, p. 27). However, Lakoff's tone more matched that of Hockett, which was mild. Harris's favorite term to describe Chomsky's attacks on others is "dismissive." There are abundant examples of this in the review of *Verbal Behavior*. Chomsky ridicules stimulus control as "a retreat to mentalistic psychology" in one place (p. 32) and simply misrepresents the context of Skinner's somewhat casual use of terms like reinforcement and stimulus control. His misconstruction of Skinner's well illustrated use of "frames" allows Chomsky to present grammatical frames having in common only inflectional endings in a cer-

tain order; not at all related to Skinner's *man hungry* example and its ensuing illustration (Chomsky, 1959, p. 54). As Harris indicates in at least one place the review was probably instrumental in Chomsky's subsequent career. Harris gives an example of a response by Chomsky to a critic which Harris labels a "typical dismissal." An excerpt may give the tenor of the comment: "The cited remark is just one illustration of his complete lack of comprehension of the goals, concerns, and specific content of the work he was discussing, and...is based on such gross misrepresentations of this work that comment is hardly called for" (Harris, p. 143).

In Chapter 4 (*The beauty of deep structure*) the later technical embellishments of the *Aspects of Syntax* model (Chomsky, 1955) are detailed. The issue of intuitive judgments of *grammaticality* returns and is clearly central to much of the ensuing controversies which evolve. Originally Chomsky proposed that such judgments were to be made only on "clear cases" (Chomsky, 1957, p. 4) such as, we might suppose, "The house can will be built" cited by Lyons (1977). That promise appeared to be abandoned quite early and Chomsky, and others influenced by him, made many apparently quite arbitrary judgments of acceptability. These were sometimes contested by other linguists. One fairly early indication, not covered by Harris, of just how arbitrary such judgments were was supplied by Labov (Brown, 1973, quotes him at length). Labov, a linguist engaged in describing black ghetto speech, ended with these telling words. "One can see examples of this problem at any linguistic meeting, where paper after paper will cite crucial data as acceptable or unacceptable without obtaining agreement from the audience" (p. 387) As Harris recounts, Anna Hatcher, a Bloomfieldian, opposed a Chomsky statement that "The verb *perform* cannot be used with mass-word objects; one can perform a *task*, but one cannot *perform labor*", to which Hatcher countered with *perform magic* (p. 97). Indeed, the reader may not object to the original *perform labor*,

depending on local usage. But on such, and apparently slim, basis a whole generation of linguists became engaged and apparently the objectors were, at least figuratively, "shouted down" in exchanges in the literature. The adherents to Chomsky's position came from the younger generation; sentences and phrases which they said *cannot* belong to the English language became the ordinance in both Chomsky's rise to power in linguistics and later in the internecine warfare within and about MIT.

An example of the nature of the intuitive judgments being made is seen in the two contrasting sentences: "Everyone speaks two languages on Cormorant Island" and "Two languages are spoken by everyone on Cormorant Island." Reading the two sentences was said by Chomsky to lead to two possible interpretations for the first sentence and not the other and this in turn violated the rule that transformations should not change meaning. This early contention lead to one of several patches to Chomsky's grammar known formally as the Katz-Postal hypothesis (Harris, p. 87, 100, 144). Katz and Postal apparently felt that the two sentences, if they were ambiguous, were ambiguous in the same way, and further were the product of performance factors and outside the bounds of a formal analysis as Chomsky had defined it (Harris, p. 100). The subsequent rejection of the Katz-Postal hypothesis by Chomsky was among the earliest apparent differences between he and Postal (Katz apparently remained somewhat above the fray). The casual reader may not be able to discern in which of the two sentences Chomsky encountered two meanings, or whether both do, or neither. The highly idiosyncratic and subjective quality of such judgments becomes apparent in these examples. Apparently, neither altered vocal stresses used in speaking the two sentences nor linguists' prior knowledge of the languages spoken by the well studied Cormorant Islanders was considered to have influenced the analysis. The combination of a strong intuitive license, the arbitrary exclusion of anything deemed to be "performance data," and Chomsky's

idealization argument would seem to make almost any proposal immune from criticism and certainly remote from actual language behaviors.

Harris in attempting to detail what he considers the major technological changes presents a number of terms which found favor in the various modifications or evolutions of Chomsky's grammar. Some major players seem to be *phrase structure rules*, *transformation rules*, *lexical insertion*, *deep structure* and *surface structure* along with "arcane theory-internal devices" (p. 94) like *triggers* and *empty categories*. Some of these had changed between the two major Chomsky statements, referred to in the book as *Syntactic Structures* (Chomsky, 1957) and *Aspects* (Chomsky, 1965). The major changes according to Harris were: "New components and new rule types...taking over jobs previously done by either phrase structure rules or transformations, some...completely new tasks. There was a lexicon, which catalogued the words. The lexicon included some new devices, like subcategorization rules and the building of complex symbols. Lexical insertion rules...take over a job...that was previously handled by phrase structure rules. And a semantic component...with its semantic interpretation rules" (p. 93). Similar terms and reactions to them are seen in the remainder of the chapter. At the end of the chapter Harris proclaimed the *Aspects* model as elegant; "It linked sound and meaning. It represented knowledge of language. It housed the beautiful deep structure. But it leaked" (p. 100).

The preceding chapters are prelude to the eventual topic of the book: the wars within the Chomsky movement. The wars, were always wars of words which resulted from the efforts of some of Chomsky's students and former students to fix features of the *Aspects of Syntax* model (Chomsky, 1965) and later called the standard model. While Chomsky was distracted by his political advocacy or for other reasons away from MIT, the Generative Semanticists attempted to fill the gap. When Chomsky returned in 1967 from a sabbatical at

Berkeley, several proposed changes to the *Aspects* model had been widely circulated. Through a subsequent series of lectures Chomsky was seen to be directly undermining these efforts, including the originally accepted Katz-Postal hypothesis. This led to classroom confrontations and underground efforts (mimeograph) at retort.

George Lakoff seems to have been the clearest leader in the internal war which erupted in approximately 1967. As detailed by Harris (pp. 152-153), Lakoff (as a junior lecturer) confronted Chomsky in Chomsky's own lectures with insistent interruptions and exceptions while Paul Postal, and James McCawley seem to turn to parody and written polemics in both privately circulated memos and professional papers. From Harris's account the type of near dissembling became a common characteristic of the Chomsky wanabees that had been characteristic of Chomsky's own attacks on other positions. In time it became the theme of mutual sallies between Noam Chomsky and the group consisting of George Lakoff, Paul Postal, James McCawley, John Ross (Raj), Robin Lakoff et al., as the latter group began to revise critical portions of TG under the title of *generative semantics*. In the exchanges, George Lakoff is seen in the book to complain of just the sort of unfairness on Chomsky's part that he had emulated in his review of Hockett, discussed here earlier. Allied with Chomsky in the ensuing wars was Ray Jackendoff (principal proponent of X-bar notation) and the still younger, up-and-coming linguists and students.

To appreciate the battle lines drawn it is necessary to examine briefly the tenets which are shared by both camps, and the differences that arose. Probably both sides in the controversy would subscribe (more or less) to Harris' characterization of Chomsky's position:

A generative grammar is a formal mechanism which generates structural descriptions of the sentences in a language, in the mathematical sense of *generate*. A generative grammar is a collection of rules which define the sounds, words, phrases, and sentences in the same way that geometry is a collection of rules which define circles and squares. (p. 32)

The object is to confine the analysis to the sentence itself-without reference to any human behavior, or context, however formulated. For Chomsky it was a problem in logic and syntax. *Meaning*, the eternal enigma to legions of compositionists, literary critics, language teachers, historians, English experts, lexicographers and the like, was to be generated from this code. Many of the above were originally attracted to the Chomsky camp because of his promise to restore meaning to American linguistics, and for their apparent misinterpretation of *grammaticality*, both of which the Bloomfieldians had removed from consideration. According to Harris: "Chomsky was a dream come true for them. He starts with the sentence...he promises to help crack meaning; and he embraces the traditional grammars on the English professors' shelves. He found a ready market" (p. 75).

It is easy to contrast the Chomsky program to Skinner's (1957) aim to disentangle verbal behavior from logic. Skinner's view, which is the antithesis of both linguistics and philosophy, was to regard syntax as incidental to the behavior of speaking, reading and writing, as a sort of editing with intraverbals and minimal tacts serving autoclitic functions. In this view the historical evolution and emergence of a grammar might be likened to the clustering or bunching of autos in highway traffic which is successfully described by two factors: the number of cars per lane of traffic, and the fact that cars don't drive at uniform speeds. For the individual speaker Skinner saw some of what we call grammar as a problem of composition with the remainder being standard responses, functional units and reactions to common thematic, formal and intraverbal sources. Sentences displayed by linguists and others as examples of grammatical logic, Skinner did not consider to be composition in as much as "Formal evidence alone will not show whether sentences have been composed. Memorized sentences emitted as purely intraverbal sequences, sentences reproduced as echoic or textual behavior, or the blends of a few key responses with

stock patterns are not composed in this sense" (Skinner, 1957, p. 346). The key for Skinner was what he called autoclitic behavior, the behavior of adding tags and ordering of the raw thematic material, for the effect it has on the audience. When Chomsky (1959, p. 53) complains of Skinner's autoclitic use of "all" as modifying, not swans, but the entire sentence "Swans are white" he was attacking it for its formal logical properties; its effect on the listener would be clearly extra sentential (outside the sentence) and not within the realm of his formal analysis. Meaning also had no place for Skinner as a separate entity; the traditional term usage and the behavioral designation of stimulus control would easily replace it in practice.

To return to Harris' narrative, it was the major basis of contention between the two contending camps whether meaning (thus semantics) or syntax was the prime generator in generative grammars. Somewhat complicating the matter is the impossibility of disentangling the two; syntax, at least for Chomsky, is often dependent on the definition of word classes (nouns, verbs, etc.) for which syntax provides the arrangement; but these same word classes understandably are also seen by others as being part of the meaning (semantics) of the term or terms. Chomsky was adamant that the underlying syntax alone dictate the meaning, and everything else about the sentence. For Chomsky, syntax was pure logic and to borrow a phrase from Pinker (1994, p. 124) "colorless, odorless and tasteless."

The Generative Semanticists for their part were willing to make meaning the prime generator. For this reason a number of the Chomsky supporters from the composition ranks who "fret passionately about meaning" (p. 75), shifted their allegiance to the upstarts. The major ammunition in the war, to further the author's metaphor, were sentences concocted to confound the other side's best mechanisms. Shifting, imprecise terminologies, and everywhere intuitive judgments, were common to both sides.

A fitting conclusion might be that it would be unfair to see the Lakoff or vari-

ous Chomsky arguments and counter-arguments as especially deceitful within that particular tradition. The lesson seems to be that where the correctives of empirical data are absent, and where only consensus reigns, there are no final judgments except through the opprobrium or approbation the largest and loudest audience. This apparently is the theme throughout the nearly ten years of war with insiders and outsiders; a precise chronology is hard to come by in Harris' account. One thinks of the Oxford rules of debate sometimes characterized as "no kidnapping of opponent's close family members" or to the disputations of the middle ages where the quality of the fruit thrown was an indication of victory or defeat. This type of academic confrontation seems to have had a long, if not entirely felicitous, history. Harris attempts to defend some of the vituperation by saying that science has always contained personal attacks (p. 160).

One of Chomsky's few public references to his contentions with the generative semanticists occurs in *Language and responsibility* (Chomsky, 1977):

The situation grew even worse...when generative semanticists began to incorporate non-linguistic factors into grammar: belief, attitudes, etc. That amounts to a rejection of the initial idealization of language, as an object of study. A priori, such a rule cannot be ruled out, but it must be empirically motivated. If it proves to be correct, I would conclude that language is a chaos that is not worth studying. (pp. 152-153)

As the war came to a conclusion by Harris' account Chomsky could claim victory. By persuasion, or by his position in the field, one by one the opposition left the battle field and went to other pursuits, concocting yet other grammars. Chomsky, for his part continued to revise his own position, apparently to the present time. Harris implies that this left many disaffected, especially from other fields, and Chomsky's ties now are less with psychology, linguistics and the like, but with philosophy. A final Harris quotation may be of use here:

From *Syntactic Structures*, Chomsky moved to the standard theory, to the extended standard theory (which...became known as the revised extended standard theory), to government-bind-

ing theory...that has been giving way in recent work to the principles and parameters theory, and now...talk about a "minimalist program." Nor is the welter of names asymptomatic. The number of technical proposals and conceptual shifts outweighs the number of designations...substantially, and the personnel of the models has seen a rather constant turnover. Indeed, as we go to press, the work coming out of MIT...suggests another quite dramatic shift, and...toward some of the driving ideas of generative semantics. D(eep)-structure seems finally to be following phlogiston and ether and the dodo into oblivion; S(urface)-Structure too (p. 258)

A much earlier linguist, Edward Sapir, has been credited with the statement that "all grammars leak." Harris uses this as his most repeated (peaceful) metaphor. First he sees the Bloomfieldians Trager and Smith as having produced a complete statement of grammar which was "beautiful," but then found to "leak." Harris also tries to retrace the TG linguists' early attempts to modify versions of the TG theory. Each new modification which fixed some previous flaw, seemed on further reflection, to cause Harris, after pronouncing the result beautiful, to say "but it leaked" (cf. p. 100), and again for Generative Semantics (p. 134). For the non-linguist the multiple changes seem to be analogous to patching a boat by taking the material from somewhere else in the boat, which then develops a leak of its own. Although not labeled as patches by Harris, the Katz-Postal Hypothesis, X-bar theory and especially Trace Theory are most easily seen in that role, along with a score, or perhaps hundreds of lesser known propositions, generated by the competing linguists.

Speaking of no particular group, but perhaps all, Dewight Bolinger is quoted as saying of linguistic terminology: "One sign of immaturity [in a science] is the endless flow of terminology. The critical reader begins to wonder if some strange naming taboo attaches to the terms that a linguist uses, whereby when he dies they must be buried with him." Bolinger and Sears (1981, p. 554) as quoted by David Crystal (1985).

Stylistically, Harris' book is breezy, easy to read if you are not too concerned about immediately apprehending details. The explanations of various theoretical points,

like those discussing the evolution of the various models are too brief, and at times too unconvincing to help much. Harris even cautions about the vagueness of several proposals as he discusses them. The reader will encounter more terms used in recent linguistics than are useful but the only explanation you may receive for some will be in the form of clever but ever-changing metaphors and the same is partially true of events. Even armed with a current dictionary devoted to linguistics and phonology the Harris book is rough going. The author tries to smooth the way with metaphors and analogies, but the frequently changing terminology and conceptual issues remain difficult for the nonlinguist, and perhaps for the linguist as well. In order to make the whole subject entertaining to the reader Harris resorts a bit too often to hyperbole. In addition the book is necessarily burdened with what linguists consider crucial technical language for which there is little firm definition. Since the book is the result of many interviews, thus many voices, it is not always clear whose viewpoint is being expressed. When he says that Chomsky always expressed a certain view and gives the reason, the argument is often clearly that of Chomsky himself. On the other hand, Harris might often express a contrary view when recounting an interview with George Lakoff or Paul Postal, but may not always identify clearly the source or that the view is not his own (until much later). Nevertheless the book represents a momentous effort and will probably find its place in the history of the field of linguistics.

The chapter notes, deferred until the end of the book (p. 261 ff.) and the references should reward diligence for someone who is intent on pursuing them further. The notes sometimes are more interesting, and perhaps, enlightening reading than the text itself. They appear to be written in a more purely descriptive style and supply added information of the interviews. You can't, even from an informal reading, fail to learn something about the history of linguistics from this book, even if only the names of

the major players. Toward the end of the regular narration you will find that there are still more contenders for the grammar to end all grammars: stratification grammar, tagametics, case grammars (several varieties), and relative newcomers: relational grammar, Montague grammar and cognitive grammar. And there are more – one can only wonder if there is any way to end the debates, the recasting of terms. One would like to hope that the generative grammarians of whatever stripe have exhausted the possibilities. But no. From the title and introduction of a book by James D. McCawley (1982), it seems that controversies such as these might be fueled for at least another thousand years. His title: *Thirty million theories of grammar* and the words: "I deal here with easily forty issues, each of which admits at least two possible positions, and I doubt that weeding out the inconsistent, incoherent, or blatantly false combinations of positions would reduce the number of combinations by a factor of more than a few powers of 2," and so on.

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