THE LANGUAGE OF ACTION: A REVIEW OF SCHAFER'S
A NEW LANGUAGE FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS¹

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A colleague prompted my reading of R. Schafer's book *A New Language for Psychoanalysis* (1976), which, as the title suggests, is about linguistic revision in psychoanalysis. Without prompting, I would have overlooked this book. I think most other behavior analysts would have overlooked it too. True, we show some interest in linguistic revision in our own discipline (e.g., Deitz, 1986; Deitz & Arrington, 1983, 1984; Himeline, 1980; Lee, 1981, 1986), and that terminological and conceptual interest might prompt some of us to consider Schafer's work. But many of us would probably assume that linguistic revision in psychoanalysis amounts only to renaming the hypothetical constructs of psychoanalysis. Those constructs are, of course, the kinds of theoretical entities that the radical behaviorists among us categorically reject. I am pleased to report that Schafer's recommendations are more radical than I (and perhaps most of us) might have expected.

Why should recommendations for linguistic revision in psychoanalysis interest behavior analysts? I believe they should interest us because they concern a problem that Skinner and other behavior analysts have long struggled with. The problem is that of shifting how we talk and think about psychological matters from nouns and things ("intelligence," "creativity," "memory," etc.) to verbs and events ("reading a book," "typing a letter," "spelling a word," etc.). Given that we share this linguistic problem with Schafer, it should distress us that Schafer does not cite Skinner at all. Worse than that, behaviorism (in the generic sense) is given bad press in Schafer's book. If only on these grounds, the book warrants a behavior analytic review. We must emphasize that Schafer's recommendations are similar to those

that radical behaviorists have made about psychological language. At the very least, it can do no harm to set the record straight, by acknowledging that Schafer's recommendations have more in common with radical behaviorism than a naive reader of Schafer's book might otherwise suppose.

A Starting Point

Let us begin by noting that Skinner and Schafer agree on the starting point for psychological inquiry. They both insist that arguments about human conduct must begin in ordinary or conventional categories, or categories available before systematic inquiry has begun. In explicitly acknowledging the ordinary origins of psychological thinking, both Schafer and Skinner depart from traditional practice in psychology. That practice amounts to borrowing ordinary categories without acknowledging the origin of these categories and without subjecting them to sustained scrutiny. Many critics (e.g., Madison, 1969; Midgley, 1978, p. xvi; Peters, 1960, p. 50) have deplored this practice. Departing from it, Schafer explicitly accepts ordinary categories as his starting point, and, further, he takes a critical stance with respect to them. In taking this stance, Schafer runs the same risk as Skinner does of inviting critics to believe that he wishes to construct an entirely new language. Schafer does want to construct a new language for psychoanalysis, but this new language is meant to emerge out of linguistic categories that are already available. Schafer has in common with Skinner, then, not that he dismisses ordinary categories, but rather that he deplores the uncritical acceptance of ordinary or vernacular categories that characterizes much of psychological inquiry.

Let us turn now to Schafer's action language. Verbs are the foundation of this language. Schafer's account includes verbs designating concrete actions ("writing a letter," "drinking a cup of coffee," etc.). Because these verbs designate the events of immediate inter-

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est to behavior analysts, we should feel comfortable with Schafer's proposal to this point. That is, we can readily accept a language that lets us talk about children looking at their audience while speaking, about adults arriving on time for work, and so on. Schafer also includes the verbs that Givón (1979, p. 337) has called "verbs of consciousness" ("knowing," "thinking," "wanting," "intending," etc.). We can feel comfortable about using verbs that designate concrete actions, but we might want to raise questions about using verbs of consciousness, as I will note later.

In addition to verbs, Schafer includes adverbs in his action language. He uses them to state the mode of an action. So, we can talk about people acting carefully, confidently, consciously, and so on. Schafer's action language, then, is based on a verb-adverb format. It lets us talk about a person cautiously turning a corner, enthusiastically telling listeners about a movie, working efficiently, and so on. The whole thing is admirably concrete and practical, even if consistent and fluent usage of such a mode of talking is doubtless more difficult than it might seem to be when first encountered.

Verbs and adverbs are the only parts of our ordinary psychological vocabulary that Schafer accepts. He does not accept the psychological nouns ("memory," "personality," "mind," "knowledge," etc.). On the contrary, he explicitly excludes these words. As I will argue later, Schafer's exclusion of psychological nouns is important. We can see this exclusion, along with consistent use of the verb-adverb format, as a foundation upon which we might develop a truly behavioral mode of talking and thinking about psychological matters. Having said that, I will now discuss action language in more detail, under three headings corresponding to the parts of ordinary language with which Schafer is concerned, namely, nouns, adverbs, and verbs.

Nouns

Schafer's verb-adverb format has an interesting consequence for how we talk and think about people. Most centrally, using the verb-adverb format does not let us talk about what a person *has* (intelligence, presence of mind, a reservoir of anger, etc.) or about what a person *is* (intelligent, happy, depressed, etc.). We cannot talk in those ways if we do not use the

psychological nouns (and correlated adjectives). That is, eliminating the psychological nouns eliminates some of the questions that we might otherwise raise about psychological matters. Further, it eliminates the organocentric myth that has long plagued psychology, the myth that Ryle (1949/1966), Malcolm (1970, 1971), Kantor (e.g., 1947, 1968), Skinner (e.g., 1938, pp. 3–5, 1977), and Dewey (e.g., 1930), among others, have fought against. This myth locates psychological phenomena inside the organism and legitimizes our questions about what a person *has* or *is*. In contrast, using only verbs and adverbs lets us talk only about what a person does or does not do and about how he or she does or does not do it. The verb-adverb format leads us to talk and to think about acting or doing and about nothing else.

Regrettably, Schafer does not exclude all the nouns but instead insists that we must give purposes, intentions, and meanings a central place. That is, he retains "purpose," "intention," and "meaning" while rejecting other psychological nouns such as "anger," "timidity," and "consciousness." This inconsistency weakens Schafer's argument, for he could still have included the behavioral substance of "purpose," "intention," and "meaning" by using the verb-adverb format and by saying that people act purposefully, intentionally, and meaningfully. That alternative would accomplish an aim that doubtless gave rise to Schafer's inconsistency. Schafer's usage was presumably to emphasize that he wants to deal with action (i.e., conduct or socially important performance) rather than with motor output (i.e., physical movement). Such an emphasis is necessary given that efforts to exclude the psychological nouns are often misconstrued by critics of behaviorism as attempts to physicalize the subject matter of psychology.

Schafer's exclusion of most psychological nouns makes his argument seem different from Skinner's. After all, Skinner continues to use the psychological nouns, giving them a behavioral interpretation. This difference between Skinner and Schafer is only apparent, however, as I can clarify by noting why Schafer rejects the psychological nouns.

Schafer excludes the psychological nouns because they too easily distract us from action. They let us base our psychology on the unspoken assumption that "anger," "depres-

sion," and the like designate items separate from action. That is, we end up thinking about anger, depression, and the like as if they are behind action (rather than *of* it) and, what is more, as if they have causal properties with respect to action. Conventional psychology rejects actions as mere behavior and insists that psychology is properly about memory, language, cognition, emotion, and the like. These entities are conceptualized as characteristics of the organism that are manifested in its behavior. This, of course, is the aspect of conventional psychology that radical behaviorists criticize most directly.

Schafer categorically rejects the notion of a conceptual nervous system implicit in such entities, as of course does Skinner. Schafer further insists, rightly, that our bodies contain only neural structures, glands, muscles, and the like. He insists that our bodies as bodies do not contain memory, intelligence, personality, anger, and so on. Thus he rejects the organocentric referents of the psychological nouns, and he rejects the traditional attribution of causality to organocentric entities. Like behavior analysts, he rightly insists that statements attributing action to mind, personality, and the like have only the appearance of causal statements, because they only redescribe the observed events in a less well-specified manner. However tenuous their explanatory status, causal relations are implicit in such statements, and Schafer suggests that, in this way, mechanistic thinking gets adopted by serious investigators. We might say in response "how like Skinner," and, again, rightly so.

To many people, a psychology that does not let us talk about "memory," "imagination," "cognition," and the like must exclude much of what is interesting and important in human conduct and experience. In my experience, most listeners resist any attempt to question, let alone to exclude, the psychological nouns. It seems evident to them that psychology is properly about memory, creativity, cognition, and the like. But Schafer makes clear that he does not intend to exclude the interesting and important events that inhabit the psychological domain. On the contrary, he wants us to see that domain more clearly, by eliminating the puzzles bequeathed by the common misuse of psychological nouns. That is, Schafer wants to exclude only the nouns and not the aspects of conduct that they have traditionally designated

by retaining the verbal and adverbial equivalents that more effectively capture these aspects of action.

The commitment to dealing with complex aspects of conduct is also apparent in Skinner's comments about the psychological nouns. For example, "memory" has to do with acting appropriately with respect to past events (Skinner, 1969, p. 4), "mind" is often a synonym of "behavior" (Skinner, 1977), "purpose" and "intention" point to the field of operant behavior (e.g., Skinner, 1974, p. 55), and so on. Consistent with these comments, it seems clear to some writers (e.g., Deitz, 1986; Lee, 1986) that ordinary use of the psychological nouns is behavioral, in that when we use psychological nouns, we talk about action or behavior-in-context and about nothing else. Seen this way, Skinner's translations of the psychological nouns, no matter how incomplete, point to the aspects of conduct that these nouns designate. Skinner's strategy does seem different from Schafer's, then, but only because Skinner retains the nouns. In the end, both positions focus our attention on action, and both let us acknowledge the full complexity of the domain captured, however elusively, by the ways we use the psychological nouns.

Even so, we might do well to reconsider Skinner's practice of translating and thereby retaining and using some psychological nouns. That is, we might do better to frame our statements about conduct exclusively in the verb-adverb format. Relevant to this, Schafer points out that not using the nouns changes the kinds of questions we ask. For example, instead of asking what love is, what it does, what effect it has, and so on, we ask how one acts to love or how one acts lovingly and about the implications and consequences of this mode of action. Similarly, instead of asking what fear is, we ask how one acts to fear or how one acts fearfully. The same can be said of our questions about "intelligence," "cognition," "consciousness," "happiness," and so forth. The force of such words is verbal (to fear, to love, etc.) or adverbial (to act knowingly, to act consciously, to act happily, and so on). In changing the form of our questions, we do not exclude the actual events of human action. But we do implicitly insist that there is no grief apart from grieving acts and grieving modes of acting, no intelligence apart from intelligent modes of acting, no anxiety apart from anxious modes

of acting, and so on. We avoid the puzzles brought about by uncritically accepting the psychological nouns as the names of organocentric things.

Schafer's translations are liberating, if only because expressions based on the psychological nouns too easily suggest that we are passive objects at the mercy of forces that control us from within. We tacitly accept this mechanistic view when we talk in ways that attribute agent-like (i.e., causal) properties to "mind," "memory," "ideas," "knowledge," and the like. We say that "ideas come to mind," "slip the mind," "are brought to mind," and so on, that "our mind plays tricks on us," that "happiness comes and goes," that "our memory fails us," "works well," and so on. Of course, only people come and go, work, fail us, and so on. At a theoretical level, the grammatical idioms, as Deitz (1986) has called them, need not present problems if we specifically exclude organocentric interpretations of them from our systematic psychological inquiries. But at a personal level, they do seem to present problems. We often let ourselves become trapped by the bad mood of the moment, by our failing memories, by our never-lifting depressions, and so on. We become trapped by characterizing our own circumstances in terms of what we have and what we are, or, better, by what we and others *say* we have and are. An emphasis on acting and on verbal and adverbial translations of the psychological nouns is one step toward freeing us from this trap.

Adverbs

Schafer considers whether he might restrict action language to verbs, but rejects this possibility and explains that the adverbs indicate additional behavior. For example, when we act happily, the act qualified by the adverb is accompanied by certain collateral behavior, including smiling, laughing, speaking favorably about things, and so on. Similarly, when we act angrily, we engage in certain collateral behavior, which might include tensing our muscles, clenching our teeth, hitting, thinking of attack, and so on. Including the adverbs lets Schafer substitute an action language for "suspicion," "sadness," "misery," "depression," "anxiety," and so forth. He talks about acting suspiciously, sadly, miserably, depressively, anxiously, and so on, directing our attention

to modes of acting and away from entities apparently separate from behavior.

As I said before, Schafer's argument is liberating. Instead of asking how my colleagues manage to be so cheerful, for example, I might observe and list the collateral behavior that accompanies their talking, walking, looking, and so on, and that occasions my saying that my colleagues are cheerful people. I might check whether other members of my verbal community agree substantially on my discrimination of cheerful from noncheerful acting. I might then practice acting in a cheerful way myself, and I might teach others to do so too. Further, I might explore whether acting in this way makes a difference in terms of its tangible and emotional effects. In all of this, the emphasis is on acting (i.e., on doing something), on varying what is done, and on systematically exploring the effects of acting in various different ways. Of course, in a psychology concerned with what people *have* (intelligence, personality, emotion, etc.) and with what people *are* (learning disabled, retarded, psychotic, gifted, etc.), this active approach would make no sense. It would seem more like practice (therapy, teaching, etc.) than like psychology. Both to Schafer, the psychoanalyst, and to Skinner, the behavior analyst, a psychology that views action as mere symptom is a psychology that needs radical revision. The revision amounts to the shift in emphasis I mentioned before, away from nouns and organocentric things toward verbs and contextualized events.

Before leaving this discussion of adverbs, we should note that Schafer does not assume that we are necessarily conscious of what we are doing. Rather, he insists that "consciously" is a mode of doing things and that acts can be performed consciously, unconsciously, or pre-consciously. It is possible to act without consciously doing so, in that acting consciously has to do with the mode of acting and not with acting as such. This rejection of the common assumption that consciousness is an intrinsic property of acting makes Schafer's view compatible with Skinner's. As is well-known, from Skinner's point of view, behaving-with-results need not be preceded, accompanied, or followed by stating what one will do, is doing, or has been doing. A basic concern in behavior analysis is with whether subjects and clients

act at all and to what end. Whether they act consciously or not is a secondary matter, albeit not an unimportant one. Stated generally, then, Schafer's use of "consciously," and of other adverbs, is consistent with the acceptance by behavior analysts of behaving-with-results (i.e., acting as defined by its consequences) as the primary concern in psychological inquiry.

Verbs

Perhaps the first issue to consider in discussing Schafer's use of verbs is that the concept of action is not restricted to perceptually obvious actions such as crossing a road, writing a letter, and posting a letter. On the contrary, Schafer includes wishing, perceiving, remembering, despairing, grieving, forgetting, fantasizing, enjoying, hoping, and the like, as actions. Relevant to this, Givón (1979, p. 33) has distinguished verbs of consciousness ("wishing," "forgetting," etc.), of cognition ("knowing," "thinking," etc.), of emotion ("fearing," "hoping," etc.), and of intent ("wanting," "intending," etc.). Schafer interprets the categories described by verbs of consciousness as actions at a higher level of generality. The verb "to fear," for example, refers to an action that subsumes several concrete actions and modes of acting (e.g., fleeing, avoiding, acting timidly). In similar vein, Malcolm (1970, 1971) has insisted that "remembering," "expecting," "thinking," and the like designate collections of actions. Skinner would surely agree in that he has treated "deciding," "reasoning," "knowing," "attending," "thinking," and the like (e.g., Skinner, 1953, pp. 242-256) as words that designate constellations of behavior-in-context.

Another issue relating to verbs concerns Schafer's views about explanation. These views follow from Schafer's emphasis on acting and, thus, from the prominence he gives verbs in his action language. To Schafer, explanation is a matter of finding out what a person is doing. This account of explanation probably will seem unacceptable to those who accept the traditional assumption that actions are already well-described and that our task is to find their causes. But Schafer's approach follows a long and respectable, if minority, tradition (e.g., Hunter, 1932; Muenzinger, 1927; Walker, 1942) asserting, on the grounds that multiple descriptions are possible for any item of be-

havior, that psychological description is not easily given. A person reading a book might be studying, doing homework, complying with parental instructions, and so on. Schafer gave this example, but similar examples are scattered through the literature of psychology and philosophy (e.g., Best, 1978; McFall, 1982; McKearney, 1977). The potential membership of an item of conduct in more than one class sets the first task of psychological description. To Schafer, that task is to make human acts intelligible by identifying their implications, interrelations, and consequences; that is, by locating them within a network of actions.

Schafer's argument about psychological explanation is consistent with behavior analysis, at least as it is done in the field or clinic. First, the notion that one act might participate in more than one class of behavior is familiar to behavior analysts. Ferster (e.g., 1965, 1981) and Goldiamond (e.g., Goldiamond, 1974; Goldiamond, Dyrud, & Miller, 1965) have discussed it, and the point is of course made in *Verbal Behavior* (Skinner, 1957), with the example of one form (e.g., "fire") that can participate in the echoic relation on one occasion, in the tact relation on another, and so on. Second, the task of finding out what a person is doing is the task of giving a behavioral interpretation. Skinner (e.g., 1974, pp. 228-229) has explained that a behavioral interpretation is a guess about the relevant contingencies in a particular case. A contingency is a work requirement, so an interpretation is a guess about what a person is getting done through bodily effort. Goldiamond (e.g., 1974, 1984) has provided many examples of behavioral interpretation in clinical settings, and Carr and Durand (1985) have offered a behavioral interpretation of children's misconduct based on experimental findings. As is evident in these reports, tantruming, scratching oneself, staying in bed all day, and other diverse acts might in some cases amount to the single act of seeking attention. In other cases, they might amount to the act of terminating the demands of other people, and so on. Goldiamond's approach requires therapists to identify the function of the behavior at issue (which act is it? what is the critical result? what is the relevant contingency?) and to establish less costly ways of acting that will produce the same critical re-

sult. In all of this, behavior analysts pursue an approach to therapy consistent with Schafer's emphasis on the importance of finding out what a person is doing.

Another issue arises in relation to the verbs of action language, that being the matter discussed by many psychologists in terms of whether the organism is active or passive. Although Schafer does not address this issue directly, his comments about passivity emphasize that acts are activities that people do and not events that happen to people. In making this point, Schafer is not entering into the debate about the passive versus the active organism noted above. When discussing passivity, Schafer seems to be criticizing the personal trap I mentioned earlier of falling victim to pseudo-explanations of "depression," "failing memory," and the like. Schafer comments that we find it difficult to disregard these pseudo-explanations and to see ourselves as actors or doers. The man who interrupts himself while talking might not see interrupting as something he does; the woman who forgets the shopping list might not see taking the shopping list as something she did not do; and so on. Instead, we too easily see ourselves as victims of fear, memory lapses, and the like. Schafer wants us to see acting and not-acting for what they are, and he wants us to reject ways of thinking that too often leave us victims of hypothetical internal forces.

A related matter is Schafer's emphasis on the notion of human agency. Many behavior analysts are likely to reject this notion because it suggests the organocentric control of behavior. But I do not believe that organocentric control is what Schafer intends to imply. He explicitly rejects the notion of an agent inside an agent, a ghost in the machine, or a mastermind working the mechanism. He rejects the dualism that locates mind organocentrically and that gives it causal properties in relation to the motor output of the body. This rejection of dualism is consistent with his rejection of psychological nouns. That is, from this perspective, we can see dualism as a myth embodied in our uncritical acceptance of the ways in which the psychological nouns let us talk about human beings. Schafer's emphasis upon human agency, then, is his emphasis upon acting or doing, nothing more. It amounts to recognizing that every psychological proposition has a subject ("*John* ran to the shops,"

etc.) and that the subject is the doer, actor, or agent of the action. In short, Schafer seems to mean no more by "agent" than Skinner means when he talks about the behavior, the speaker, the listener, the artist, and so on, as a locus of behavior.

Schafer stresses that his emphasis on the human being as agent lets him contrast a psychology of action with two other ways of conceptualizing what a person is. The first alternative formulation sees a person as an organism that reacts to external and internal forces. The second sees the person as governed by the thoughts, feelings, inner conflicts, and so on of an organocentric mind. Behavior analysis has more in common with Schafer's formulation than with these two other views. In saying this, I realize that many of us have conceptualized persons as organisms whose behavior is shaped by the environment, with "environment" covering variables inside and outside the skin. This latter formulation suggests that we see a person in one of the two ways that Schafer rejects. But I believe we should see this latter formulation as an approximation of something that better captures what we do and that identifies behavior analysis as a psychology of action. Let me explain briefly what I mean.

Emphasizing the two-term contingency as our most basic unit gives us a psychology of action, and thus of persons rather than of organisms, as I have argued elsewhere (e.g., Lee, 1983). This contingency-oriented psychology emphasizes doing in Schafer's sense of acting upon the world, as is evident from the central place given to the concept of operant behavior in behavior analysis. This concept, after all, encompasses the notion of an organism's acting on itself or on its surroundings with results. Seemingly in conflict with Schafer, behavior analysis also gives a central place to external control. This external control is not located in the environment in some amorphous sense of all the variables that affect the motor output of the body. Rather, it is located in contingencies, which are external in the sense that they transcend the individual organism whose behavior participates in them on any particular occasion. That is, many contingencies exist before any single individual's participation in them and persist after such participation. For example, the contingency stated "if you look in the mirror, then you will see yourself" transcends any single individual, as does the con-

tingency stated "if you submit your work late, then you will fail." These contingencies are external in the transcendent sense, even if actual, dated instances of them always involve the behavior of a particular organism on a particular occasion.

We have, then, an approach that emphasizes behaving-with-results (i.e., acting) and that at the same time accepts external control. Certainly, our approach seems to conflict with Schafer's because we accept external control. But that apparent conflict surely arises only because Schafer does not take the next step that must be taken in building a psychology of action. That step is to recognize both the ubiquity of contingencies in action and the contribution of past contingencies to current dispositions to act. External control of the kind exerted by past contingencies on current dispositions then becomes an inevitable consequence of accepting behaving-with-results as the subject matter of psychology. At least, it is an inevitable consequence of accepting behaving-with-results as the subject matter of psychology. At least, it is an inevitable consequence once we see the ubiquity of contingencies in action, the potency of contingencies as independent variables, and the possibility of rejecting the limiting assumption of contiguous causality.

Schafer's emphasis on acting is a positive departure from the organocentric emphasis that dominates most psychologies. Further, it is a positive departure from the ordinary tendency to excuse a disinclination to act by reference to hypothetical internal forces. Indeed, we can understand Schafer's emphasis on acting as a matter of prompting us to act with a respectable frequency. Such advice is likely to be useful in that a high density of acting is usually, if not always, an important precondition if contingencies are to affect performance. But an emphasis on acting, however essential, is incomplete in itself. And it is this incompleteness that will lead many behavior analysts to raise doubts about Schafer's contributions to their own concerns.

The incomplete nature of an emphasis on acting was implicit in what I said above about contingencies. For one thing, an emphasis on acting does not give an explicit place to the constraints placed on acting by past contingencies and current ecologies. Skinner gave a striking account of the constraints exerted by

past contingencies when he discussed drawing from copy. He noted that a person who does not have the relevant history cannot engage successfully in this behavior. The behavior is under the control of the copy, because of a past history of differential reinforcement with respect to copying. The behavior is not under the control of the artist but instead under the control of the past contingencies in conjunction with the current ecology (Skinner, 1953, p. 118). This latter account rejects organocentric control and reminds us that successfully prompting someone to act is limited in part by the person's existing repertoire. That is, we cannot successfully prompt a person to act unless the prompted variant or fragments of that variant are already available. Further, successful prompting is limited in the long run by the reinforcers available in the milieu. At worst, the relevant domain might not reinforce the behavior we prompt. If so, then the dispositions both to act at all and to comply with instructions to act might be weakened as much as the behavior we prompt. In short, Schafer's emphasis on acting needs to be supplemented with detailed information in each individual case about the available repertoire and about the contingencies of the relevant milieu.

Despite this, we should not minimize Schafer's contribution. His work implicitly recognizes the difficulty of freeing psychological thinking from the organocentric myth that constrains it. Further, Schafer's work identifies one strategy for dealing with this task, the strategy of improving the language of psychology. This strategy should interest behavior analysts because we, like Schafer, must convince psychologists who adhere to the organocentric myth that they are mistaken. We must convince them that the subject matter of psychology consists of nothing other than behavior-in-context. One way to do that might be to follow Schafer and further to develop a mode of talking that does not use psychological nouns and that does not at the same time impoverish the domain of psychological discourse. If we can develop and establish such a mode of talking, then we might ask other psychologists what reasons they have for persisting with a psychology that concentrates on hypothetical internal mechanisms. In short, behavior analysts might do well to accept the challenge implicit in Schafer's proposals for a new language for psychoanalysis; we might do well both to de-

velop a more extended and consistently behavioral mode of talking and thinking, and to develop ways of teaching people to use this mode of talking and thinking. The result might more effectively challenge the obfuscation brought about by the organocentric myth and its embellishments. Furthermore, it might do much to establish more concrete and more obviously humane ways of talking and thinking about the actions of human beings in matters of daily life.

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